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Abstract 
 
I defend the view that McKinsey reasoning is concerned with the following three claims: 
(i) If a subject's mental state is individuated by a given property, then she can know a 
priori that she a thought that has that property. 
(ii) Many de dicto structured cognitive predicates express properties that logically imply 
the existence of contingently existing physical objects external to the subject. 
(iii) Every de dicto structured cognitive predicate expresses a property which individuates 
the cognitive state described. 
Specifically, claims (i)-(iii) and a non-inferential principle governing the extent of our a 
priori knowledge capacities imply that a subject can know a priori that contingent objects 
external to her exist.  Cartesian reflections, semantic evidence adduced by Kripke and the 
Fregean view that cognitive verbs express mental relations between persons and 
propositions support claims (i)-(iii) respectively.  McKinsey reasoning is, thus, seemingly 
paradoxical. 
 
The dominant response is to evade or reformulate McKinsey reasoning (Brueckner, 
Boghossian, Davies, Wright, Brown).  I argue that such responses tacitly assume claim (iii), 
which encourages the replacing of claims (i)-(ii) with alternative claims involving inferential 
knowledge principles and subjects’ having a priori knowledge of thought content which is 
externally determined; this package, on my view, is defective.  I rebut suggestions that 
McKinsey reasoning is undermined by arguments for the claim it is not absurd to possess 
the capacity to know a priori that contingent external objects exist (Sawyer, Brewer), since 
they are directed at the reformulated reasoning only. 
 
I defend the view that there is sufficient evidence to both reject claim (iii) and replace it 
with an alternative claim concerning linguistic, not propositional, meaning.  My view 
dissolves the issue of whether a priori access to one’s thought contents is achievable, if 
such contents are externally determined (Burge, Flavey & Owens).  It also provides a novel 
response to a recent problem about our capacity to know our thought contents (Kallestrup 
& Pritchard). 
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Terminology 
 
Quotations are indicated by dual quotation marks and single line spacing.  For example, 
 
“Oscar can simply deduce E, using only premisses that are knowable a priori, 
including the premiss that he is thinking that water is wet. Since Oscar can deduce 
E from premisses that are knowable a priori, Oscar can know E itself a priori.” 
(1991a, p15). 
 
Sentences are indicated by single quotation marks.  For example, ‘George is five feet tall’. 
 
Sentence variables are denoted by the dollar sign $.  For example, consider the cognitive 
predicate, ‘S thinks that $’. 
 
The lowercase letter t is used a s a variable for terms. 
 
Labels for terminology, names of principles labels and the like are indicated by italics with 
abbreviations of the label in brackets.  For example, The Cognitive Predicate Assumption (CPA). 
 
Proposition variables are denoted by lowercase italicises alphabetical letters.  For example, 
the proposition that p. 
 
Propositions are denoted by italicised words, and preceded by the clause “the proposition 
that”.  For example, the proposition that Laura thinks that Gödel is cute logically implies the 
proposition that Gödel exists. 
 
Symbols for property variables are denoted by uppercase and bold type alphabetical letters.  
For example, the properties F and G. 
 
Properties are denoted by bold type.  For example, on some views the sentence ‘Laura 
thinks that George is cute’, expresses the property Laura thinks the singular proposition 
that George is cute. 
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Mental state variables are denoted by a curly bold-face letter m.  For example, Laura 
possesses mental state .  For example, Laura’s mental state is subjectively 
indistinguishable from the mental state *.   
 
Sometimes when I wish to be especially clear that I am concerned with an object I may 
underline it.  For example, the contingently existing physical object  - the man - Gödel. 
 
S is used as a variable for a subject. 
 
Formulations of principles and claims, especially when they are first introduced, are written 
up using ten point Ariel type and are preceded by a label which is written using italicised twelve 
point Garamond type.  For example, 
 
Propositional Theory of Individuation (PTI) 
All cognitive attitudes and states are individuated by their propositional contents. 
 
Arguments, outlines of arguments, outlines of reasoning are written up using ten point Ariel 
type and are preceded by a label which is written using italicised twelve point Garamond type.  
Each claim of the argument is given a reference label on the left hand side in (curly 
brackets).  The status of the claim is abbreviated in [square brackets] on its right hand side.  
The spacing between the claims is single spacing, rather than the usual one and a half line 
spacing.  For example, 
 
Simplistic Traditional McKinsey Reasoning 
 
(STMR0) The de dicto structured cognitive predicate ‘Laura thinks that George is cute’ is true 
[assumption]. 
 
(STMR1) The de dicto structured cognitive predicate ‘Laura thinks that George is cute’ 
expresses the property Laura thinks the singular proposition that George is cute [From SE 
and STMR0] 
 
(STMR2) The proposition that Laura thinks the singular proposition that George is cute logically 
implies the proposition that George exists [from SE, STMR1 and STMR0]. 
 
(STMR3) The property Laura thinks the singular proposition that George is cute 
individuates with respect to the cognitive state it describes [From CPA, STMR1 and STMR0] 
 
(STMR4) Laura can know strongly a priori that she possesses the property Laura thinks the 
singular proposition that George is cute [From PAI, STMR3]. 
 
Therefore,  
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(STMR5) Laura can know strongly a priori that George exists [from STMR2 and STMR4 and 
certain auxiliary claims to be described] 
 
But, 
 
(STMR6) Laura cannot know strongly a priori that George exists [the consequence of an 
auxiliary claim to be described] 
 
Therefore, 
 
(STMR7) Laura both can and cannot know strongly a priori that George exists [from STMR5 and 
STMR6] 
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Introduction 
 
In Chapter 1, I set up an argument which I call Traditional McKinsey Reasoning which is 
concerned with the following three theses: 
 
 Privileged Access to Individuating Factors (PAI) 
For any subject, S, if S possesses a given mental state , which is individuated by property F, 
S can know strongly a priori that she possesses F. 
 
Semantic Externalism (SE) 
Many de dicto structured cognitive predicates express properties that are logically wide (in the 
sense of logically implying the existence of contingently existing physical objects external to the 
thinker). 
 
Cognitive Predicate Assumption (CPA) 
Every de dicto structured cognitive predicate expresses a property that individuates with respect 
to the mental state it describes. 
 
The Cartesian predicament supports PAI.  Semantic evidence adduced by Kripke (1972), 
Kaplan (1979) and others (for example, McKinsey 1987) supports SE.  Frege (1892) and 
Russell’s (1912) work supports CPA.  Roughly, S knows that p strongly a priori iff could 
possess such knowledge in a solipsistic world.  Consequently, S’s strong a priori knowledge 
that p does not depend on any empirical assumptions. 
 
Traditional McKinsey Reasoning aims to show that the conjunction of PAI, SE and CPA are 
incompatible.  Specifically, it aims to show that assuming the conjunction of PAI, SE and 
CPA results in an absurd conclusion.  In order to be successful, Traditional McKinsey 
Reasoning, requires instances of the following two auxiliary claims to be true: 
 
Closure of the capacity for strong a priori knowledge across meta-logical implication (CA) 
For any subject S and any propositions p and q:  If S can know a priori that p and the 
proposition that p logically implies the proposition that q, then S can know a priori that q. 
 
Environmental Access 
For any subject , S, and any proposition that e, where e asserts the existence of contingently 
existing ordinary physical objects logically distinct from S, S cannot know strongly a priori that e. 
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Chapter 2 deals with some preliminary thought experiments which I commonly refer to 
throughout the thesis.  These are the famous thought experiments of Putnam (1975)  and 
Burge (1979) and related thought experiments used by Flavey & Owens (1994) and 
Boghossian (1987 and 1997). 
 
In Chapter 3, I sharply distinguish Traditional McKinsey Reasoning from another argument 
which is commonly labelled “McKinsey Reasoning”.  I call this other argument the 
Boghossian-Brown Reasoning.  The Boghossian-Brown Reasoning appears to be concerned with the 
following claims: 
 
W-PAC 
For any subject , S, and any mental state individuated by the property S is thinking that p:  If S 
is thinking that p, then S can know weakly a priori that she thinks that p. 
 
S-Wide externalism 
In many cases, if a subject, S, possesses a thought that p, then S’s thought that p fails to 
weakly supervene upon the subject’s internal physical state. 
 
A priori knowability of S-Wideness Instances 
For any subject, S, and any mental state individuated by the property S is thinking that p or S 
thinks that p and such properties fail to weakly supervene upon a subject’s internal physical 
state, and any proposition that e which asserts the existence of contingently existing ordinary 
physical objects: S can know “a priori” that if she thinks that p then e. 
 
Ambitious Environmental Access 
For any subject , S, and any proposition that e, where e asserts the existence of contingently 
existing ordinary physical objects logically distinct from S, S cannot know weakly a priori that e. 
 
A priori deduction principle 
{If S can know weakly a priori that p and S can know a priori that (if p, then q) and S can 
simultaneously believe both that p and that (if p, then q) and S can competently deduce q from 
this simultaneous belief}, then S can know weakly a priori that q. 
 
Where S knows that p weakly a priori iff S acquires his knowledge without using empirical 
investigation as a justicictory basis but may make empirical assumptions. 
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There are many differences between the Boghossian-Brown Reasoning and Traditional McKinsey 
Reasoning, which I list in Chapter 3.  One main difference between them is that the latter 
explicitly states CPA, whereas the former tacitly assumes CPA.  Another main difference 
between the two types of reasoning is that, at first glance, the philosophical basis of the 
claims which are the concern of the Boghossian-Brown Reasoning are unclear.  Whereas, the 
philosophical basis of each of the claims of Traditional McKinsey Reasoning (PAI, SE and 
CPA) are clear and have been briefly mentioned above.  In Chapter 3, I suggest that a 
number of commentators on “McKinsey Reasoning” fail to sharply distinguish between 
Boghossian-Brown Reasoning and Traditional McKinsey Reasoning in the way I do. 
 
My aim in the thesis is to defend Traditional McKinsey Reasoning.  Specifically, in Chapters 4 
and 5, I defend its auxiliary claims.  Also in these chapters I discuss the Ambitious 
Environmental Access thesis and the inferential principle A priori deduction principle, which are 
the concern of the Boghossian-Brown Reasoning; I conclude the latter claim may be plausible 
but the former is inconclusive.  However, even if I’m wrong in my discussion of the claims 
that are of the concern of the Boghossian-Brown Reasoning, my defence of Traditional McKinsey 
Reasoning will not be affected, since the arguments are so very different and concerned with 
distinct claims. 
 
Given that I defend Traditional McKinsey Reasoning, I am left with a problem.  On the one 
hand, each of PAI, CPA and SE are entrenched theses in philosophy but, on the other 
hand, the conjunction of these theses is incompatible.  So how do I resolve this problem?  
I endorse McKinsey’s way out of the dilemma.  Specifically, in Chapters 6 and 7 I defend 
the PAI and SE theses.  In Chapter 8, I tentatively endorse McKinsey’s rejection of CPA.  
In Chapter 9, I outline McKinsey’s positive picture of how we have private and internal 
logically narrow thoughts about public and external ordinary contingently existing 
contingent objects and natural kinds.  In Chapter 10, I show how the overall package I 
endorse dissolves the “Achievement Problem” for privileged access.  The “Achievement 
Problem” says, roughly, that since the contents of a subject’s mental states depend on 
ordinary contingently existing physical objects and kinds, we cannot have “a priori” 
knowledge that we possess such mental states.  In Chapter 10, I also suggest that the 
package I endorse provides an illuminating way of looking at another recent problem for 
knowledge of our thoughts posed by Kallestrup & Pritchard (2004). 
 
Additionally, in Chapters 6 and 7 I examine elements of the claims W-PAC and A priori 
knowability of S-Wideness Instances of the Boghossian-Brown Reasoning.  I suggest that they may be 
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explained by their proponent’s making the tacit assumption of CPA.  I also suggest that the 
claims are dubious.  However, once again, I stress that even if I’m wrong on these matters, 
it won’t affect my defence of Traditional McKinsey Reasoning because this reasoning is so very 
different from the Boghossian-Brown Reasoning. 
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Chapter 1 
 
In this chapter I shall detail my understanding of “McKinsey Reasoning” which I call 
Traditional McKinsey Reasoning.  My understanding of “McKinsey Reasoning” differs quite 
radically from the presentations of the reasoning by other commentators (see, for example 
Kallestrup (2011), Wright (2000), (Davies (1998, 2000), Brown (2004), Farkas (2008)).  
However, I shall marshal sufficient textual evidence from broad sweep of McKinsey’s work 
to support my understanding of “McKinsey Reasoning”.  Moreover, I think this textual 
evidence will show that some others who have commentated on “McKinsey Reasoning” 
have grossly misunderstood the reasoning in a number of ways.  Explaining these 
commentators’ misunderstandings is not the task of this chapter.  My aim in this chapter is 
to explain Traditional McKinsey Reasoning.  I shall outline the form of argument it uses, 
suggest that it is prima facie plausible and, thus, suggest that we have prima facie 
justification that it presents a paradox.   
 
A full blown defence of each and every claim or principle utilised by Traditional McKinsey 
Reasoning is not the aim of this chapter.  However, I do wish to outline these claims and 
make them at least prima facie plausible.  In later chapters of the thesis, however, I shall 
defend these claims or principles from the strongest attacks that I can locate.  Thus, by the 
end of those chapters, I conclude that we have good reason to think that Traditional 
McKinsey Reasoning presents us with a genuine paradox.  I then spend later parts of the thesis 
outlining a sketch of how we resolve that paradox. 
 
I shall suggest that there is prima facie support in the history of philosophy for the 
following three claims: 
 
Privileged Access to Individuating Factors (PAI) 
For any subject, S, if S possesses a given mental state , which is individuated by property F, 
S can know strongly a priori that she possesses F. 
 
Semantic Externalism (SE) 
Many de dicto structured cognitive predicates express properties that are logically wide (in the 
sense of logically implying the existence of contingently existing physical objects external to the 
thinker). 
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Cognitive Predicate Assumption (CPA) 
Every de dicto structured cognitive predicate expresses a property that individuates with respect 
to the mental state it describes. 
 
Certain interpretations of the Cartesian predicament support PAI.  Semantic evidence 
adduced by Kripke, Kaplan and, perhaps, others supports SE.  CPA has been an 
entrenched view in philosophy and may originate from the works of Frege (1892) and 
Russell (1912). 
 
Traditional McKinsey Reasoning aims to show that the conjunction of PAI, SE and CPA are 
incompatible.  Thus, if successful, Traditional McKinsey Reasoning, forces us to give up at least 
one of PAI, SE and CPA.  Indeed, if we are persuaded by Traditional McKinsey Reasoning, we 
may be forced to give up more than one of PAI, SE and CPA. 
 
How does Traditional McKinsey Reasoning work?  Specifically, what is the form of argument it 
uses?  I shall argue that Traditional McKinsey Reasoning must utilise instances of the following 
two principles: 
 
Closure of the capacity for strong a priori knowledge across meta-logical implication (CA) 
For any subject S and any propositions p and q:  If S can know a priori that p and the 
proposition that p logically implies the proposition that q, then S can know a priori that q. 
 
Environmental Access 
For any subject , S, and any proposition that e, where e asserts the existence of contingently 
existing ordinary physical objects logically distinct from S, S cannot know strongly a priori that e. 
 
In this chapter, I shall be suggesting that the relevant instances of each of these principles 
is prima facie plausible and will be fully defending them in later chapters of this thesis. 
 
The basic idea of the reasoning is to take a de dicto structured cognitive predicate which 
satisfies each of SE, CPA and PAI and show how, together with an instance of meta-
closure principle CA, it produces a claim which is contrary to the Environmental Access 
thesis.  Since, instances of meta-closure principle CA and the Environmental Access thesis are 
true, or so I shall argue, we are forced to conclude that PAI, SE and CPA are jointly 
incompatible. 
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Thus, Traditional McKinsey Reasoning presents us with a paradox:  On the one hand, each of 
PAI, SE and CPA enjoy entrenched support from various parts of the history of 
philosophy.  On the other hand, Traditional McKinsey Reasoning, shows us that we cannot 
jointly assume the conjunction of PAI, SE and CPA. 
 
If you were persuaded that PAI, SE and CPA were jointly incompatible which one would 
you give up?  Or would you give up more than one of them?  McKinsey’s answer to this 
question is to give up CPA alone.  Specifically, McKinsey’s position is that the evidence in 
favour of SE is overwhelming and certain interpretations of the Cartesian predicament that 
support PAI are correct. Thus, McKinsey singles out CPA for rejection.  McKinsey is, thus, 
forced to explain why the support for CPA, which may be derived from the work of Frege 
(1892) and Russell (1912), is inadequate.  In later chapters of this thesis, I shall be sketching 
this response of McKinsey’s and tentatively endorsing it. 
 
It is possible to respond to the last few questions of mine in the following way:  “I’m not 
persuaded that PAI, SE and CPA are jointly incompatible, so I do not have to explain 
which one of these theses is false.”  This response, in effect, commits one to claiming that 
there is a flaw in the mode of reasoning utilised by Traditional McKinsey Reasoning.  The 
thought behind such a response is that at least one of the relevant instances of meta-
closure principle CA and the Environmental Access thesis are false.  I shall be arguing against 
such a response when I defend the relevant instances of CA and Environmental Access from 
attacks later on in the thesis. 
 
One final thing to emphasise are the three paradox building stages or levels I am going to 
go through when I set up Traditional McKinsey Reasoning.  I am not suggesting these stages or 
levels are the typical way one might initially create (or roughly think of) a paradox but they 
do make sound presentational sense.  In particular, satisfying each of these stages ensures 
that some of the important tasks and challenges one faces when presenting a paradox are 
adequately completed. 
 
The first stage or level is the philosophical basis stage.  The philosophical basis stage involves 
adducing evidence whether it is semantic evidence, armchair theorising or support from the 
history of philosophy in favour of the truth of a certain claim.  The philosophical basis stage 
also sharply sets out and describes the claims in question and, perhaps, distinguishes these 
claims from other similar or related claims in an attempt to avert any potential 
misunderstandings. 
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The second stage or level is the target-identification stage.  The target identification stage takes 
the claims identified in the philosophical basis stage and states an aim or goal one has 
towards these claims.  It might be to show that a disjunction of the claims is incompatible 
or it might be to show that a conjunction of the claims are jointly incompatible and so on. 
 
The third and final stage of paradox building is what I shall call the mechanical stage.  In this 
stage the mode of reasoning used to achieve the target identified in the second stage is set 
out.  Any auxiliary claims required by the mode of reasoning are described and defended at 
this stage. 
 
When one undertakes paradox building, perhaps, the various stages sometimes take place 
together or some sort of a reflective equilibrium between the various stages takes place. 
 
However, each of the three stages must be completed for us to present a seeming paradox.  
In order to see this, imagine if one of the stages did not take place.  Imagine, for example, 
that one completed the second and third stages but not the first.  Specifically, imagine that 
one had a sound argument to show that a conjunction of certain claims is incompatible but 
provided no philosophical basis or evidence for each of the claims.  What would be the 
point of doing this?  Why should we care if certain claims are jointly incompatible if we 
have been given no evidence for accepting them in the first place?  In this example, 
labouring away with hard, detailed and time-consuming work at completing the third and 
second stages may be pointless, unless one also successfully completes the first stage. 
 
Similarly, for example, one cannot build a paradox by simply labouring away at the first and 
second stages and hope to have achieved one’s goal, unless one also completes the third 
stage by producing a sound argument which achieves that goal. 
 
In this chapter I want to emphasise that I am attempting to fully complete the first two 
stages:  In §1-5, I shall be explaining the philosophical basis for accepting PAI, SE and 
CPA, thus completing the philosophical basis stage.  I have repeatedly stated that my aim is to 
show that the conjunction of PAI, SE and CPA are incompatible, thus completing the 
target-identification stage.  In §6-8 I shall explain Traditional McKinsey Reasoning using examples 
involving particular de dicto structured cognitive predicates and suggest that it is prima 
facie reasonable to accept the instances of the meta-closure principle CA and Environmental 
Access thesis used by the reasoning.  Thus, by the end of §8, I have only partially completed 
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the mechanical stage of showing how Traditional McKinsey Reasoning constitutes a paradox.  I 
have not completely shown the reasoning to be a paradox because I have not defended the 
instances of the meta-closure principle CA and the Environmental Access thesis against 
literature which might be thought to refute such principles; I shall complete this task in 
later chapters of the thesis.  In §9 I summarise the state of play so far and show how 
circumstances can be such that one is free to reject one of PAI , CPA and SE  In §11-13, I 
outline some variations of Traditional McKinsey Reasoning.  I suggest that while these 
presentations are technically sound – or, in my terminology, sound at the mechanical level – 
they has certain presentational defects.  Specifically, the presentational defect it has is that it 
never makes clear that CPA is a suspect for rejection and, thus, it makes it very difficult for 
a lay reader of the argument to finger CPA alone as the culprit responsible for the paradox.  
In §14 I outline the plan for the rest of the thesis. 
 
§1 Preliminaries 
 
First, take a simple non-cognitive sentence ‘George is cute’, say.  Now turn that into a 
cognitive sentence, ‘Laura thinks that George is cute’, for example.  Note that the cognitive 
sentence contains no element concerning the existence of Laura or George.  For example, 
the cognitive sentence contains no element like this:  ‘George exists’ or ‘Laura exists’ or 
‘George and Laura both exist’.  For example, ‘George exists’ is an existence predicate whereas 
‘Laura thinks that George is cute’ is a cognitive predicate. 
 
Note that the scope of the cognitive predicate is structurally de dicto.  That is to say, the 
cognitive predicate is logically and grammatically de dicto in the sense that the scope of the 
term ‘George’ - the (small scope) proper name ‘George’ – falls logically and grammatically 
within the scope of the cognitive operator ‘thinks’. 
 
Consider another few examples.  The cognitive predicate ‘Bob thinks that that pub is good’ 
can be read in a structurally de dicto manner when the term ‘that pub’ has small scope 
relative to the cognitive operator ‘thinks’.  The cognitive predicate ‘Segei believes that you 
are rich’ can be read structurally de dicto when the term ‘you’ has small scope and the 
cognitive operator ‘believes’ has the larger scope.  The cognitive predicate ‘Sergei believes 
that I am rich’ can be read structurally de dicto when the term ‘I’ has small scope relative to 
the operator ‘believes’.  Similarly then cognitive predicate ‘Sergei wishes that he is rich’ can 
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be read as structurally de dicto when the term ‘he’ has small scope relative to the operator 
‘wishes’. 
 
Now consider the sentence ‘Rome burns and Laura thinks that George is cute’, when I (or 
McKinsey) speak of de dicto structured cognitive predicates we do not wish to categorise 
sentences like this as one of them.  We want the ‘thinks’ component of the cognitive 
predicate covering the entire scope of the proper names and indexical pronouns in the 
whole sentence.  Or put another way, we want each of the proper names and indexical 
pronouns to have a smaller scope than the cognitive operator ‘thinks’.  In the sentence 
‘Rome burns and Laura thinks that George is cute’ the scope of the proper name ‘Rome’ 
does not fall within the scope of ‘thinks’, thus the sentence is not classified as a de dicto 
structured cognitive predicate.  Similarly, neither McKinsey, nor myself, would classify the 
sentence ‘Laura thinks that George is six feet tall and it is in fact true that George fact six 
feet tall’ as a de dicto structured cognitive predicate.  Why?  The second occurrence of the 
term ‘George’ clearly does not fall within the scope of ‘thinks’ in that last sentence. 
 
Are there readings of cognitive predicates that are not structurally de dicto?  Are there such 
cases where a given term, t, in a simple sentence $(t) has large scope relative to a cognitive 
operator c in a sentence ‘S cs that $(t)’?  Examples where t is a proper name or indexical 
pronoun may be tricky to give.  Indeed, it may be tricky to give uncontroversial examples at 
all.  However, here is an attempt to give an example where the general term ‘arthritis’ is 
used for the relevant t:  Consider the sentence ‘Oscar believes that he has arthritis in his 
thigh’.  A non-structurally de dicto reading of the predicate – that is a structurally de re 
reading of the predicate – would be equivalent to ‘As regards to arthritis, Oscar believes 
that he has it in his thigh’.  On the structurally de re reading the property ascribed by the 
predicate to Oscar is relational with respect to the type of condition meant by ‘arthritis’.  
This example is not uncontroversial, and it is arguable that the predicate should be read in a 
structurally de dicto manner where the term ‘arthritis’ has small scope relative to the 
cognitive operator ‘believes’.  Of these controversial examples, I have no more to say in 
this chapter.  All I wish to do is to give the reader a feel for the difference between de dicto 
structured cognitive predicates and structurally de re cognitive predicates. 
 
A cognitive predicate’s being structurally de re or de dicto is to be sharply distinguished from 
its being semantically de re or de dicto (that is to say de re or de dicto in meaning).  A 
semantically de re cognitive predicate ascribes a relation between an object (a res) and a 
cognitive predicate.  It is arguable, though not uncontroversial, that some of the de dicto 
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structured cognitive predicates in the last examples such ‘Laura thinks that George is cute’, 
‘Bob thinks that that pub is good’, ‘Sergei believes that you are rich’, ‘Sergei believes that I 
am rich’, ‘Sergei wishes that he is rich’ are all semantically de re.  This is because, it could be 
argued, though not uncontroversially, that each of these cognitive predicates expresses a 
property that essentially involves a contingently existing ordinary physical object that is 
logically distinct from the thinker of whom the ascription is made. 
 
Consider, for example, the de dicto structured cognitive predicate ‘Laura thinks that 
George is cute’, on some views, this predicate ascribes the property Laura thinks the 
singular proposition that George is cute; and since this property logically implies that an 
ordinary contingently existing physical object distinct from Laura – the man George – 
exists, it is said that “the predicate is semantically de re with respect George”.  That is to 
say, on the view under consideration, the predicate ascribes the relation characterised by 
the cognitive attitude verb ‘thinks’ between Laura and the ordinary contingently existing 
physical object George. 
 
What about semantically de dicto predicates?  It may be a controversial view that there are 
such predicates.  If there are such predicates, one way of characterising them may be to say 
something like:  the property expressed by the cognitive predicate in question has to be 
understood semantically as somehow characterising a subject’s cognitive state at least in 
part by one of the subject’s modes of thinking or way of referring to the (putative) object 
of her cognitive state. 
 
The moral of this discussion is to show that there is (or may be) distinctions within the 
class of cognitive predicates that cut in two different ways:  The cognitive predicate can be 
structurally de re or de dicto and the predicate may either be semantically de re or semantically 
de dicto. 
 
However, the cognitive predicates that are going to be the focus of this chapter are 
structurally de dicto cognitive predicates. 
 
§2 Cognitive state individuation 
 
In order to understand McKinsey’s position, we must distinguish sharply between a de 
dicto structured cognitive predicate which expresses a given property which expresses a 
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property that fails to individuate – or fails to fully characterises – with respect to the cognitive state it 
describes and a de dicto structured cognitive predicate which expresses a property that individuates 
– or fully characterises – with respect to the cognitive state it describes.  I cannot stress the importance 
of this distinction enough, if we fail to recognise it, then we will fail to fully understand 
McKinsey’s overall view. 
 
Put in a slightly different way: this distinction has it that there is a view, on the one hand, 
there are de dicto structured cognitive predicates which express properties that do not 
individuate or fully characterise (the metaphysical nature of) one’s mental states.  Whereas, 
on the other hand, there are properties expressed by de dicto structured cognitive 
predicates which do individuate or fully characterise (the metaphysical nature of) one’s 
mental states. 
 
It is quite difficult to give uncontroversial examples of this distinction because, in order to 
give such examples, one needs to have a some kind of a formed view about the kind or 
type of properties expressed by such de dicto structured cognitive predicates.  So, my best 
attempt at giving such examples to illustrate this distinction is this:  In my first example, I 
shall assume (for the sake of giving a concrete example) a certain view of the properties 
expressed by de dicto structured cognitive predicates and then attempt to describe the 
distinction.  In my second example, I’ll assume an alternative view of the properties 
expressed by cognitive predicates and again attempt to describe the distinction. 
 
The first view I’ll assume says that de dicto structured cognitive predicates express the 
property of a subject believing a certain singular proposition.  For example, on this view, 
the de dicto structured cognitive predicate ‘Laura thinks that George is cute’ expresses the 
property Bob thinks the singular proposition that George is cute.  The one side of the 
distinction I am trying to describe says that the property does not characterise or fully 
individuate Laura’s mental state.  The other side of the distinction I am trying to describe 
says that the property does individuate or fully characterise the metaphysical nature of 
Laura’s mental state. 
 
An alternative view of the properties says that the de dicto structured cognitive predicate 
‘Laura thinks that George is cute’ expresses the property Laura thinks that the G is cute, 
where property G is a description in the public language which George happens to satisfy.  
For example G might be the property discoverer of the incompleness theorem who is 
less than 5 feet tall.  The one side of the distinction I am trying to describe says that the 
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property Laura thinks that the G is cute does not individuate the mental state of Laura’s 
that it describes.  The other side of the distinction I am trying to describe says that the 
property Laura thinks that the G is cute does individuate the cognitive state of Laura’s it 
describes. 
 
Also the present discussion need not narrowly focus on the cognitive attitude verb ‘thinks’, 
it can be applied to a wide variety of cognitive attitude verbs such as ‘believes’, ‘wishes’, and 
so on.  However, for the sake of building Traditional McKinsey Reasoning, I should like to 
restrict our focus to cognitive attitude verbs occurring in de dicto structured cognitive 
predicates that are (a) stative, (b) followed by that clauses and (c) non-factive.  I shall 
explain each of these restrictions in turn. 
 
For example, if it is claimed that the sentences ‘Bob remembers that that pub serves real 
ale’ or ‘Bob forgot that that pub serves real ale’ are a de dicto structured cognitive 
predicates, they still may not qualify as one of the predicates that contain stative cognitive 
verbs because remembering and forgetting may be claimed to be processes rather than 
states. 
 
The cognitive predicates ‘Bob intends to visit that pub’ or ‘Bob desires to drink real ale’, 
may be claimed to be de dicto structured but are not always followed by ‘that’ clauses, thus 
it is not clear that these predicates are of the form ‘S cs that $’, where c denotes a stative 
cognitive attitude verb and $ denotes a simple (non-cognitive) sentence.  I am unsure 
whether Traditional McKinsey Reasoning can be deployed against predicates which are not 
followed by ‘that’ clauses hence I shall set them aside. 
 
Consider the cognitive predicate ‘S knows that $’ where $ is a simple non-cognitive 
sentence which expresses the proposition that p.   On some views, such cognitive 
predicates express the property S knows the proposition that p and such a property is 
factive in the sense that the property logically implies that p.  I shall be excluding de dicto 
structured cognitive predicates which express such factive properties in constructing 
Traditional McKinsey Reasoning. 
 
Is the verb ‘knowledge’ classed as a cognitive verb that can instantiate the c in the ‘S cs that 
$’ formula?  It is controversial whether propositional knowledge is a mental state and thus 
controversial whether ‘knowledge’ should be classed as a stative cognitive verb.  I have 
never seen McKinsey’s argument presented using knowledge as a stative cognitive attitude 
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verb and, thus, for the most part of this thesis I’ll not attempt to present instances of his 
argument where ‘knowedge’ is treated as a stative cognitive verb. 
To sum up, the cognitive predicates I wish to consider in constructing Traditional McKinsey 
Reasoning are of the form ‘S cs that $’, where c denotes a stative cognitive attitude verb and 
$ denotes a simple (non-cognitive) sentence, which contains a small-scope proper name or 
indexical pronoun and ‘S cs that $’ expresses a non-factive cognitive property. 
 
Let’s consider some examples using these alternative cognitive attitude verbs.  Consider the 
de dicto structured cognitive predicate ‘Bob wishes that that bottle contains whiskey’.  On 
some views, it expresses the property Bob wishes the proposition that that bottle 
contains whiskey.  One view has it that the property Bob wishes the proposition that 
that bottle contains whiskey fails to individuate the mental state of Bob’s which it 
describes, whereas another view has it that such a property is individuating.  An alternative 
view about the properties expressed by cognitive predicates may claim that the property 
Bob wishes the proposition that the G contains whiskey, where property G is some 
description in the public language which happens to pick out the bottle in question is 
expressed by the cognitive predicate.  On some views, the property Bob wishes the 
proposition that the G contains whiskey fails to individuate the cognitive state it 
describes, whereas on other views, it succeeds in individuating. 
 
If we fail to recognise this distinction between individuating properties and non-
individuating properties just drawn, we’ll have a tremendously hard job trying to 
understand my interpretation of “McKinsey Reasoning.”  At this point, you might reply: 
 
“Look I understand your distinction but on my view, every de dicto structured cognitive 
predicates expresses an individuating property.  Moreover, I don’t even bother explicitly 
stating that I make such an assumption, I, typically, merely tacitly make it.” 
 
My response to this reply is:  In the practice described above, you are making (perhaps 
tacitly) the very assumption which McKinsey wishes to call into question.  In order to see 
this, consider the principle in the next section. 
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§3 The Cognitive Predicate Assumption (CPA) 
 
McKinsey wishes to cause problems for a certain view about whether a property expressed 
by a de dicto structured cognitive predicate individuates with respect to the cognitive state 
it describes.  The view McKinsey targets is the view that every de dicto structured cognitive 
predicate expresses a property that individuates with respect to the cognitive state it 
describes.  Spelled out, the view McKinsey targets is this: 
 
Cognitive Predicate Assumption (CPA) 
Every de dicto structured cognitive predicate expresses a property that individuates with respect 
to the mental state it describes. 
 
CPA is a claim that lies in the sphere of philosophy of mind and, perhaps, philosophy of 
language.  It transforms claims made in philosophy of language about properties expressed 
by de dicto structured cognitive predicates into claims about the metaphysical nature of 
mental states.  For example, on some views, the de dicto structured cognitive predicate 
‘Laura thinks that George is cute’ expresses the property Laura thinks the singular 
proposition that George is cute.  If we suppose that (a) the de dicto structured cognitive 
predicate is correctly ascribed to Laura, (b) the predicate expresses the property Laura 
thinks the singular proposition that George is cute and (c) CPA is correct, then the 
property Laura thinks the singular proposition that George is cute individuates or 
fully characterises the metaphysical nature of Laura’s mental state. 
 
McKinsey wishes to show that CPA is not compatible with two other entrenched theses in 
epistemology and philosophy of language, which I shall discuss later.  The CPA thesis is a 
widely held claim in philosophy that has been held, perhaps tacitly, by some who are 
concerned with the question of whether or not the metaphysical nature of mental states are 
externally determined in some sense.  However, why should we believe CPA in the first 
place?  
 
CPA is logically implied by the conjunction of two other firmly entrenched views of the 
cognitive attitudes.  Those two claims are: 
 
Propositional Theory of Individuation (PTI) 
All cognitive attitudes and states are individuated by their propositional contents. 
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Relational Theory (RT) 
All cognitive attitude verbs express relations between persons and propositions. 
 
I shall refer to the conjunction of PTI and RT as The Proposition Theory.  The Proposition Theory 
is a widely held assumption in a number of branches of philosophy up to the present day 
and may enjoy this status due to the work of Frege (1892) and Russell. (1912). 
 
So, CPA is an entrenched view in philosophy which can be traced back to Frege and 
Russell or so McKinsey contends.  Why should we believe CPA?  McKinsey suggests we 
may believe CPA because the Proposition Theory logically implies CPA and Frege and 
Russell’s work supports the Proposition Theory. 
 
§4 Privileged Access to individuating properties (PAI) 
 
McKinsey wishes to show that CPA is incompatible with entrenched views in philosophy 
of language and epistemology.  For now, I want to set out the epistemological claim which 
is the focus of McKinsey’s argument.  The epistemological claim relates to the Cartesian 
predicament.  It is worth quoting McKinsey at length on this matter: 
 
“We tend to classify knowledge as a priori if it is knowledge that we can obtain 
"just by thinking," or in other words, knowledge that is not based upon perceptual 
observation or empirical investigation. It is because knowledge of meanings is like 
this that we are inclined to say that it is "a priori." Although I cannot give an 
adequate account here of what it means to obtain knowledge "just by thinking," 
per haps the following characterization will suffice for my present purposes. I will 
say that a person's knowledge is a priori if and only if it would remain knowledge 
even if the person were radically deceived in his assumptions and inferences 
concerning the existence and nature of the physical world that is external to his 
mind. Thus on this characterization if a piece of my knowledge is a priori, then I 
would still have this knowledge even if I were a brain in a vat and had been 
systematically deceived by a mad scientist; I would still have this knowledge even 
if I were a nonphysical mind in a nonphysical world and had been systematically 
deceived by Descartes' evil genius. 
 
On this account, there can be a priori knowledge of both necessary and 
contingent truths. For on this account, or so it seems to me, I know a priori that I 
exist, that the present time exists, and that various of my present mental 
experiences and states exist. These are of course things that might not have 
existed, but it seems to me that I have a priori knowledge of their existence, for 
these things would still exist and I would still know that they do, even if I were 
radically deceived in my assumptions about the external world.”(1987, pp2-3). 
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My best attempt at outlining the thesis that McKinsey has in mind is this: 
 
Privileged Access to Individuating Factors (PAI) 
For any subject, S, if S possesses a given mental state , which is individuated by property F, 
S can know strongly a priori that she possesses F. 
 
The PAI thesis is an attempt to capture the Cartesian intuition that we have some kind of a 
privileged access to at least some of our mental states, even if certain sceptical hypotheses 
about the external world were true.  For example, even if we were radically deceived about 
the existence of contingent physical objects and the world external to us, this strong notion 
of a priori knowledge allows that we can still know we possess the properties that 
individuate with respect to our own mental states in an a priori manner.  Thus, the sense of 
‘a priori’ in PAI is quite a strong one in the sense that it is knowledge which a subject could 
have, even if a Cartesian (or other) sceptical hypothesis concerning the nature of the 
external world and contingent objects logically distinct from the thinker were true.  For 
example, if the hypothesis that the thinker is a brain in a vat were true, then the subject 
would still retain the a priori knowledge capacity of the factors that individuate with respect 
to her own mental states. 
 
McKinsey, in fact, seems to state at least three characterisations of strong a priori 
knowledge capacities in his work: 
 
S knows strongly a priori that p only if S knows that p without making any empirical 
assumptions. (1991a, 1987) 
 
S knows strongly a priori that p only if {were S to inhabit a solipsistic world, S would know 
that p} (1987, pp2-3) 
 
S knows strongly a priori that p iff S knowledge that p is not based even in part on the use 
of perceptual observation or empirical investigation and S knowledge that p cannot be 
undermined or outweighed by the addition of any additional empirical evidence. (2003) 
 
One important element of the strong aprioricity under discussion is the fact that it is 
unrevisable in a certain sense.  The sense in question is that there is no evidence involving 
ordinary contingent physical objects that are logically distinct from the subject that could 
outweigh or undermine the knowledge the subject possesses.  Thus, the subject could 
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possess such knowledge in a solipsistic world.  And, the subject can possess such 
knowledge without making any empirical assumptions.  I shall call the kind of strong a 
priori knowledge that McKinsey has in mind privileged access. 
 
According to McKinsey, precisely what properties result in a subject satisfying the PAI 
thesis?  Any properties that individuate or fully characterise a subject’s mental state, 
according to McKinsey’s interpretation of the Cartesian predicament.  Can we cite some 
examples of those states?  It is tricky to do this unless you commit to a view on what 
properties you take to be individuating. 
 
On McKinsey’s view the only individuating properties are logically narrow properties.  For 
McKinsey a logically narrow property is tricky to define.  A rough attempt is this is: 
 
Logical Narrowness 
A property F possessed by a subject S is logically narrow iff F does not logically imply the 
existence of an object o, where o is neither identical to nor any part of any of S’s mental states, 
acts and experiences. 
 
(see also my Chapter 2 for more on the notion of “narrowness”) 
 
What kind of properties count as logically narrow on McKinsey’s view?  One good 
candidate is the property expressed by cognitive predicates that express de se thought 
ascriptions.  For example, the cognitive predicate ‘Descartes believes that he himself is a 
thinking thing’ expresses a logically narrow property, let’s call it property D.  Similarly the 
cognitive predicate ‘Ollie thinks that he himself is a hero’ expresses a logically narrow 
property, let’s call it property O.  Thus, on McKinsey’s view of the Cartesian predicament, 
if the cognitive predicate ‘Descartes believes that he himself is a thinking thing’ is true, 
Descartes can know that he has a mental state individuated by D in a strong a priori 
manner.  That is to say, were Descartes to possess the way of knowing indicated in the 
knowledge capacity, then it would depend on no empirical assumptions.  Moreover, 
Descartes could possess this knowledge-capacity (and the knowledge indicated by the 
knowledge capacity) in a solipsistic world.  Similarly, on McKinsey’s view, there would be 
no evidence involving ordinary contingently existing physical object logically distinct from 
Descartes which could outweigh or undermine Descartes knowledge-capacity. 
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Similarly, if the cognitive predicate ‘Ollie thinks that he himself is a hero’ is true, according 
to McKinsey, Ollie can know strongly a priori that he has a mental state individuated by the 
property O. 
 
Note that the fact that Ollie and Descartes can know the mental states they possess in a 
strong a priori manner does not indicate that they, in fact, do possess such knowledge.  It 
might be, for example, the cognitive predicate ‘Ollie thinks that he himself is a hero’ is true 
but Ollie is not actively thinking the thought and it is a non-active thought of Ollie’s.  In 
such circumstances, we may not be inclined to say Ollie in fact knows that he possesses a 
mental state individuated by property O.  But we may still claim that Ollie can know 
strongly a priori that he possesses this property.  (At this one might demand a more precise 
understanding of the use of the modal operator that figures in the PAI thesis.  McKinsey 
(1987 pp3-7) has provided a fuller characterisation.) 
 
§5 Semantic Externalism (SE) 
 
The final thesis which is the concern of Traditional McKinsey Reasoning is a thesis which is the 
concern of philosophy of language.  Specifically, it concerns an element of philosophy of 
language which is concerned with the properties expressed by de dicto structured cognitive 
predicates.  In brief, the claim is that many de dicto structured cognitive predicates express 
a certain kind of property.  The property in question is a logically wide property.  How do 
we define a logically wide property?  This, again is a tricky issue.  We can start by looking at 
what it is for a property to not be logically narrow according to the last definition of logical 
narrowness: 
 
Non-logical narrowness 
A property F possessed by a subject S is not logically narrow iff F does logically imply the 
existence of an object o, where o is neither identical to nor any part of any of S’s mental states, 
acts and experiences 
 
Now, this definition won’t quite do for the purposes I have in mind because perhaps there 
are certain properties that logically imply the existence of certain objects which are neither 
physical nor contingently existing.  On certain views, perhaps certain properties logically 
imply the existence of mathematical reality such as a prime number.  But a prime number is 
not a physical object and its existence may not be contingent.  I want the definition of a 
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logically wide property to be such that it logically implies the existence of an object which is 
contingently existing and physical.  With this aim in mind here is a first shot at formulating 
logical wideness: 
 
Logical wideness 
A property F possessed by a subject S is logically wide iff F does logically imply the existence of 
an object o, where (i) o is neither identical to nor any part of any of S’s mental states, acts and 
experiences and (ii) o is a physical object or object and (iii) o’s existence is contingent. 
 
The upshot of claiming that a given property is logically wide is to claim, roughly, that it 
logically implies the existence of ordinary contingently existing physical objects that are 
distinct from the thinker who may possess such a property. 
 
So, the philosophy of language claim McKinsey is concerned with is the claim that many de 
dicto structured cognitive predicates express properties that are logically wide.  But why 
should we find such a claim plausible?  According to McKinsey there is a vast array of 
evidence in favour of the claim and one source of this evidence is semantic evidence 
adduced by Kripke.  One of Kripke’s famous cases setting out this evidence is the Gödel-
Schmidt case (1972, p294).  Practically the only thing many people have heard about the 
logician Kurt Gödel is that he discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic. But people's 
uses of the name 'Gödel' would still refer to Gödel even if it had not been Gödel but an 
unknown Viennese high school teacher named 'Schmidt' who actually discovered 
incompleteness. Since a similar point can be made regarding all the other achievements for 
which Gödel is famous, it is clear that the referent of the name 'Gödel' is not determined 
by any description, like 'the discoverer of incompleteness', that might be commonly associated 
with the name. But then, surely, the name 'Gödel' has no descriptive meaning in any public 
language since if it did, there would be a commonly associated description that determines 
its referent.  Thus, the referent of the name 'Gödel' is completely exhausted by the 
contingently existing man - Gödel.  Thus, the property expressed by the de dicto structured 
cognitive predicate ‘Laura thinks that Gödel is cute’ is logically wide in the sense that it 
logically implies the existence of a contingently existing physical object distinct from the 
thinker - Laura – the object in question is the contingently existing man Gödel.  The 
property is logically wide since, given Kripke’s semantic evidence, the referent of the name 
‘Gödel’ is completely exhausted by the contingently existing man Gödel.  What is the 
property expressed by the de dicto structured cognitive predicate ‘Laura thinks that Godel 
is cute’ if the Godel-Schmidt case is correct?  It is to property Laura thinks the singular 
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proposition that Godel is cute.  Thus, given Kripkean semantic evidence, we can say 
that: 
 
The proposition that Laura thinks that Gödel is cute logically implies the proposition that 
Gödel exists. 
 
Kaplan’s (1979) work on the modal properties of sentences containing indexicals also 
supports SE.  If ‘S thinks that I am rich’ is true then the predicate expresses a property that 
logically implies the existence of an ordinary contingently existing human being distinct 
from the speaker S.  Similar comments can be made about cognitive predicates of the form 
‘S believes that you are rich’ ‘S believes that he is rich’ and S believes that that man is rich’. 
 
Spelled out, the philosophy of language thesis that McKinsey has in mind is this: 
 
Semantic Externalism (SE) 
Many de dicto structured cognitive predicates express properties that are logically wide (in the 
sense of logically implying the existence of contingently existing physical objects external to the 
thinker). 
 
Note immediately, that SE is a semantic thesis a thesis about the meaning of cognitive 
predicates – de dicto structured cognitive predicates to be precise.  Therefore, note that SE 
is not a thesis about the metaphysical nature of mental content.   SE makes no claim about 
the metaphysical nature of mental states.  Specifically, SE is not, therefore, a thesis about the 
mental content one possesses being logically wide (or “wide” in some other sense).  In 
order to get the result that the mental state one possesses is logically wide, one would need 
to find a logically wide property expressed by a de dicto structured cognitive predicate and 
then claim that this property individuates with respect to the cognitive state it describes.  Thus, one quick 
route to establishing that the metaphysical nature of mental content is logically wide is to 
claim that both SE and CPA are true. 
 
Note that in this section I’ve attempted to motivate SE by using explanations that are 
neutral on the question as to whether the thesis CPA is true.  I have given what might be 
called “a CPA-neutral explanation of SE”.  There are other alternative explanations of the 
truth of SE which require the truth of CPA in order to work successfully.  I shall discuss 
these alternative explanations of SE – “what I shall call CPA-dependent explanations of 
SE” later on in this chapter. 
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§6 Simplified Traditional McKinsey Reasoning 
 
So far, then, according to McKinsey, we have the work of Frege and Russell suggesting the 
plausibility of CPA, the Cartesian predicament supporting PAI and semantic evidence from 
Kripke, Kaplan and perhaps others supporting SE.  A broad-brushstroke description of 
McKinsey’s idea is this:  if we jointly assume CPA, PAI and SE, we can derive an absurd 
conclusion.  Since we’ll want to avoid that absurd conclusion, we should reject the view 
that conjunction of CPA, PAI and SE are true and reject at least one of these claims. 
 
Thus, I have completed two stages or levels of a paradox building recipe.  In have shown 
that a number of claims enjoy a great deal of plausibility and are motivated by literature in 
the history of philosophy, thus completing the philosophical basis stage.  I have repeatedly 
stated that I aim to show that the conjunction of these claims are jointly incompatible, thus 
completing the target-identification stage.  
 
I shall now make some headway into completing the mechanical stage of building the 
paradox.  I was inspired to write the paradox this way by McKinsey (1994) which explicitly 
emphasises the role of CPA (see especially pp308-9). 
 
On my interpretation, what I call Traditional McKinsey Reasoning aims to show that the 
following three claims are jointly incompatible: 
 
Privileged Access to Individuating Factors (PAI) 
For any subject, S, if S possesses a given mental state , which is individuated by property F, 
S can know strongly a priori that she possesses F. 
 
Semantic Externalism (SE) 
Many de dicto structured cognitive predicates express properties that are logically wide (in the 
sense of logically implying the existence of contingently existing physical objects external to the 
thinker). 
 
Cognitive Predicate Assumption (CPA) 
Every de dicto structured cognitive predicate expresses a property that individuates with respect 
to the mental state it describes. 
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An extremely broad and simplistic outline of Traditional McKinsey Reasoning involves 
adhering to the following recipe:  First pick a de dicto structured cognitive predicate which 
expresses a certain property that satisfies each of SE, CPA and PAI.  Second, show how an 
absurd conclusion can be derived from the claims that follow from the de dicto structured 
cognitive predicate and its property’s satisfaction of each of the three claims.  For example, 
assume the de dicto structured cognitive predicate ‘Laura thinks that George is cute’ is true, 
and assume a particular explanation of SE where the predicate expresses the logically wide 
property Laura thinks the singular proposition that George is cute, by jointly 
assuming PAI, CPA and SE we can reason thus: 
 
Simplistic Traditional McKinsey Reasoning 
 
(STMR0) The de dicto structured cognitive predicate ‘Laura thinks that George is cute’ is true 
[assumption]. 
 
(STMR1) The de dicto structured cognitive predicate ‘Laura thinks that George is cute’ 
expresses the property Laura thinks the singular proposition that George is cute [From SE 
and STMR0] 
 
(STMR2) The proposition that Laura thinks the singular proposition that George is cute logically 
implies the proposition that George exists [from SE, STMR1 and STMR0]. 
 
(STMR3) The property Laura thinks the singular proposition that George is cute 
individuates with respect to the cognitive state it describes [From CPA, STMR1 and STMR0] 
 
(STMR4) Laura can know strongly a priori that she possesses the property Laura thinks the 
singular proposition that George is cute [From PAI, STMR3]. 
 
Therefore,  
 
(STMR5) Laura can know strongly a priori that George exists [from STMR2 and STMR4 and 
certain auxiliary claims to be described] 
 
But, 
 
(STMR6) Laura cannot know strongly a priori that George exists [the consequence of an 
auxiliary claim to be described] 
 
Therefore, 
 
(STMR7) Laura both can and cannot know strongly a priori that George exists [from STMR5 and 
STMR6] 
 
As I remarked earlier, Simplistic Traditional McKinsey Reasoning is a very broad and simplistic 
outline of my interpretation of “McKinsey Reasoning”.  It is simplistic because there are 
several claims in the reasoning I have suppressed in order to avoid clutter.  One suppressed 
claim is the principle that licences the inference from (STMR2) and (STMR4) to (STMR5):  
It is a closure principle governing the extent of our strong a priori knowledge capacities 
across a meta-logical implication.  I shall be commenting upon this principle later.  A 
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second suppressed claim is a thesis which claims that Laura cannot know strongly a priori 
that George exists. 
 
A simple way of explaining Simplistic Traditional McKinsey Reasoning is to compare these two 
predicaments: 
 
The Cartesian Predicament 
A subject, S, possesses a certain property F which individuates her mental states.  By PAI, S 
can know strongly a priori that she possesses F.  S cannot deduce the existence of contingently 
existing ordinary physical objects from her possession of F.  Consequently, S cannot know 
strongly a priori that contingently existing ordinary physical objects exist. 
 
The Bloated Cartesian Predicament 
A subject, S, possesses a certain property F which individuates her mental states.  By PAI, S 
can know strongly a priori that she possesses F.  By CPA and SE, property F is logically wide 
and individuates with respect to the cognitive state it describes.  Thus, S can deduce the 
existence of contingently existing ordinary physical objects from her possession of F.  
Consequently, S can know strongly a priori that contingently existing ordinary physical objects 
exist. 
 
Simplistic Traditional McKinsey Reasoning is moving us from the Cartesian Predicament to the 
Bloated Cartesian Predicament.  However, intuitively, the Bloated Cartesian Predicament is absurd.  
 
Note immediately that both CPA and SE need to be added to PAI to shift us from the 
Cartesian Predicament to the Bloated Cartesian Predicament.  Adding only one of CPA or SE to 
PAI is not sufficient to induce the shift. 
 
In order to see this, consider the state of affairs of assuming CPA and PAI only.  On this 
picture, every property expressed by a de dicto structured cognitive predicate individuates 
with respect to the cognitive state it describes and according to PAI a subject can know 
that she possesses such properties.  But why think these properties are logically wide?  
Perhaps for example, these properties are all logically narrow.  In order to force the result 
that some properties are logically wide, we need to assume SE. 
 
Similarly, assuming SE and PAI only does not shift us from the Cartesian Predicament to 
the Bloated Cartesian Predicament.  On this picture, according to PAI, a subject can know 
that she possesses properties that individuate with respect to her mental state.  And, 
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according to SE, many de dicto structured cognitive predicates express properties that are 
logically wide.  But why think these properties individuate with respect to the cognitive 
state they describe?  Perhaps for example, the properties expressed do not individuate with 
respect to the cognitive state they describe.  In order to force the result that such properties 
individuate we need to add the assumption CPA. 
 
Here is another explanation of Simplistic Traditional McKinsey Reasoning:  Assume that a de 
dicto structured cognitive predicate involving an ordinary small scope proper name is true.  
According to semantic externalism, such a predicate expresses a logically wide property.  
According to CPA, this logically wide property individuates with respect to mental state.  
According to PAI, a thinker can know strongly a priori that she possesses this property.  
But, according to SE, it is an existence presupposition of the logically wide property that a 
contingently existing object logically distinct from the thinker exists.  And, the thinker must 
know strongly a priori that all existence presuppositions of the mental state individuating 
properties she possesses, for otherwise she would not know that she possesses these 
properties strongly a priori, contrary to the PAI assumption.  So, the thinker must know 
strongly a priori that a contingently existing physical object logically distinct from her 
exists.  But it is absurd that any thinker can know strongly a priori that a contingently 
existing physical object logically distinct from her exists. 
 
In the next section, I shall continue discussing the mechanical stage of the “McKinsey 
Reasoning” I shall be defending.  In the next section, I shall spell out the suppressed claims 
or theses used by Simplistic Traditional McKinsey Reasoning.  This amounts to spelling out why, 
in the explanation above, I am helping myself to claims such as “And, the thinker must 
know strongly a priori that all existence presuppositions of the mental state individuating 
properties she possesses, for otherwise she would not know that she possesses these 
properties strongly a priori...” and “it is absurd that any thinker can know strongly a priori 
that a contingently existing physical object logically distinct from her exists..” 
 
§7 Traditional McKinsey Reasoning Proper 
 
In Simplistic Traditional McKinsey Reasoning I suppressed two claims:  The instance of a certain 
closure principle governing the extent of our strong a priori knowledge capacities and a 
claim about how a subject cannot know that contingently existing physical objects logically 
distinct from her exist.  It is useful to see how these suppressed claims work in the context 
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of a piece of Traditional McKinsey Reasoning, which I shall call Traditional McKinsey Reasoning 
Instance.  Traditional McKinsey Reasoning Instance assumes that the de dicto structured cognitive 
predicate ‘Laura thinks that George is cute’ is true, and assumes, a particular explanation of 
SE where the predicate expresses the logically wide property Laura thinks the singular 
proposition that George is cute, by jointly assuming PAI, CPA and SE we can reason 
thus: 
 
Traditional McKinsey Reasoning Instance 
 
(TMRI0) The de dicto structured cognitive predicate ‘Laura thinks that George is cute’ is true 
[assumption]. 
 
(TMRI1) The de dicto structured cognitive predicate ‘Laura thinks that George is cute’ 
expresses the property Laura thinks the singular proposition that George is cute [From SE 
and TMRI0] 
 
(TMRI2) The proposition that Laura thinks that George is cute logically implies the proposition 
that George exists [from SE, TMRI1 and TMRI0]. 
 
(TMRI3) The property Laura thinks the singular proposition that George is cute individuates 
with respect to the cognitive state it describes [From CPA, TMRI1 and TMRI0] 
 
(TMRI4) Laura can know strongly a priori that she possesses the property Laura thinks the 
singular proposition that George is cute [From PAI, TMRI3]. 
 
(TMRI5) If {Laura can know a priori that she thinks that George is cute and the proposition that 
Laura thinks that George is cute logically implies the proposition that George exists}, then Laura 
can know a priori that George exists. [from meta-closure principle CA] 
 
Therefore,  
 
(TMRI6) Laura can know strongly a priori that George exists [from TMRI2 and TMRI4 and 
TMRI5] 
 
But, 
 
(TMRI7) Laura cannot know strongly a priori that George exists [from Environmental Access 
Thesis] 
 
Therefore, 
 
(TMRI8) Laura both can and cannot know strongly a priori that George exists [from TMRI6 and 
TMRI7] 
 
Thus, the meta-closure principle I am using as one of the auxiliary claims is this: 
 
(TMRI5) If {Laura can know a priori that she thinks that George is cute and the proposition that 
Laura thinks that George is cute logically implies the proposition that George exists}, then Laura 
can know a priori that George exists. 
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Note immediately, Laura, nor any subject, is not required by closure principle (TMR5) to 
have any epistemic attitude (a priori or otherwise) to the truth if Laura thinks George is 
cute, then George exists.  Indeed, as we shall see later, myself and McKinsey deny the 
following claim: 
 
LT-Instance 
If the proposition that Laura thinks that George is cute logically implies the proposition that 
George exists, then (if Laura thinks that George is cute, then George exists) is a logical truth. 
 
The meta-closure principle (TMRI5) is an instance of the following more general closure 
principle: 
 
Closure of the capacity for strong a priori knowledge across meta-logical implication (CA) 
For any subject S and any propositions p and q:  If S can know a priori that p and the 
proposition that p logically implies the proposition that q, then S can know a priori that q. 
 
Again, note immediately the meta-closure principle CA does not require that any subject 
have any epistemic attitude such as knowledge or the capacity to know (a priori or 
otherwise) to the truth if p, then q.  Indeed, McKinsey and myself deny the following claim: 
 
LT 
For any propositions p and q:  If the proposition that p logically implies the proposition that q, 
then (if p, then q) is a logical truth. 
 
Our denials of LT and LT-Instance commit us to a neutral free logic (more of this in the 
thesis chapters).  The denial of LT helps one resist certain kinds of counter examples to 
principles CA and (TMRI5).  
 
Note also that meta-closure principles like (TMRI5) and CA might not be what some 
epistemologists are used to:  Some epistemologists may be focussed on trying to capture 
how a subject acquires knowledge by deduction and may want to stuff the antecedent of 
my principle with clauses something like ‘S deduces p from q’, thus turning it into a 
different principle, which I would not want to use in my presentation of Traditional McKinsey 
Reasoning.  These issues are discussed in later chapters. 
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Other epistemologists might think that the meta-closure principle CA just is the same as its 
analogous standard closure principle.  The analogous standard closure principle in question 
is this: 
 
Standard closure of the capacity for a priori knowledge across logical implication (SCA) 
For any subject S and any propositions p and q:  If S can know a priori that p and it is a logical 
truth that (if p, then q), then S can know a priori that q. 
 
Note the difference in the phrasing of the second conjunct between CA and SCA:  CA is 
concerned with the “meta-proposition” which says “the proposition that p logically implies 
the proposition that q” whereas SCA is concerned with the logical truth (if p, then q). 
 
These epistemologists may think that the meta-closure principle CA just is the standard 
closure principle SCA and then drawing on their skills of finding counter examples to 
standard closure principles in other epistemological debates, they may think finding 
counter-examples to SCA amounts to also finding examples to CA.  However, the meta-
closure principle CA and the standard closure principle SCA are not related in the way 
desired by such an epistemologist unless one also assumes LT (or something even stronger 
than LT.  But, to repeat the point, myself and McKinsey deny LT; hence counter-examples 
to SCA will not necessarily constitute counter-examples to CA.  I discuss these issues in 
more detail in later chapters. 
 
It now remains for me to suggest why closure principle CA – or at least the instances of it 
used by Traditional McKinsey Reasoning – is at least prima facie plausible.  Let’s focus on the 
instance of CA used by Traditional McKinsey Reasoning Instance which is this: 
 
(TMRI5) If {Laura can know strongly a priori that she thinks that George is cute and the 
proposition that Laura thinks that George is cute logically implies the proposition that George 
exists}, then Laura can know strongly a priori that George exists. 
 
In effect my explanation of (TMR5) is that Laura can know a priori that George exists because 
of the antecedent of (TMR5).  What I am suggesting is that the facts that support the truth 
of its antecedent just are the very facts that support the truth of its consequent.   
 
Specifically, the explanation of the antecedent of (TMR5) is that, given SE, the property 
possessed by Laura when the de dicto structured cognitive predicate is true of her is a 
logically wide property.  Why is it a logically wide property?  In this particular case it is 
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because the property essentially involves a contingently existing ordinary physical object.  
But if such a property is individuating and PAI is true, Laura must know strongly a priori 
that she possesses this property and, given the definition of strong aprioricity must know 
that George exists. 
 
The other claim used by Traditional McKinsey Reasoning Instance which I have not yet 
discussed is: 
 
(TMRI7) Laura cannot know strongly a priori that George exists [from Environmental Access 
Thesis]. 
 
The Environmental Access thesis is phrased thus: 
 
Environmental Access 
For any subject , S, and any proposition that e, where e asserts the existence of contingently 
existing ordinary physical objects logically distinct from S, S cannot know strongly a priori that e. 
 
I take the Environmental Access thesis to be plausible by appealing to the various 
characterisations of strong a priori knowledge that McKinsey uses.  For example, consider 
a typical case of a subject, S’s, knowledge that e.  Could S know that e in a solipsistic world?  
Of course not: in a solipsistic world the proposition that e would be false, since the 
proposition that e concerns the existence of contingently existing ordinary physical objects 
that are logically distinct from S.  Hence, if S has the capacity to know that e, it cannot be a 
capacity to know strongly a priori that e.   Another example:  if S knows that e, then can S 
know that e without making any empirical assumptions?  S needs to assume that she is not 
in a solipsistic world.  But such an assumption is an empirical assumption.  So, if S can 
know that e, it cannot be a capacity to know strongly a priori that e. 
 
§8 Traditional McKinsey Reasoning Template 
 
The overall template for Traditional McKinsey Reasoning is this. 
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Traditional McKinsey Reasoning 
 
Let c be a stative cognitive operator.  Let S be a subject.  Let $ be a simple non-cognitive 
sentence.  Then for any non-factive de dicto structured cognitive predicate of the form ‘S 
cs that $’ which expresses a logically wide property F, where F describes S’s cognitive state; 
and some proposition that e, which asserts the existence of contingently existing ordinary 
physical objects logically distinct from S, we can reason as follows: 
 
(TMR0) The de dicto structured cognitive predicate ‘S cs that $’ is true [assumption]. 
 
(TMR1) The de dicto structured cognitive predicate ‘S cs that $’ expresses the property F [From 
SE and TMR0] 
 
(TMR2) The proposition that F logically implies the proposition that e [from SE, TMR1 and 
TMR0]. 
 
(TMR3) The property F individuates with respect to the cognitive state it describes [From CPA, 
TMR1 and TMR0] 
 
(TMR4) S can know strongly a priori that she possesses the property F [From PAI, TMR3]. 
 
(TMR5) If {S can know a priori that she possesses property F and the proposition that F logically 
implies the proposition that e}, then S can know a priori that e. [from meta-closure principle CA] 
 
Therefore,  
 
(TMR6) S can know strongly a priori that e [from TMR2 and TMR4 and TMR5] 
 
But, 
 
(TMR7) S cannot know strongly a priori that e [from Environmental Access Thesis] 
 
Therefore, 
 
(TMR8) S both can and cannot know strongly a priori that e [from TMR6 and TMR7] 
 
Note that the cognitive attitude verb c need not be an instance of a subject actively or 
occurently thinking.  Note also that the simple sentence $ need not contain an ingredient 
term that is directly referential.  That is to say, $ need not be of the form $(t) where t is a 
term whose referent is completely exhausted by a contingently existing ordinary physical 
object.  However, perhaps the easiest, reader friendly, instances of Traditional McKinsey 
Reasoning use certain de dicto structured cognitive predicates of the form ‘S cs that $(t)’ 
where t is a directly referential term.  In short, a simple sentence $ containing a directly 
referential term t in de dicto structured cognitive predicates of the form ‘S cs that $’ is 
sufficient for Traditional McKinsey Reasoning to be applied to it but it is not necessary.  What 
is a necessary condition for Traditional McKinsey Reasoning is a simple sentence $ occurring in 
de dicto structured cognitive predicates of the form ‘S cs that $’ in some way or another 
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produces the result that the property expressed by the predicate is logically wide.  The 
example in the next section is an attempt to cite an instance of traditional McKinsey 
Reasoning where none of the terms of an (alleged) de dicto structured cognitive predicate 
are directly referential. 
 
§9 Non-direct referential examples of  Traditional McKinsey 
Reasoning 
 
For example, consider the cognitive predicate ‘Oscar thinks that arthritis is painful’.  On 
some, controversial, views this predicate is de dicto structured.  Moreover, on some, 
controversial, views this predicate expresses the property Oscar thinks that arthritis is 
painful and the property logically implies the existence of a speech community of human 
beings who are logically distinct from Oscar.  Let e* be the proposition that a speech 
community of human beings who are logically distinct from Oscar exist.  Thus, on these controversial 
views, the instance of SE in question we have is: 
 
SE-Arthritis Instance 
The proposition that Oscar thinks that arthritis is painful logically implies the proposition that e. 
 
Note that SE-Arthritis Instance does not obtain because some term in the (alleged) de dicto 
structured cognitive predicate is directly referential. 
 
Were we to agree with the controversial views just described we could construct the 
following instance of Traditional McKinsey Reasoning. 
 
Traditional McKinsey Reasoning Instance-II 
 
(TMRII0) The cognitive predicate ‘Oscar believes that arthritis is painful’ is true and de dicto 
structured  [assumption]. 
 
(TMRII1) The de dicto structured cognitive predicate ‘Oscar believes that arthritis is painful’ 
expresses the property Oscar believes that arthritis is painful [From SE and TMRII0] 
 
(TMRII2) The proposition that Oscar thinks that arthritis is painful logically implies the 
proposition that e* [from SE, TMRII1 and TMRII0]. 
 
(TMRII3) The property Oscar believes that arthritis is painful individuates with respect to the 
cognitive state it describes [From CPA, TMRII1 and TMRII0] 
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(TMRII4) Oscar can know strongly a priori that he possesses the property Oscar believes that 
arthritis is painful [From PAI, TMRII3]. 
 
(TMRII5) If {Oscar can know a priori that he thinks that he thinks that arthritis is painful and the 
proposition t that Oscar thinks that arthritis is painful logically implies the proposition that e*}, 
then Oscar can know a priori that e*. [from meta-closure principle CA] 
 
Therefore,  
 
(TMRII6) Oscar can know strongly a priori that e* [from TMRII2 and TMRII4 and TMRII5] 
 
But, 
 
(TMRII7) Oscar cannot know strongly a priori that e* [from Environmental Access Thesis] 
 
Therefore, 
 
(TMRII8) Oscar both can and cannot know strongly a priori that e* [from TMRII6 and TMRII7] 
 
 
I, myself, do not agree with the claim that ‘Oscar thinks that arthritis is painful’ is de dicto 
structured and expresses a logically wide property (nor would McKinsey).  I am just using 
the controversial claim to illustrate the power of Traditional McKinsey Reasoning when it is 
combined with these controversial views.  I have also used the example to illustrate that it 
does not require any of the terms of the simple sentence in the cognitive predicate utilised 
by Traditional McKinsey Reasoning to be directly referential. 
 
§10 Kind Term Traditional McKinsey Reasoning 
 
On some views the predicate ‘S thinks that water is wet’ expresses a certain property, say 
property F*, which is logically wide, not because the term ‘water’ is directly referential (in 
the sense that its referent is completely exhausted by the contingently existing ordinary 
physical substance water).  Rather, on these views, property F* is logically wide due to some 
other explanation, which does not require the term ‘water’ to be directly referential.  For 
example, certain explanations of SE might have it that property F* is logically wide because 
its possession by S requires the existence of planet earth or a certain kind of speech 
community distinct from S or some disjunction of these conditions.  On other views, the 
predicate ‘S believes that water is wet’ expresses a certain property, say property F*, which 
is logically wide, precisely because the term ‘water’ is directly referential in that its referent is 
completely exhausted by the substance water.  Is there any way of capturing these various 
explanations of SE in a concise way?  Here is one attempt: 
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Let’s say E is a proposition asserting the existence of contingently existing ordinary 
physical objects logically distinct from the thinking subject, S.  For example, the 
proposition that E, might be the proposition that planet Earth exists or it might be the 
proposition that a speech community of more than one member logically distinct from S exists or it may 
be a different proposition formed out of the disjunction of the last two propositions or it 
may simply be the proposition that water exists.  Now the general instance of SE that I have 
been trying to articulate is this: 
 
SE-Water Instance 
The de dicto structured cognitive predicate ‘Oscar thinks that water is wet’ expresses a property 
that is logically wide. 
 
Or, put another way we might say that, according to SE, 
 
the proposition that F* logically implies the proposition that E. 
 
Traditional McKinsey Reasoning Water Instance 
 
(TMRW0) The cognitive predicate ‘Oscar thinks that water is wet’ is true and de dicto structured  
[assumption]. 
 
(TMRW1) The de dicto structured cognitive predicate ‘Oscar thinks that water is wet’ expresses 
the property F* [From SE and TMRW0] 
 
(TMRW2) The proposition that F* logically implies the proposition that E [from SE, TMRW1 and 
TMRW0]. 
 
(TMRW3) The property F* individuates with respect to the cognitive state it describes [From 
CPA, TMRW1 and TMRW0] 
 
(TMRW4) Oscar can know strongly a priori that he possesses the property F* [From PAI, 
TMRW3]. 
 
(TMRW5) If {Oscar can know a priori that he possesses property F* and the proposition t that 
Oscar thinks that arthritis is painful logically implies the proposition that E}, then Oscar can 
know a priori that E. [from meta-closure principle CA] 
 
Therefore,  
 
(TMRW6) Oscar can know strongly a priori that E [from TMRW2 and TMRW4 and TMRW5] 
 
But, 
 
(TMRW7) Oscar cannot know strongly a priori that E [from Environmental Access Thesis] 
 
Therefore, 
 
(TMRW8) Oscar both can and cannot know strongly a priori that E [from TMRW6 and TMRW7] 
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At this point it might be enquired, precisely what is the property F*?  I have not specified 
because there are a variety of different views on what the property is.  However, many of 
the examples I shall be considering on various literature on the McKinsey problem simply 
take property F* to be the property Oscar thinks that water is wet. 
 
§11 Responses to Traditional McKinsey Reasoning 
 
In this section I wish to briefly detail the responses to Traditional McKinsey Reasoning.  For 
convenience, I shall group together the relevant instances of the meta-closure principle CA 
and Environmental Access thesis and label them auxiliary claims. 
 
Responses to Traditional McKinsey Reasoning are as follows.  The first is to embrace the 
reasoning as sound, accept the auxiliary claims and reject the conjunction of SE, CPA and 
PAI.  McKinsey responds to the reasoning in this way and I endorse his response.  This 
doesn’t end the story for those who endorse this first response.  We are faced with the 
question:  Which of the theses of SE, CPA and PAI should we reject?  Given the support 
from the history of philosophy that each of the theses enjoy, this is a difficult question.  
Not only do we have to state which of SE, CPA or PAI we would reject, we also need to 
explain why, in the face of the support it enjoys, we need to reject it.  There is also the 
possibility of rejecting more than one of SE, CPA, and PAI. 
 
McKinsey, himself, opts for rejecting CPA alone.  He suggests that there is sufficient 
evidence to explain why the thesis is false and to undermine the support from the work of 
Frege and Russell which the thesis seems to enjoy.  McKinsey, thus, accepts both PAI and 
SE.  I shall also be tentatively endorsing the package that McKinsey recommends. 
 
The second response to Traditional McKinsey Reasoning is to dispute its soundness by 
disputing the auxiliary claims it uses.  Specifically, this response amounts to denying at least 
one of the Environmental Access thesis and the instance of the meta-closure principle CA.  I 
do not endorse this response and I shall be defending the instance of the meta-closure 
principle CA used by the reasoning and the Environmental Access thesis in later chapters. 
 
There are also a further two responses that I shall mention and set aside.  The third 
response is to dispute the validity of Traditional McKinsey Reasoning.  My view is that the 
argument is valid and I have not seen any literature challenging its validity.  The fourth 
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response is to reject the starting assumption which claims a given cognitive predicate is de 
dicto structured and expresses a property which describes a certain cognitive state.  I think 
that, there are certain cognitive predicates where such a response may work.  But I do not 
think that the response will work for every possible cognitive predicate that can be 
constructed.  Thus, at best, this fourth response simply amounts to claiming that Traditional 
McKinsey Reasoning may be restricted in scope but it does not go as far as claiming that it is 
outright wrong (in the sense that it has sound instances of it can never be constructed). 
 
§12 The presentational defect of  conjoining CPA and PAI 
 
Traditional McKinsey Reasoning can be modified by conjoining the theses CPA and PAI to 
create the following claim: 
 
Privileged access to content (PAC) 
If S thinks that p, then S can know strongly a priori that she thinks that p. 
 
PAC, unlike PAI, does not speak of “properties which may individuate a given mental 
state.”  PAC effectively takes the truth of CPA as a foregone conclusion, whereas PAI is 
silent about the truth of CPA.  Specifically, PAC says something like “if the cognitive 
property S thinks that p is true and is an individuating property, then S can know strongly 
a priori that she possesses this property.” 
 
Traditional McKinsey Reasoning can be slightly modified to show that PAC is incompatible 
with SE.  I shall call this variation Traditional McKinsey Reasoning PAC Variation.  See 
McKinsey (2002, pp199-212) for examples. 
 
Traditional McKinsey Reasoning PAC Variation 
 
Let S be a subject.  Let $ be a simple non-cognitive sentence.  Let the proposition that p be 
the proposition expressed by sentence $.  Then for any non-factive de dicto structured 
cognitive predicate of the form ‘S thinks that $’ which expresses the property S thinks that 
p, and some proposition that e, which asserts the existence of contingently existing ordinary 
physical objects logically distinct from S, we can reason as follows: 
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(TMRPV0) The cognitive predicate ‘S thinks that $’ is true and de dicto structured  [assumption]. 
 
(TMRPV1) The de dicto structured cognitive predicate ‘S thinks that $’ expresses the property S 
thinks that p [From SE and TMRPV0] 
 
(TMRPV2) The proposition that S thinks that p logically implies the proposition that e [from SE, 
TMRPV1 and TMRPV0]. 
 
(TMRPV3) S can know strongly a priori that she thinks that p [From PAC, TMRPV1]. 
 
(TMRPV4) If {S can know a priori that she thinks that p and the proposition that S thinks that p 
logically implies the proposition that e}, then S can know a priori that e. [from meta-closure 
principle CA] 
 
Therefore,  
 
(TMRPV5) S can know strongly a priori that e [from TMRPV2 and TMRPV3 and TMRPV4] 
 
But, 
 
(TMRPV6) S cannot know strongly a priori that e [from Environmental Access Thesis] 
 
Therefore, 
 
(TMRPV7) S both can and cannot know strongly a priori that e [from TMRPV5 and TMRPV6] 
 
How should we respond to Traditional McKinsey Reasoning PAC Variation.  McKinsey and 
myself would still suggest the same solution as before which was to keep PAI and SE and 
reject CPA alone.  But how do we transpose this response to the claims in Traditional 
McKinsey Reasoning PAC Variation?  Our rejection of CPA commits us to rejecting PAC, so 
we’d say something like “we’ll keep SE and reject PAC” we might add a comment that “in 
place of PAC, we’d propose the restricted principle of privileged access PAI.” 
 
However, comments like the last two in scare quotes, when taken in isolation, disguise the 
true nature of our response which is ultimately due to our rejection of CPA.  This is why I 
have gone to great lengths in this chapter to labour the importance of CPA in “McKinsey 
Reasoning”.  Thus, one presentational defect with Traditional McKinsey Reasoning PAC 
Variation is that it fails to emphasise the role of CPA in the creation and one of the 
proposed solutions to “McKinsey Reasoning”. 
 
There is also another, second, presentational defect with Traditional McKinsey Reasoning PAC 
Variation which, again, stems from its suppression of CPA.  In shifting from Traditional 
McKinsey Reasoning to Traditional McKinsey Reasoning PAC Variation we have slightly altered 
the mechanical stage of the paradox we have been building.  Now, this change has a knock 
–on effect at the higher paradox building stages (the philosophical basis stage and the target 
identification stage).  Specifically, the target of Traditional McKinsey Reasoning PAC Variation is 
to show that PAC and SE are jointly incompatible. 
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What is the philosophical basis of PAC?  It cannot just be McKinsey’s interpretation of the 
Cartesian predicament because that only supported PAI.  So, the philosophical basis for 
accepting PAC must be given by something more than just the Cartesian predicament.  So, 
the philosophical basis for accepting PAC must be both the Cartesian predicament and the 
Frege-Russell support for CPA.  Specifically, the basis for accepting PAC must be that we 
have privileged access to individuating properties in the sense of having the capacity to 
strongly a priori know we possess them (the Cartesian predicament element) and all such 
properties expressed by de dicto structured cognitive predicates are individuating (the 
Frege-Russell CPA element).  But does anyone who is commenting on “McKinsey 
Reasoning”, especially McKinsey himself, make this clear?   Apart from McKinsey (1994) 
I’d suggest not.  In particular McKinsey (1987, 2002, 2003 and 1991a) do not make this 
clear. 
 
I’d suggest that the philosophical basis for accepting PAC is not made clear in the last 
quotation.  Hence, although it is possible to properly state the philosophical basis for 
accepting PAC, PAC has so much detail (or so many sub-theses) packed into it 
commentators have sometimes failed to fully explain it. 
 
§13 Conjoining CPA and SE and more presentational defects 
 
Traditional McKinsey Reasoning can be modified by conjoining the theses CPA and SE to 
create the following claim: 
 
Logical Externalism about Mental Content (LET) 
In some cases a subject, S, is thinking that p and the content that p is logically wide and S’s 
thought is individuated by the property of being a thought that has the content that p. 
 
LET, unlike SE, does not speak of “properties expressed by de dicto structured cognitive 
predicates being logically wide.”  Instead, LET, speaks of the metaphysical nature of 
mental states being logically wide. 
 
Traditional McKinsey Reasoning can be modified to show that LET is incompatible with PAI 
in the following way (see McKinsey 2002, pp212-7 for examples). 
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Traditional McKinsey Reasoning LET Variation 
 
Let S be a subject.  Let $ be a simple non-cognitive sentence.  Let the proposition that p be 
the proposition expressed by sentence $.  Then for any non-factive de dicto structured 
cognitive predicate of the form ‘S thinks that $’ which expresses the property S thinks that 
p, and some proposition that e, which asserts the existence of contingently existing ordinary 
physical objects logically distinct from S, we can reason as follows: 
 
(TMRLV0) The cognitive predicate ‘S thinks that $’ is true and de dicto structured  [assumption]. 
 
(TMRLV1) The de dicto structured cognitive predicate ‘S thinks that $’ expresses the property S 
thinks that p and this property individuates the mental state it describes [From LET and 
TMRLV0] 
 
(TMRLV2) The proposition that S thinks that p logically implies the proposition that e [from LET, 
TMRPV1 and TMRLV0]. 
 
(TMRLV3) S can know strongly a priori that she thinks that p [From PAI, TMRLV1]. 
 
(TMRLV4) If {S can know a priori that she thinks that p and the proposition that S thinks that p 
logically implies the proposition that e}, then S can know a priori that e. [from meta-closure 
principle CA] 
 
Therefore,  
 
(TMRLV5) S can know strongly a priori that e [from TMRLV2 and TMRLV3 and TMRLV4] 
 
But, 
 
(TMRLV6) S cannot know strongly a priori that e [from Environmental Access Thesis] 
 
Therefore, 
 
(TMRLV7) S both can and cannot know strongly a priori that e [from TMRLV5 and TMRLV6] 
 
 
Traditional McKinsey Reasoning LET Variation is technically or mechanically sound but, it 
suffers from at least two potential presentational defects. 
 
Firstly, my (and McKinsey’s) solution to Traditional McKinsey Reasoning LET Variation is 
“keep PAI and reject LET”.   Perhaps we would add “replace ME with LET”.  But, the 
comment in the last two sets of scare quotes masks why we want to reject LET.  One can 
reject LET by rejecting SE or CPA or both, and our position is to only reject CPA.  Our 
rejection of CPA is neither being made explicit, nor being explained in the last two sets of 
scare quotes. 
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Secondly, what is the philosophical basis of accepting LET?  It cannot just be acceptance 
of SE, since SE speaks merely of “de dicto structured cognitive predicates”, not of “the 
metaphysical nature of mental states”.  Rather, the philosophical basis of LET must be that 
SE is true and every property expressed by the de dicto structured cognitive predicates 
which SE speaks of is individuating (which is in effect to add the Frege-Russell support for 
CPA to the explanation).  So, given the amount of detail (or sub-theses) packed into LET 
one has to very attentive to detail in order to accurately and fully explain why accepting 
LET is plausible. 
 
§14 Road ahead 
 
Ideally, my plan for the rest of the thesis would have been to fully defend the auxiliary 
claims used by Traditional McKinsey Reasoning, thus securing the incompatibility of the 
conjunction of PAI, SE and CPA and then sketch my solution of rejecting CPA alone; 
and, finally, sketch a positive picture of the non-factive and stative cognitive attitudes.   
 
However, matters are not so straightforward because a number of commentators on 
“McKinsey Reasoning” do not recognise it as being what I have called Traditional McKinsey 
Reasoning.  Rather, though a series of misunderstandings, with which I have some sympathy, 
they take “McKinsey Reasoning” to be attempting to show that two other theses that are 
not PAI, CPA or SE (but may have some similarities with them) are incompatible and a 
necessary part of the reasoning to show this involves some subject performing a deduction. 
 
Commentary on this alternative kind of alternative “McKinsey Reasoning” remains 
prominent and widespread to the present day.  So much so, that perhaps some of the best 
responses to the Traditional McKinsey Reasoning which I have set out might be buried within 
the commentary on this alternative kind of “McKinsey Reasoning”.  So, a detour into 
considering this kind of alternative “McKinsey Reasoning” is required for this reason 
alone. 
 
Moreover, there is some interesting “cross-talk” between the proponents of Traditional 
McKinsey Reasoning (specifically, McKinsey himself) and commentators on the alternative 
kind of “McKinsey Reasoning”.  The “cross-talk” is mostly one way: from McKinsey to 
the commentators on alternative “McKinsey Reasoning” (see McKinsey (2001) and, 
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especially, McKinsey (2002, 2003).  The “cross-talk” reveals some interesting elements of 
Traditional McKinsey Reasoning and the alternative kind of “McKinsey Reasoning”. 
 
It is rather difficult to dive into a discussion of this alternative kind of “McKinsey 
Reasoning”.  One needs some kind of context to thoroughly understand it.  This, in turn, 
requires a discussion of some old thought experiments given by Putnam and Burge.  This 
discussion is required for at least two reasons.  Firstly, some variants of the alternative 
“McKinsey Reasoning” narrowly focus on instances of the reasoning which use cognitive 
predicates containing kind terms and, in so doing, are drawing on certain interpretations of 
work from Burge and Putnam which comment on such cognitive predicates.  Secondly, 
some versions of alternative “McKinsey Reasoning” rely quite heavily on a subject being 
agnostic about the application conditions of a concept she possesses (or perhaps even 
misunderstanding the application conditions of a concept she possesses) and in so doing 
draw on Burge’s famous “arthritis” thought experiment, which discusses such cases.  So, in 
the next chapter, I shall discuss the relevant work of Putnam and Burge. 
 
In Chapter 3, I shall set out a template of the alternative form of “McKinsey Reasoning” 
and contrast it with my Traditional McKinsey Reasoning.  With that contrast in the open, in 
chapters 4 and 5 I shall discuss the auxiliary claims used by both Traditional McKinsey 
Reasoning and alternative “McKinsey Reasoning”. 
 
In chapters 6, 7 and 8 I look at some “straightforward responses” to the types of 
“McKinsey Reasoning”.  These “straightforward responses” grant the various auxiliary 
claims (at least for the sake of argument) and, instead, consider rejecting one of the other 
main claims of the reasoning. Chapter 8 presents McKinsey’s rejection of CPA, which I 
endorse.  Chapter 9 sketches the positive picture of thought McKinsey has constructed and 
which I tentatively endorse. 
 
Chapter 10 considers various related alleged paradoxes and philosophical problems that 
may be thought to be related to “McKinsey Reasoning”.  I suggest that these problems 
tacitly assume CPA, and with the role of that assumption explicitly stated and rejected they 
can be resolved. 
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Chapter 2 
 
In §1 and §3 I shall briefly review the famous examples of Putnam (1975) and Burge 
(1979).  This is important because some of those who comment on “McKinsey Reasoning” 
tend to draw on certain interpretations of Putnam and Burge’s famous work.  In §2 I 
briefly discuss some extensions of Putnam’s work which relating to the so called 
‘achievement problem’.  §4 concludes. 
 
§1 The Putnam Thought Experiment 
 
The Putnam scenario might be described thus: 
 
Twin-Earth is planet which is very distant from Earth (in the actual world).  Oscar resides 
on Earth.  Oscar has a duplicate or a doppelganger on a distant planet (in the actual world) 
called Twin-Earth.  Twin-Earth is qualitatively the same as Earth except that on Twin-
Earth the stuff that fills the lakes, rivers and so on is not water but a chemical compound 
XYZ, which is macroscopically indistinguishable from water but has a different chemical 
structure to water.  Both Oscar and his internal duplicate are ignorant of the chemical 
composition of water and the substance in place of water on Twin-Earth, say twater.  
According to Putnam, both Oscar and Toscar are alike in all their “narrow states”.  Now 
when Oscar utters the word, water, intuition has it that he picks out only the substance 
H2O on earth.  Whereas when Toscar uses the token ‘water’, Toscar’s token of the word 
picks out only the substance XYZ on Twin-Earth. 
 
The Putnam example raises up to four issues.  The first, is to account for the difference in 
meaning (if any) between Oscar’s use of the word ‘water’ and his twin’s use of the word.  
The second issue is to account for the difference (if any) between the twins’ grasp of 
meaning of the word ‘water’.  A third issue concerns accounting for the difference (if any) 
between the de dicto structured cognitive predicate ‘Oscar believes that water is wet’ and 
the de dicto structured cognitive predicate ‘Toscar believes water is wet’.  A fourth issue is 
to account for the difference (if any) between the metaphysical nature of Oscar’s mental 
state compared to the mental state of his twin.  Some of these issues are parasitic upon 
another:  For example, if there simply is in fact no difference between the meaning of 
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Oscar’s use of the word ‘water’ from Toscar’s use of the word, then there is no need to 
account for the difference in the twins’ grasp of meaning of the word (for their grasp of the 
meaning would be the same). 
 
§1.1 Issue 1: Accounting for the difference in meaning 
 
Is there a difference in meaning between the twins’ uses of the word ‘water’?  Here is 
McKinsey’s answer. 
 
“Now, it seems obviously correct to say, as Putnam does, what the Twin 
Earthians call 'water' is not H20 but XYZ.  Thus the word 'water' when used by 
us on Earth has a different extension than it does when used by our 
doppelgangers on Twin Earth. But then, given that a general term's extension is 
determined by its meaning, there must also be some difference between the 
meaning that 'water' has on Earth and the meaning it has on Twin Earth. The 
problem is to account for how this difference in meaning is possible, given the 
extreme qualitative similarity of Earth and Twin Earth.” (1987, pp10-11) 
 
Here McKinsey notes that (a) each of the twin’s uses of water has a different extension and 
suggests that (b) a difference in the extension of a term is sufficient for a difference in 
meaning of a term.  McKinsey’s answer to the problem he mentions is to claim that each 
speaker’s use of ‘water’ must mention some object which, the substance water, and not the 
substance XYZ, bears some relation to. In order to see this point consider giving the 
meaning of ‘water’ in purely qualitative terms: 
 
(DF1) x is water =df x is the colourless, odourless, thirst-quenching liquid of the kind that 
fills up lakes, rivers and oceans and falls from the sky as rain. 
 
The meaning specified by (DF1) is satisfied by both samples of H2O on Earth and samples 
of XYZ on Twin-Earth, thus (DF1) gives us the false consequence that XYZ on Twin-
Earth is water. 
 
Nor can appeal to the chemical structure help to yield the correct meaning of ‘water’.  
Consider for example, 
 
(DF2) x is water =df  x is H2O 
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Although water is H2O, ‘water’ does not mean H2O.  Moreover, one can be ignorant of the 
fact that water is H2O and yet still grasp the meaning of ‘water’.  Given definitions (DF1) 
and (DF2) look unpromising, McKinsey concludes: 
 
“It seems that in order to specify water so as to distinguish it from what Twin 
Earthians call 'water', a person with no scientific knowledge would have to 
mention some object to which water, but not XYZ, bears a certain relation. For it 
seems that the only differences that would exist between water and XYZ, besides 
the chemical differences, lie in the distinct objects to which the two kinds of 
liquids would be related. Thus water, but not XYZ, is found in the lakes and 
rivers of Earth; water, but not XYZ, is stuff that we (the inhabitants of Earth) 
have experienced; and so on. Perhaps, then, 'water' could be defined by 
mentioning some particular object to which water, but not XYZ, bears a certain 
relation.” (1987, p10). 
 
One obvious candidate that may satisfy McKinsey’s criteria is to simply say that the term 
‘water’ has a referent that is completely exhausted by the ordinary contingently existing 
physical substance water and the meaning of ‘water’ simply is the referent.  Thus, on this 
proposal, the meaning of ‘water’ just is its referent the substance water.  Now, McKinsey, 
himself, rejects this option but this may be an option that is used by other philosophers 
we’ll be considering who commentate on the McKinsey problem. 
 
McKinsey himself says: 
 
“it is counterintuitive to suppose that a predicate like 'believes that water is wet' 
would be [semantically] de re with respect to the semantic contribution of the 
term 'water'. For surely, it is possible to believe that water is wet even though it 
should turn out that there is no such thing as water, and no natural kind to which 
such stuff belongs.” (1994, p322). 
 
So, given that McKinsey has the intuition that it is possible to have (non-factive and 
stative) cognitive attitudes about water even when there is no such substance as water, he 
rejects the claim that the meaning of ‘water’ simply is its referent.  In fact, McKinsey claims 
that the term ‘water’ has two meanings.  The first meaning is its propositional meaning 
which just is its referent.  The second meaning is its linguistic meaning, the linguistic 
meaning gives a rule which fixes the referent of water (and thus fixes the propositional 
meaning of ‘water’).  McKinsey’s suggestion is that in simple non-cognitive sentences, like 
‘The glass contains water’, the term ‘water’ only contributes its referent to the sentence.  
Thus, the proposition expressed by the sentence ‘the glass contains water’ is simply a 
function of the referent of ‘water’.  However, in cognitive sentences or predicates such as 
‘Oscar thinks that water is wet’ the referent of ‘water’ drops out as irrelevant and instead 
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the linguistic meaning of water partly determines the property that is expressed by the 
cognitive predicate. 
 
At this point one might reply:  How has McKinsey earned the right to suggest that kind 
terms like ‘water’ have two kinds of meaning?  Given the small fraction of McKinsey’s 
work that I have presented, I have not done enough to show that he has earned this right.  
In order to earn the right, however, McKinsey needs to reject CPA and the Proposition 
Theory, which is partly the task of Traditional McKinsey Reasoning.  So for the moment, for the 
sake of exposition, let us grant that these two types of meaning are possible. 
 
So what does McKinsey take to be the meaning of ‘water’?  Specifically, what does 
McKinsey take to be the linguistic meaning of ‘water’?  In order to answer this question, let 
us say that a genuine term is a term that refers directly to, without describing a given object.  
For example, if the term ‘Earth’ is treated as a genuine term, then it refers directly to the 
contingently existing physical object the planet Earth.  That is to say, in such 
circumstances, the referent of ‘Earth’ is completely exhausted by the contingently existing 
planet Earth.  In such circumstances, the sole semantic function of ‘Earth’ in simple (non-
cognitive) sentences is to introduce a referent into what is said by such sentences.  Or put 
another way, in such circumstances, the simple sentence containing the term ‘Earth’ 
expresses a proposition that is singular with respect to the contingently existing planet 
Earth.  For example, in such circumstances the simple sentence ‘Earth rotates’ expresses a 
proposition which is singular with respect to Earth. 
 
McKinsey’s proposal is that we can account for the difference in the meaning of ‘water’ in 
the Twin Earth case by specifying that the meaning of ‘water’ contains an element 
containing a special type of genuine term (let’s call it a distinguishing genuine term).  The 
distinguishing genuine term will be such that it ensures that only samples of the substance water 
and not the substance XYZ satisfy the referent of the word ‘water’.  Here is an attempt to 
specify the meaning of ‘water’ using the term ‘Earth’ as a distinguishing genuine term: 
 
(DF3) x is water iff x is the colourless, odourless thirst-quenching liquid of the kind that is 
found on Earth. 
 
Since the substance XYZ is not found on Earth but the substance water is, then (DF3) 
serves to ensure that the word ‘water’ refers only to the substance water. 
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Note also that (DF3) has the ordinary contingently existing physical object planet Earth as 
a constituent and the meaning (DF3) would not exist unless planet Earth exists.  McKinsey 
says: 
 
“Let us say that an "objectual meaning" is a meaning that can only be expressed 
by use of a genuine term that refers to a particular concrete object. Such a 
meaning essentially involves a particular object, or has that object "as a 
constituent." For instance, if we identify the meaning that [(DF3)] ascribes to 
'water' with the relational property expressed by [(DF3)]'s definiens, then this 
property would be an example of an objectual meaning that has the planet Earth 
as a constituent.  What the Twin Earth case seems to show, then, is that there are 
objectual meanings.” (1987, p11). 
 
Now, McKinsey, for reasons independent of the Putnam case, is not satisfied by (DF3).  In 
the end he settles with the following definition: 
 
(DF4) For any ø, if ø is a token of 'is water', then for any property P, ø is to predicate P if 
and only if: there is a natural kind K such that in the actual world, the colorless, odorless, 
thirst-quenching liquid that we have experienced belongs to K, and P = the property of 
belonging to K. 
 
Now the pronoun ‘we’ used in (DF4) to demonstratively pick out a group consisting of the 
speaker and other inhabitants of Earth.  Thus the rule expressed by (DF4) is an objectual 
rule that essentially involves that group.  The speaker’s twin on Twin-Earth would use ‘we’ 
to pick out himself and the other inhabitants of Twin-Earth.  So, the rule expressed on 
Twin-Earth, though qualitatively similar to the rule used on Earth, is a different rule 
involving a different group. 
 
The morals of this brief discussion is that the Putnam case shows that, firstly, there is, in 
fact, a difference in meaning of the word ‘water’ when used on Earth and Twin-Earth.  
Secondly, the difference is to be accounted for by the fact that the meaning of ‘water’ is 
objectual in the sense of involving an ordinary contingently existing physical object or 
objects which water on Earth and not XYZ bears some relation to.  Thirdly, if you are 
persuaded that the only significant kind of meaning is propositional meaning, then you 
might account for this difference by claiming that the meaning of ‘water’ on Earth just is its 
referent the substance water.   Fourthly, if you are persuaded that there are both 
propositional and linguistic meanings, then you might claim that the linguistic meaning of 
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‘water’ is objectual because it involves a genuine term whose referent is completely 
exhausted by a contingently existing physical object external to the speaker. 
 
§1.2 Issue 2: Accounting for grasp of meaning 
 
One can also view the Twin Earth case as challenging us to account for the difference, if 
any, in the twins’ grasp of the meaning of the word ‘water’.  If the meaning of water must 
be objectual in some sense or another, then it would seem that the twins do in fact grasp 
different meanings of the word ‘water’.  How should we account for this?  It would appear 
that the thought experiment refutes the following version of Internalism about meaning: 
 
Meaning Internalism 
Necessarily, if two persons share all of the same “narrow psychological states”, then one of the 
persons means something by a given word iff the other person means the same thing by that 
word. 
 
Now, since Oscar and Toscar uses of ‘water’ have different meanings, given Meaning 
Internalism, Oscar and Toscar cannot share all of the same narrow states.  Thus, the twins 
grasp of the meaning of ‘water’ cannot be accounted for by appeal to their narrow states. 
 
However, Meaning Internalism, as it stands needs to clarify what is meant by a “narrow 
psychological states”? 
 
One of the crucial claims required to show that the Twin Earth Case refutes Meaning 
Internalism is that the twins share all of the same “narrow psychological properties”.  But is 
this claim correct?  It would seem to be false for first person or de se cognitive attitudes 
(see for example McKinsey 1991b).  For example, if Oscar possesses the property 
expressed by the cognitive predicate ‘Oscar thinks that he himself is a hero’ is classed as 
“narrow” and individuating, then Oscar will possess a property that Toscar will not 
possess.  Why? Oscar has only thoughts about Oscar and has no thoughts about Toscar.  
Similarly, Toscar has only thoughts about Toscar and has no thoughts about Oscar. 
 
Thus, using the Twin-Earth Case to refute the Meaning Internalism does not work if first 
personal psychological states are allowed to qualify as “narrow psychological states”.  One 
might reply that first personal psychological states should not qualify as “narrow”.  In order 
to evaluate this objection we need firmer definitions of a “narrow” psychological state. 
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Strict Logical Narrowness 
A property F possessed by a subject S is strictly logically narrow iff F does not logically imply 
the existence of an object o, where o is neither identical to nor any part of any of S’s mental 
states, acts and experiences and property F is not contingently relational. 
 
Liberal Narrow State 
A property F possessed by a subject S is liberally logically narrow iff F does not logically imply 
the existence of an object o, where o is neither identical to nor any part of any of S’s mental 
states, acts and experiences. 
 
Both types of narrow states are logically narrow in the sense that they do not logically 
imply the existence of contingently existing ordinary physical objects external to the thinker 
or speaker who possesses the state.  However, the definition Liberal Narrow State allows that 
the state in question may be contingently relational.  Thus the definition Liberal Narrow State 
allows that first-person psychological states, which are contingently relational, count as 
“narrow psychological states”.  On the other hand, the definition Strict Narrow State does 
not allow first person psychological states to count as narrow because it does not allow 
contingently relational states to satisfy it. 
 
We, thus, have two notions of Meaning Internalism: 
 
Strict Meaning Internalism 
Necessarily, if two persons share all the same strict narrow psychological states, then one of 
the persons means something by a given word iff the other person means the same thing by a 
given word. 
 
Liberal Meraning Internalism 
Necessarily, if two persons share all the same liberally narrow psychological states, then one of 
the persons means something by a given word iff the other person means the same thing by a 
given word. 
 
The Twin Earth Case refutes Strict Meaning Internalism but not Liberal Meaning Internalism. 
(see McKinsey 1991b, pp146-56 for more on this).  However, Liberal Meaning Internalism still 
faces some very difficult questions:  Firstly, how can we account for the differences in the 
twins’ grasp of the meaning of ‘water’ by appeal to only their first personal psychological 
states?  In the absence of such an explanation, one might as well claim that Liberal Meaning 
Internalism is false after all.  Secondly, how can the meaning of ‘water’ be grasped by private 
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first personal attitudes even when the meaning of ‘water’ belongs to a word in the public 
language and involves ordinary contingently existing public physical objects? 
 
If one assumes the Proposition Theory it is possible to push the Liberal Meaning Internalist into 
an untenable position.  In order to see this, let’s take an objectual meaning which might be 
drawn from the Twin Earth case.  For example, consider, 
 
(DF3) x is water iff x is the colourless, odourless thirst-quenching liquid of the kind that is 
found on Earth. 
 
Now the mental state by which Oscar grasps the rule (DF5) might be 
 
(O1) Oscar intends that: for any x, x is to be taken as satisfying is is water’ iff x has the 
same structure as the odourless, colourless thirst-quenching of that kind found on Earth. 
 
By assuming the Proposition Theory, we are entitled to take the (non-factive and stative) 
cognitive state ‘intends that’ as expressing a relation between the subject Oscar and a 
proposition.  Moreover, given the proposition theory we also take this cognitive state of 
Oscar’s to be individuated by the proposition which he bears the cognitive state towards.  
Now, the term ‘Earth’ in (DF5) is functioning as a genuine term with no descriptive 
meaning in the public language and its referent is completely exhausted by the contingently 
existing physical planet Earth.  Thus, since the proposition which Oscar has the cognitive 
attitude ‘intends that’ towards in (O1) is a function of the referent of the genuine term 
‘Earth’, Oscar essentially has a cognitive attitude towards or about the contingently existing 
planet Earth.  Given this last result, the cognitive state ascribed by (O1) cannot be a private 
and narrow state belonging to Oscar because it essentially involves the contingently existing 
planet Earth. 
 
Now, the last argument can be short circuited if we do not assume the Proposition Theory.  
Were we not to assume the Proposition Theory, then perhaps the cognitive ascription (O1) 
does not express a relation of a cognitive attitude between Oscar and a proposition and 
perhaps that attitude will not be individuated by the proposition (if any) that concerns the 
cognitive attitude.  So the challenge for the Liberal Meaning Internalist, can be met, provided 
he finds some reason to reject the Proposition Theory.  Since Traditional McKinsey Reasoning can 
be used as an attack on CPA (which is logically implied by the Proposition Theory), one can 
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use Traditional McKinsey Reasoning to form the beginnings of an attack on the Proposition 
Theory. 
 
On the other hand, if you accept the Proposition Theory, you might see Liberal Meaning 
Internalism as untenable.  Hence, you might conclude that no version of Meaning Internalism 
is tenable and conclude that the Twin Earth case shows that one’s grasp of meaning must 
involve psychological states which logically imply the existence of ordinary contingently 
existing physical objects. 
 
§1.3 Issue 3: Extending the moral to de dicto structured cognitive 
predicates 
 
It is possible to extend the Twin Earth case to be not just about  difference of meaning and 
grasp of meaning but to be about de dicto structured cognitive predicates and even to be 
about the metaphysical nature of mental states. 
 
It is easy to see how the experiment can be about de dicto structured cognitive predicates.  
Consider the cognitive predicate ‘Oscar thinks that water is wet’.  As long as one of the 
views in the previous sections are correct, we’ll end up concluding that the cognitive 
predicate expresses a logically wide property. 
 
If for example, we think that the term ‘water’ has no linguistic meaning and only 
propositional meaning, then to account for the Putnam Case, we might say that the 
referent of the term ‘water’ just is the substance water.  Consequently the de dicto 
structured cognitive predicate, on this view, is semantically de re with respect to the 
substance water.  Thus, we might be committed to the following claim: 
 
The de dicto structured cognitive predicate ‘Oscar thinks that water is wet’ expresses a 
logically wide property. 
 
We might take that property to be the property Oscar thinks that water is wet. 
 
If so we might claim that: 
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The proposition that Oscar thinks that water is wet logically implies the proposition that water 
exists. 
 
On the other hand, we may consider ‘water’ to have both propositional and linguistic 
meanings.  But even when we focus on the linguistic meaning of ‘water’ the property 
expressed by the de dicto structured cognitive predicate ‘thinks that water is wet’ will still 
be semantically de re with respect to some ordinary contingently existing physical object but 
perhaps not the substance water.  Following (DF4) the cognitive predicate could be 
semantically de re with respect to planet Earth.  Or following, (DF5) the cognitive 
predicate could be de re with respect to the community of humans Oscar is related to on 
planet Earth. 
 
Now if we define the proposition that E as we did in the last chapter (a proposition 
asserting the existence of some ordinary contingently existing physical object) it is easy to 
see that all the views I have just described are united on the following two claims: 
 
SE-Water Instance* 
The de dicto structured cognitive predicate ‘Oscar thinks that water is wet’ expresses a logically 
wide property 
 
SE Water Instance** 
The proposition that Oscar thinks that water is wet logically implies the proposition that E. 
 
§1.4 Issue 4: A difference in the metaphysical nature of mental states? 
 
Can we conclude that the Putnam Case shows that the metaphysical nature of the twins 
thoughts are different?  Specifically, can we conclude from the Putnam Case that Oscar has 
a mental state individuated by the property Oscar thinks that water is wet and Toscar 
has a distinct mental state individuated by a different property (say, the property Toscar 
thinks that twater is wet)?  Yes, provided we assume CPA.  If we do not assume CPA, we’ll 
have to answer this question in the negative.  Let me explain. 
 
If we assume CPA, then not only will the de dicto structured cognitive predicate ‘Oscar 
thinks that water is wet’ express a wide cognitive property but the property will also 
individuate with respect to the cognitive state it describes.  For example, if the cognitive 
predicate expresses the property Oscar thinks that water is wet, then this property will 
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individuate Oscar’s belief.  Whereas, given CPA, a different property will individuate the 
mental state of Toscar, perhaps the property Toscar thinks that water is wet, for 
instance. 
 
If we do not assume CPA, then while the properties Oscar thinks that water is wet and 
Toscar thinks that water is wet may be both logically wide and expressed by certain de 
dicto structured cognitive predicates, those properties do not individuate either of the 
twins’ mental states. 
 
How do we decide whether or not to assume CPA?  Part of the point of Traditional 
McKinsey Reasoning is to force us not to assume it if we also subscribe to PAI and SE. 
 
§2 The achievement problem and travelling cases 
 
If we accept CPA and the claim that the de dicto structured cognitive predicate ‘Oscar 
believes that water is wet’ it is possible to construct so-called counterfactual cases.  These 
cases are meant to put pressure on the view that a subject has “privileged” or “a priori” 
access to her thought in some sense. 
 
Very roughly the cases go like this.  Take Susan who inhabits Earth and thinks that water is 
wet.  Susan could be regularly unwittingly transported from Earth to planet Twin-Earth as 
defined by Putnam and back again in a way that is unbeknownst to her.  Now, after a 
sufficient time on planet Twin-Earth when Susan truly and sincerely utters “I think that 
water is wet” she’ll express the thought that twater is wet yet everything will seem the same 
internally (or from the inside) to Susan.  This scenario gives us the outline of the following 
argument (see for example Flavey and Owens 1994, Farkas 2008). 
 
Achievement Reasoning Template 
 
(ART1) If S can know a priori that she is thinking that p, then S can distinguish a priori between 
the actual situation in which she thinks that p and a relevant alternative situation in which she 
lacks the thought that p [claim] 
 
(ART2) There are situations in which S lacks the thought that p which S cannot a priori 
distinguish from the actual situation in which she possesses the thought [claim]. 
 
(ART3) At least some of the situations in which in which S lacks the thought that p which S 
cannot a priori distinguish from the actual situation in which she possesses the thought are 
relevant alternative situations to the actual situation [claim] 
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Therefore, 
 
(ART4) S cannot know a priori that she thinks that p [from ART1, ART2 and ART3]. 
 
 
Note, firstly, that the argument, requires CPA to generate the scenarios which support one 
of its claims.  With CPA denied, it would be open to us to deny that logically wide 
properties expressed by de dicto structured cognitive predicates such as ‘Susan thinks that 
water is wet’ individuate with respect to Susan’s thoughts.  With CPA denied, we could 
claim that everything seems the same on the inside to Susan precisely because Susan’s 
thoughts are the same due to them being individuated by logically narrow properties. 
 
Secondly, we need to get a grip on what is meant by “a priori” knowledge of thoughts in 
this example.  Does it mean the kind of strong aprioricity that McKinsey is concerned 
with?  Or does it mean something weaker?  I’d suggest that if (for the sake of argument) we 
grant CPA, then the argument does threaten the strong a priori knowledge that McKinsey 
is concerned with since surely S would already know strongly a priori that E and, 
consequently, she would know strongly a priori that she is not in any one of the relevant 
alternative scenarios. 
 
However, we did not need Susan’s elaborate story to tell us this, since Traditional McKinsey 
Reasoning, which involves no such elaborate story, tells us that if we assume both CPA and 
SE, then PAI (the capacity to know strongly a priori of the properties that individuate our 
mental states) has to be rejected. 
 
Rejection of PAI is compatible with subscribing to some kind of weaker privileged access 
thesis where we have the capacity to know weakly a priori the contents of our thoughts: 
 
S knows that p weakly a priori iff S acquired knowledge that p without perceptual 
observation or empirical investigation but may have made empirical assumptions.  This 
alternative definition of aprioricty yields a weaker privileged access thesis: 
 
W-PAC 
For any subject , S, and any mental state individuated by the property S is thinking that p:  If S 
is thinking that p, then S can know weakly a priori that she thinks that p. 
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Perhaps cases like the Susan switching scenario do not threaten W-PAC because a subject 
can simply make the empirical assumption that she is not undergoing any of the slow-
switching scenarios like Susan’s.  This still doesn’t end the discussion as one might reply 
that, even given W-PAC, allows a subject to make certain empirical, a subject still requires 
adequate discriminative abilities of the sort mentioned in claim ART1. 
 
However, the question of whether W-PAC has any philosophical basis remains to be seen.  
In Chapter 1, I suggested that the Cartesian predicament supported PAI where a sense of 
strong aprioricity was involved.  It does not seem to be part of that Cartesian predicament 
that the subject possesses knowledge of her thoughts, only if she makes certain empirical 
assumptions.  So, the Cartesian Predicament does not seem to support W-PAC.   
 
§3 Burge’s Experiment 
 
Certain examples given by Burge (1979) are thought to have broader scope than Putnam’s 
because they can be applied to any general term such as ‘arthritis’, ‘sofa’ and ‘brisket’ as 
well as kind terms such as ‘water’.  It is commonly thought that if Burge is correct then 
belief or thought ascriptions containing these terms will imply the existence of a speech 
community (of more than one member) which is logically distinct from the speaker or 
thinker. 
 
Moreover, if we combine CPA with the common moral drawn from Burge’s thought 
experiment, then we would also be forced to conclude that the metaphysical nature of the 
mental state individuated by such a property logically implies the existence of a speech 
community.  
 
For example, suppose the cognitive predicate ‘Oscar believes that arthritis is painful’ is de 
dicto structured and expresses the property Oscar believes that arthritis is painful.  
According to the Burge view, the property Oscar believes that arthritis is painful 
logically implies the existence of a speech community.  Moreover, if we accept CPA, then 
the metaphysical nature of the mental state individuated by the property Oscar believes 
that arthritis is painful is logically wide. 
 
In this section I shall identify the arguments extracted from Burge’s work that we might 
use to express this conclusion. 
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A rough and ready explanation of one of Burge’s examples  concerns a subject, say Oscar, 
who has a less than perfect grasp of the concept expressed by the word ‘arthritis’.  Oscar 
(correctly) believes that he has arthritis in his ankles.  And, Oscar has become convinced 
that he has arthritis in his thigh and speaks to his doctor about the topic.  The doctor tells 
Oscar that it is impossible for him to have arthritis in his thigh since, by medical definition, 
arthritis is an inflammation of (only) the joints.  Oscar defers to his doctor’s linguistic 
authority and stands corrected.  Then, Burge asks us to imagine a counterfactual situation 
in which Oscar’s entire personal history is identical to the previous case but except that the 
word ‘arthritis’ is now used by Oscar’s linguistic community to cover any wide class of 
rheumatoid ailments of the joints, tendons, muscles and bones.  So, in the counterfactual 
situation Oscar’s grasp of the concept of ‘arthritis’ is adequate. 
 
Burge points out that in the actual situation, up until the time his doctor corrects him, 
Oscar believes that he has arthritis in his thigh, whereas in the counterfactual situation 
Oscar has no beliefs about arthritis at all.  In the counterfactual situation, the beliefs that 
Oscar expresses using the word ‘arthritis’ seem to concern a general class of rheumatoid 
ailment and not arthritis.  Now, prior to correction by his doctor Oscar is internally the 
same in both the actual and counterfactual situations, and since the only difference in the 
situations up to that point is in Oscar’s social and linguistic environment, Burge concludes 
that the contents of Oscar’s beliefs are dependent upon his social and linguistic 
environment. 
 
There are two morals one might draw from this case of Burge’s.  The first is that the 
contents of one’s beliefs (or at least beliefs containing at least one general term such as 
‘arthritis’) are dependent on one’s social and linguistic environment.  The second is that the 
general term ‘arthritis’ and perhaps other similar terms have logically wide meanings (in the 
sense that correct specification of their meaning logically implies the existence of ordinary 
contingently existing physical objects such as a speech community). 
 
McKinsey (1993) suggests that the first moral is far too strong.  McKinsey claims that the 
contents of one’s beliefs are not in general dependent upon the social or linguistic 
community.  However, McKinsey readily admits that the contents of one’s beliefs 
sometimes – in certain special circumstances – are dependent on one’s social or linguistic 
community.  And, according to McKinsey, Burge’s example shows that these special 
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circumstances are when a subject has an inadequate or incomplete grasp of the concept of 
a general term that is part of the belief. 
 
In order to see this last point, consider a case where a subject has an adequate or complete 
grasp of the concept of ‘arthritis’: 
 
“Consider Arthur, an M.D. who specializes in diseases of the joints and who 
actively engages in research on the various forms of arthritis.  Arthur's grasp of 
the concept of arthritis is of course perfect. But in fact, let us suppose, no word 
for arthritis occurs in the language of Arthur's community; perhaps he has come 
up with the concept on his own, and prior to the publication of his research, he 
has not yet found an appropriate technical term to use for the condition. (Maybe, 
he thinks, he should call it 'arthuritis'!) 
 
Arthur of course has many beliefs about arthritis, but let us just consider his 
simple belief that arthritis is painful. It seems quite clear that this belief would in 
no way be logically dependent upon Arthur's social or linguistic environment. But 
then, since my description of Arthur is clearly consistent with Burge's description 
of his example, there seems to be nothing about the features of Burge's example 
which justifies the claim that the contents of one's beliefs are in general dependent 
upon one's social and linguistic environment.” (McKinsey, 1993 p326). 
 
 
Thus, if Arthur’s belief that arthritis is painful does not logically imply the existence of a 
linguistic or speech community.  We can conclude that at least when a subject has a 
complete grasp of the meaning of a general term such as ‘arthritis’ the meaning is not 
logically wide.  Moreover we can conclude that in cases where a subject has a complete 
grasp of a general term, the subject’s belief does not depend on one’s linguistic 
environment.  Hence, a qualified de dicto structured cognitive predicate such as ‘Arthur 
believes that arthritis is painful and Arthur has complete understanding of all the terms 
involved’ does not express a property which logically implies the existence of a speech 
community.  Indeed, Arthur could possess this belief in a solipsistic universe. 
 
What happens if we qualify the cognitive predicate in a different way, so as to explicitly 
hone in on a case where a subject has an incomplete grasp of the meaning of a general 
term.  Consider, for example, the cognitive predicate ‘Oscar believes that arthritis is painful 
and Oscar has incomplete grasp of the meaning of ‘arthritis’’.  In this case, McKinsey 
would grant that Burge’s argument may show that such a cognitive predicate, if de dicto 
structured, expresses a property that logically implies the existence of a linguistic 
community. 
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However, there is an interesting consequence of Burge’s first case.  Given the generality of 
the terms to which the term can be applied, it suggests that what is making the terms work 
is not the meanings of the words – the general terms – in question but the meaning of the 
word ‘believes’.  McKinsey suggests that the Burge case does show that there are two 
radically different conditions under which a subject can satisfy any (de dicto structured) 
belief predicate, even a predicate that has entirely logically narrow content. One way is to 
satisfy the predicate by having complete understanding of the concepts involved.  Another 
way is for the subject to have an incomplete understanding of the concepts involved but 
the subject’s lack of understanding can be made up for by membership of a linguistic 
community whose language contains a word that expresses the relevant concept. 
 
Thus, the proper conclusion to draw from Burge’s first case is that there are two distinct, 
and radically different, conditions each of which are sufficient for the satisfaction of the 
belief predicate.  One of those sufficient conditions will require membership of a given 
social or linguistic community for its satisfaction.  Thus properties expressed by de dicto 
structured belief predicates which can be used in Burge’s example are disjunctive in form.  
For example, the de dicto structured belief predicate ‘S believes that arthritis is painful’ 
expresses the disjunctive property either N or W. Where N is the logically wide property 
which obtains when the thinker grasps all of the meanings of the terms involved and W is 
the logically wide property where the thinker fails to grasp all of the meanings involved. 
 
Now the property either N or W is itself logically narrow, since one can satisfy property by 
possessing property N alone which does not logically imply the existence of a speech 
community. 
 
However, the property either N or W is not supervenient on the believer’s internal states, 
since in both situations in Burge’s first case the subject is the same internally but in the one 
situation the subject possesses a certain belief and yet fails to possess this belief in the other 
situation.  Moreover, these disjunctive properties, even though logically narrow, cannot be 
used to individuate any belief.  McKinsey explains this well: 
 
“while Oscar and his doctor might both believe (in Burge's sense) that arthritis is 
painful, the beliefs of Oscar and his doctor that would make this ascription true of 
each would certainly seem to be quite different.” (McKinsey, p331). 
 
(see also Loar 1985, p105.) 
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According to this quote, although the disjunctive property either N or W may be 
expressed by the cognitive predicate ‘believes that arthritis is painful’, the disjunctive 
property cannot be the property that is used to individuate the metaphysical nature of the 
mental state of Oscar and his doctor, since if it was it would result in Oscar and his doctor 
sharing the same belief states.  And, this last result seems counter-intuitive. 
 
McKinsey’s way around this difficulty is to qualify the belief predicate we are using.  He 
says: 
 
“Suppose the sentence S has completley narrow meaning and we want to use the 
predicate' believes that S' to ascribe an individuating belief property to Oscar.  We 
can do this simply by qualifying the predications o as to rule out the irrelevant 
disjunct. We can, for instance, say something like 'Oscar believes that S, with 
complete understanding of all the concepts involved'. Or we can say, 'Oscar 
believes that S, and he would believe that S even if the sentence(s) he uses to 
express this belief meant something else in his language'. By explicitly ruling out 
the irrelevant wide disjunct in Burge's belief properties, these formulations can 
ascribe properties that are not only narrow in Putnam's sense, but that also are 
supervenient on internal states and that individuate the beliefs ascribed.” (2003, 
p331-2). 
 
 
McKinsey further suggests: 
 
“To be on the safe side, a defender of narrow content could adopt a set of new 
definitions for the whole range of cognitive attitude operators.  For instance, we 
might define 'x believesN that S' as an abbreviation of 'x believes that S, with 
complete understanding of the concepts involved'.  Adoption of such a definition 
is harmless, since if Burge is right, it provides us with the narrow belief predicates 
we need for purposes of individuation, and if Burge is wrong, the definition is just 
redundant and we end up with the same operator that we started with.” (2003, 
p332). 
 
McKinsey’s official view is that Burge is wrong.  McKinsey’s view is that the cognitive 
predicate ‘Oscar believes that he has arthritis in his thigh’ is not de dicto structured.  
Instead, McKinsey proposes that it is de re structured.  That is to say, McKinsey proposes 
that the predicate is structurally equivalent to this structurally de re formulation ‘As regards 
to arthritis, Oscar believes that he has it in his thigh’.  McKinsey contends that his position 
explains at least as much as Burge’s, he says: 
 
“This hypothesis explains why it seems false to say in the counterfactual situation 
that Oscar believes he has arthritis in his thigh. For, in this situation, Oscar not 
only fails to have the concept of arthritis, but he also has no access to the concept. 
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In the actual world, he can refer to arthritis as "what doctors mean by 'arthritis'." 
But in the counterfactual situation, this mode of reference would pick out not 
arthritis, but a general type of rheumatoid ailment. Thus my hypothesis explains 
the same intuitions as Burge's.(1993, p333). 
 
So the moral of this section is that the thought that claims that cognitive predicates 
containing general terms like ‘arthritis’, ‘sofa’ and ‘brisket’ are logically wide in the sense of 
logically implying the existence of a certain speech community, can be resisted in various 
ways.  One way, which is McKinsey’s position, is to claim such predicates are structurally 
de re.  Another way, is to treat the cognitive predicate as structurally de dicto but qualify it 
so as to restrict it to expressing only logically narrow properties.  Such a qualification might 
require adding to the predicate the clause that the thinker understands each of the narrow 
meanings involved. 
 
§4 Conclusion 
 
I have outlined a number of ways of handling the experiments of Putnam, Burge and 
others.  What I have been keen to emphasise is that for any of these experiments to have a 
bearing on the metaphysical nature of mental states one needs to assume CPA.  But, of 
course, CPA is precisely the claim McKinsey is suggesting that we give up.  So, the only 
time you’ll catch McKinsey (or myself) assuming CPA is for the purposes of reductio in 
Traditional McKinsey Reasoning.  And, given that SE and PAI are plausible, or so I shall be 
contending, then Traditional McKinsey Reasoning forces us to give up CPA.  In the next 
chapter, I shall be outlining the development of a separate argument which sometimes gets 
labelled as “McKinsey Reasoning”.  This alternative “McKinsey Reasoning” takes some of 
the material in this chapter to be about the metaphysical nature of mental states, because 
commentators on this reasoning themselves (tacitly) assume CPA. 
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Chapter 3 
 
In this chapter I shall suggest that there is another argument that has loomed large in the 
literature on the “McKinsey Reasoning” that must be sharply distinguished from the 
Traditional McKinsey Reasoning .  I shall call this form of argument the Boghossian-Brown 
Reasoning (hereafter the B-B Reasoning).  Commentators seldom sharply distinguish 
Boghossian-Brown Reasoning from Traditional McKinsey Reasoning  (see, for example Kallestrup 
(2011), Wright (2000), (Davies (1998, 2000), Brown (2004), Farkas (2008)).  However, I 
shall suggest that there are quite radical differences between the two types of reasoning.  
Moreover, those who claim to be commentating on “McKinsey Reasoning” tend to, in the 
bottom, have B-B Reasoning in mind.  However, I shall be suggesting that it is really 
Traditional McKinsey Reasoning which these commentators should have cause to worry about.  
This is, in part, because Traditional McKinsey Reasoning is simpler, thinner, easier to 
understand than B-B Reasoning.  Moreover, each claim of Traditional McKinsey Reasoning has 
good motivation in the history of philosophy; and this is not obviously the case with the 
main claims the B-B Reasoning is concerned with. 
 
In §1-2 I explain the development of Boghossian-Brown Reasoning and suggest that its source 
was a series of responses in the Analysis journal in the 1990s to a variant of Traditional 
McKinsey Reasoning that was compressed and lacking in presentational acumen.  In particular, 
I suggest that the role of the crucial claim CPA had not been made clear and the notion of 
“a priori knowledge” ended up becoming confused and weakened.  §3 is my best attempt at 
stating the B-B Reasoning.  §4 Attempts to list some of the differences I can spot between 
Traditional McKinsey Reasoning and the B-B Reasoning.  §5 concludes. 
 
§1 McKinsey (1991a) and presentational confusions 
 
The B-B Reasoning was developed out of a series of responses to one of McKinsey’s 
presentations of his argument in the Analysis journal in the 1990s.  It is the purpose of this 
section to outline this particular presentation of McKinsey’s and some of the responses it 
received and to explain how, between them, these papers de-emphasised and, in some 
cases, ignored crucial presentational elements which need to be emphasised to aid 
comprehension of Traditional McKinsey Reasoning. 
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§1 McKinsey (1991a) 
 
It is important to emphasise that Traditional McKinsey Reasoning can be used for at least two 
purposes.  The first purpose, which I have been emphasising, is that it can be used to show 
PAI, CPA and SE are jointly incompatible.  The second purpose, which I have not yet 
emphasised, is that it can be used as an ad hominem argument against anyone who 
endorses each of PAI, CPA and SE.  Specifically, Traditional McKinsey Reasoning can be used 
to show that anyone who endorses each of PAI, CPA and SE is committed to an absurd 
consequence.  McKinsey (1991a) is an attempt to give an ad hominem argument against 
Burge (1988 & 1982) who is alleged by McKinsey to endorse PAI, CPA and SE. 
 
So, McKinsey (1991a) seems to be emphasising the second purpose of Traditional McKinsey 
Reasoning.  However, McKinsey (1991a) does not present Traditional McKinsey Reasoning to 
the letter, instead it presents one of its logically equivalent (but, in my view, presentationally 
deficient) formulations.  Specifically, McKinsey (1991a) seems to gesture towards the 
argument Traditional McKinsey Reasoning LET Variation.  Thus, the overriding aim of 
McKinsey (1991a) seems to be to gesture towards the argument Traditional McKinsey 
Reasoning LET Variation as an ad hominem argument against Burge (1988 & 1982) , who, 
according to McKinsey, appears to endorse both PAI and LET. 
 
In addition to this under-emphasis of the wider philosophical point of the argument in 
McKinsey (1991a) there are a further several problems with McKinsey (1991a) which I 
outline in the remaining sub-sections. 
 
§1.1 Philosophical basis of the the claims in McKinsey (1991a) 
 
McKinsey (1991a) does briefly mention the philosophical basis of the argument that it is 
gesturing towards.  Specifically, at the start of the article McKinsey’s interpretation of the 
Cartesian predicament and the strength of aprioricity required to support it is briefly 
mentioned without being explained in detail.  McKinsey says: 
 
“It has been a philosophical commonplace, at least since Descartes. to hold that 
each of us can know the existence and content of his own mental states in a 
privileged way that is available to no one else. This has at least seemed true with 
respect to those 'neutral' cognitive attitudes such as thought, belief, intention, and 
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desire, whose propositional contents may be false. The crucial idea is not that 
one's knowledge of these states in oneself is incorrigible, for surely one can make 
mistakes about what one believes. intends. or desires. Rather the idea is that we 
can in principle find out about these states in ourselves 'just by thinking', without 
launching an empirical investigation or making any assumptions about the 
external physical world. I will call knowledge obtained independently of empirical 
investigation a priori knowledge. And I will call the principle that it is possible to 
have a priori knowledge of one's own neutral cognitive attitude states, the 
Principle of Privileged Access, or just 'privileged access' for short.” (1991a, p9). 
 
The above quote suggests to me that McKinsey is trying to characterise the PAI thesis.  
Recall it says: 
 
Privileged Access to Individuating Factors (PAI) 
For any subject, S, if S possesses a given mental state , which is individuated by property F, 
S can know strongly a priori that she possesses F. 
 
However, the quote is also consistent with McKinsey’s trying to characterise the PAC 
thesis.  Recall it says: 
 
Privileged access to content (PAC) 
If S thinks that p, then S can know strongly a priori that she thinks that p. 
 
Now, provided every de dicto structured cognitive predicate of the form ‘S thinks that $’ 
expresses a property that is logically narrow (which is, effectively, a denial of SE), one can 
unproblematically endorse PAC and take PAC to be consistent with the Cartesian 
predicament.  This is because if one’s mental state is individuated by the logically narrow 
property expressed by a dicto structured cognitive predicate of the form ‘S thinks that $’ 
one can know strongly a priori that she possesses the property that individuates without 
making any empirical assumptions, since she could possess such a property in a solipsistic 
world.  Of course, someone who endorses such a picture owes us an explanation as to why 
every de dicto structured cognitive predicate of the form ‘S thinks that $’ expresses a 
logically narrow property.  That is to say, a proponent of such a picture owes us an 
explanation as to why she would reject SE.  Explaining why one denies SE may be an 
especially difficult task given the array of semantic evidence in its favour. 
 
The upshot of the last McKinsey quote is that it leaves the reader unsure as to whether the 
Cartesian predicament described by the quote supports PAI or PAC.  Some commentators 
on McKinsey (1991a) infer that it must be PAC – or a weakened version of PAC - which 
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McKinsey is proposing.  But if it is PAC that is being proposed then the (contrary to fact 
assumption) CPA is not being explicitly stated.  The reader is just left to assume that every 
de dicto structured cognitive predicate expresses an individuating property. 
 
§1.2 Confusion over the role of deduction 
 
Note that I have stressed that McKinsey (1991a) “gestures towards the argument Traditional 
McKinsey Reasoning LET Variation” it does not outright sharply state the argument.  In 
particular, at no point does it mention the argument’s reliance on the meta-closure 
principle CA.  The paper’s failure to mention this does leave the reader room to 
misinterpret the structure of the argument. 
 
Another related issue which may add to the reader’s confusion over the structure of the 
argument gestured towards in McKinsey (1991a) is the mention of the subject in the 
example, Oscar, having the ability to perform a certain deduction: 
 
“(2b) The proposition that Oscar is thinking that water is wet conceptually implies 
E, 
 
and it is easy to see that (I),(2b), and (3) form an inconsistent triad. 
The argument is this. Suppose (1) that Oscar knows a priori that he is thinking 
that water is wet. Then by (2b), Oscar can simply deduce E, using only premisses 
that are knowable a priori, including the premiss that he is thinking that water is 
wet. Since Oscar can deduce E from premisses that are knowable a priori, Oscar 
can know E itself a priori. Rut this contradicts (3), the assumption that E cannot 
be known a priori. Hence (l), (2b), and (3) are inconsistent. And so in general, it 
seems, anti-individualism is inconsistent with privileged access.” (1991a, p15). 
 
In the quote above it looks as though the argument being gestured towards takes Oscar’s 
performing the deduction – or being able to perform the deduction – as a necessary 
premise required to takes us from the claim “Oscar can know strongly a priori that water is 
wet” to the claim “Oscar can know strongly a priori that E” where the proposition that E 
concerns the existence of ordinary contingently existing physical objects. 
 
Now, given my interpretation of “McKinsey Reasoning” as Traditional McKinsey Reasoning, I 
clearly show that it is only the instance of the meta-closure principle CA which is required 
for the soundness of the argument.  Stories of a subject performing a certain deduction (or 
being able to perform a certain deduction), while they may be consistent with Traditional 
McKinsey Reasoning are not a claim required by it. 
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§1.3 Narrow focus on one term – the kind term ‘water’ 
 
McKinsey (1991a) focuses on only one example of the de dicto structured cognitive 
predicates which express properties that individuate with respect to the cognitive states 
they describe (this of course must require the contrary to fact assumption CPA).  It focuses 
on a cognitive predicate involving the kind term ‘water’.  I think that the kind term ‘water’ 
is one of the trickiest predicates to use to explain Traditional McKinsey Reasoning and its 
variations (see Chapters 2, 8 and 9 for more on this). 
 
Part of the reason as to why I think such a term is tricky is that, in my view, I think, in 
agreement with McKinsey, that kind terms such as ‘water’ have two kinds of meaning: 
linguistic meaning and propositional meaning.  The propositional meaning simply is the 
referent of the term ‘water’.  However, the linguistic meaning of the term ‘water’ involves a 
tricky and tortuous discussion which I have tried to outline in the previous chapter. 
 
I think the linguistic meaning of ‘water’ does contain a descriptive element but it is not 
completely exhausted by that descriptive element (see Chapters 2, 8 & 10).  This is because, 
on my view, the meaning of the term ‘water’ contains yet another element: a non-
descriptive element that consists of a genuine term whose referent is completely exhausted 
by a contingently existing ordinary physical object.  I think it would have been better for 
McKinsey (1991a) to consider the simpler cases of cognitive predicates containing terms 
that have no descriptive element at all but merely has a referent which is completely 
exhausted by an ordinary contingently existing physical object. 
 
For example, the cognitive predicates ‘Oscar thinks that that man is rich’ or ‘Oscar thinks 
that Sergei is rich’(where the terms ‘that man’ and ‘Sergei’ have no descriptive meaning in 
the public language and who have referents that are completely exhausted by contingently 
existing ordinary physical objects) would, in my view, have helped to give more reader 
friendly examples. 
 
So, again, McKinsey (1991a)’s focus on a cognitive predicate containing a kind term, in my 
view, make life much harder than it should be for the reader.  However, in the previous 
chapters, I have tried to give a very general formulation of the logical wideness of the 
properties expressed by de dicto structured cognitive predicates involving the kind term 
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‘water’ which cover some of the various explanations of the logical wideness.  McKinsey, 
himself, also uses such a formulation in his (1991a). 
 
§1.4 No mention of CPA 
 
The presentational problems I have mentioned so far are enough to throw a diligent reader 
way off course when trying to reconstruct the structure of the argument in McKinsey 
(1991a).  But I have, so far, not mentioned what I see as the most glaring presentational 
error of McKinsey (1991a) – its suppression of the CPA thesis.  The CPA thesis has to be 
used to transition one from mere externalism about de dicto structured cognitive predicates 
(that is semantic externalism, SE) to externalism about the metaphysical nature of mental 
content (that is, logical externalism about thought content LET).  What McKinsey (1991a) 
has done is just to present LET.  He says: 
 
“Some neutral cognitive states that are ascribed by de dicto attitude sentences 
(e.g., 'Oscar is thinking that water is wet') conceptually imply the existence of 
objects external to the person to whom the state is ascribed.” (1991a, p15). 
 
Jumping straight to the LET thesis is fine as far as constructing a quick incompatibility 
argument goes but it does not make it easy for the reader to see the variety of options in 
responding to the argument.  In particular, it does not make it easy for the reader to see 
that rejecting CPA, allows us to hold onto both the Cartesian intuitions in favour of PAI 
and the various semantic intuitions we have in favour of SE and its instances. 
 
As noted earlier, CPA is the consequence of the Proposition Theory which is a deeply 
entrenched view in philosophy of mind and language.  As the Proposition Theory is so deeply 
entrenched it may be that some philosophers are inclined to tacitly assume it.  Regarding 
CPA and the Proposition Theory, it may be that McKinsey’s audience may not consciously or 
explicitly subscribe to these claims but instead they may well simply tacitly subscribe to them.  
So, these commentators may be reading over McKinsey’s (1991a) and completely miss one 
of the points it is trying to make.  The point in question being that there is a seeming 
conflict between the Cartesian predicament, semantic externalism and the view that every 
de dicto structured cognitive predicates express an individuating property (i.e. CPA).  
They’ll miss the point because (a) they may be tacitly subscribing to CPA while they are 
reading it and (b) there is nothing in that (1991a) paper to draw their attention to the fact 
that CPA might be at least partly responsible for the absurd conclusion suggested by some 
of the reasoning in the paper. 
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Thus, the very audience that McKinsey wants to strike right of the heart of – in the sense 
of forcing them to reconsider their deeply entrenched views about CPA – may end up 
being completely and utterly dialectically untouched by his (1991a) paper! 
 
Now, the way of dealing with those who tacitly assume CPA, in my view, is to present 
“McKinsey Reasoning” in such a way that it explicitly emphasises the role of CPA.  In my 
view, this presentational strategy encourages those who might tacitly assume CPA to 
consider very carefully whether their assumption is correct.  Unfortunately, McKinsey 
(1991a) does not use this presentational strategy.  I have offered a presentational strategy in 
Chapter 1 which explicitly emphasises the role of CPA and its origin. 
 
So, to summarise (in reverse order) McKinsey (1991a) has at least five presentational 
defects in my view:  Firstly, it does not emphasise the role of CPA.  Secondly, it narrowly 
focuses on cognitive predicates containing the term ‘water’.  Thirdly, it may leave the reader 
with the feeling that a subject’s performing a certain kind of deduction is a necessary claim 
required by the reasoning.  Fourthly, it does not emphasise the philosophical basis of the 
paradox.  Fifthly, while it emphasises that it is giving an argument against Burge, it does not 
emphasise the wider philosophical role that the argument could play. 
 
 
§2 Brueckner’s response to McKinsey (1991a) 
 
Brueckner’s (1992 & 1995) responses to McKinsey (1991a) took the main thrust of the 
paper to be the construction of an ad hominem argument against Burge (1988 & 1982).  I 
can spot at least three interesting elements of Brueckner’s response to McKinsey.  The first 
element concerns Brueckner’s discussion of “externalism” or “anti-individualism”.  The 
second concerns the formulation of the privileged access thesis which Brueckner gestures 
towards.  The third is Brueckner’s discussion of whether a subject can know that external 
physical objects distinct from herself exist.  I shall comment upon each element in turn. 
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§2.1 Formulation of “externalism” or “anti-individualism” 
 
Firstly, the instance of “anti-individualism” or “externalism” which is the concern of 
McKinsey (1991a) is: 
 
“Some neutral cognitive states that are ascribed by de dicto attitude sentences 
(e.g., 'Oscar is thinking that water is wet') conceptually imply the existence of 
objects external to the person to whom the state is ascribed.” (1991a, p15). 
 
Brueckner suggests that (a) the implication in the quote above is weaker than logical or 
conceptual and (b) there is textual evidence to suggest that Burge (1988 & 1982) would 
endorse such a weaker formulation.  Thus, Brueckner shows no signs of picking out the 
suppressed claim CPA as playing a crucial role in what he takes to be “McKinsey 
Reasoning”.  Were he to have explicitly considered CPA, then he would have noticed that 
the thesis quoted above is, in fact, the conjunction of SE and CPA. 
 
Arguing that the implication in the thesis above is weaker than logical is a curious position 
to take, since I take it that the proper moral to infer from the twin earth thought 
experiments ought to be that the meaning of ‘water’ and thus de dicto structured cognitive 
predicates involving the term ‘water’ are objectual – they logically imply the existence of 
ordinary contingently existing physical objects (see for example Chapters 2, 8 and 9).  So, it 
looks as though Brueckner is denying this moral of the thought experiments and he does 
cite evidence from Burge (1988 & 1982) which suggests that it is right to do so.  So, if 
Brueckner is correct, he may have shown that McKinsey (1991a) fails to satisfy one of its 
aims.  The aim in question is the aim of presenting a sound ad hominem argument against 
Burge. 
 
However, nothing Brueckner has said blocks the other aim of McKinsey (1991a) or my 
Traditional McKinsey Reasoning which is to make the wider philosophical point that the 
Cartesian notion of privileged access is incompatible with certain forms of “externalism”.  
In order to see this, remember that Traditional McKinsey Reasoning can be constructed against 
de dicto structured cognitive predicates that do not involve kind terms.  Consider for 
example the logically wide cognitive predicate that would be expressed by ‘Laura thinks 
that that man is cute’. 
 
Would Brueckner really deny the de dicto structured cognitive predicate ‘Laura thinks that 
that man is cute’ fails to express a logically wide property?  If he does not, then one cannot 
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take the point from his paper that Traditional McKinsey Reasoning and its variations are 
outright wrong or unsound.  Rather, Brueckner’s point is, at best, that Traditional McKinsey 
Reasoning is restricted in scope, in that it cannot be used on de dicto structured cognitive 
predicates involving kind terms such as ‘water’, and it cannot be used as a an ad hominem 
argument against Burge. 
 
If, on the other hand, Bruecker would deny the de dicto structured cognitive predicate 
‘Laura thinks that that man is cute’ fails to express a logically wide property and denies the 
more general claim SE, then he is effectively denying one of the claims required to set up 
Traditional McKinsey Reasoning and its variations.  In these circumstances, Brueckner could 
grant the soundness Traditional McKinsey Reasoning and its variations, and simply claim that 
assuming the conjunction of PAI, SE and CPA is contrary to fact because assuming SE is 
contrary to fact. 
 
If SE is being denied, then there is still much work to be done.  In particular, we are owed 
two explanations:  Firstly, we need an explanation as to why the semantic evidence cited in 
favour of SE, in fact fails to support it.  Secondly, we need an explanation as to why the 
properties expressed by de dicto structured predicates must be logically narrow. 
 
The crucial question is:  would Brueckner deny SE or simply deny only particular instances 
of it (instances involving the kind term ‘water’ for example)?  Frustratingly, the Analysis 
journal debate in the 1990s sheds no light on this question, since McKinsey (1991a) and its 
commentaries tended to focus on the kind term ‘water’.  Thus debating over the logical 
versus the metaphysical or counterfactual wideness of de dicto structured cognitive 
predicates involving the kind term ‘water’ distracts our attention from whether other de 
dicto structured cognitive predicates involving non-kind terms are logically wide or not. 
 
McKinsey’s own reply to Brueckner is to suggest that in denying LET-Instance and instead 
backing Oscar’s thought that water is wet metaphysically or counterfactually implying some 
proposition that E he is endorsing a trivial and uninteresting form of externalism. 
 
Note that the Cartesian predicament allows that when a subject, S, can know strongly a 
priori that she possesses a given property F (which individuates a certain mental state of 
hers), F can metaphysically imply the existence of contingently existing external physical 
objects and this is the case whether F is a logically wide or logically narrow property.   
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In particular, if the property S thinks that water is wet is logically wide and S can know 
she possesses this property strongly a priori, it is also the case that the property might 
metaphysically imply the existence of contingently existing physical objects.  For example, 
it may metaphysically imply that S has a contingently existing body or that there exist 
certain sperm and egg cells. 
 
On the other hand, if the property S thinks that water is wet is logically narrow and S can 
know strongly a priori that she possesses the property, then one explanation of a 
metaphysical implication is blocked.  This is because one cannot claim the property S 
thinks that water is wet metaphysically implies the existence of contingently existing 
ordinary physical objects because it logically implies their existence.  But one can still 
endorse such a metaphysical implication by endorsing an alternative explanation of the 
metaphysical implication.  Perhaps, for example, one might try to extrapolate a different 
metaphysical explanation by drawing on Burge’s work as Brueckner has done.  Moreover, 
one can still claim that S’s strong a priori knowledge of the logically narrow property 
metaphysically implies the existence of an ordinary contingently existing physical object 
such as S’s physical body or certain sperm and egg cells.  But such a position is, of course, a 
“metaphysical internalist” or “individualist” since (what is assumed to be the individuating) 
property S thinks that water is wet is by assumption logically narrow. 
 
Thus, Brueckner’s claim to have saved “externalism” or “anti-individualism” from being 
incompatible with privileged access is odd.  It is odd because an internalist about the 
metaphysical nature of mental states who endorses PAI can also happily claim that the 
logically narrow properties one has privileged access to are also metaphysically or 
counterfactually wide.  Rather, Brueckner seems to have carved out an internalist position 
about the metaphysical nature of mental states regarding the property Oscar thinks that 
water is wet .  But this position, to repeat, is not to claim a variation of Traditional McKinsey 
Reasoning is unsound, rather it is to claim at least one instance of SE (or LET) is false. 
 
In response to McKinsey, Brueckner later suggests that the characteristic anti-individualist 
or externalist thesis in fact involves the notion of weak supervenience or S-wideness. 
 
S-Wide externalism 
In many cases, if a subject, S, possesses a thought that p, then S’s thought that p fails to 
weakly supervene upon the subject’s internal physical state. 
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But when we deal with S-wide externalism we get the same old problem back again.  Does the 
S-wide externalism thesis really have any opponents?  Consider a paradigm internalist de dicto 
structured cognitive predicate such as ‘Ollie believes that he himself is a hero’.  Such a 
property is logically narrow since it does not logically imply the existence of contingently 
existing physical objects that are distinct from Ollie.  But such a property is also S-wide 
since it fails to supervene on Ollie’s internal physical state.  This is because Ollie, who 
shares exactly the same narrow states as his doppelganger Tollie, possesses a property that 
is not possessed by Tollie.  For Ollie’s thought is about Ollie, Tollie’s thought is about 
Tollie, Tollie has no beliefs about Ollie and Ollie has no beliefs about Tollie. 
 
So, no metaphysical internalist who endorses privileged access in the form of PAI, is likely 
to deny that many of the properties she can know she possesses strongly a priori fail to 
supervene on a subject’s internal physical state.  If this is the case, then, once again, it 
seems as though the response to McKinsey which Brueckner is carving out is PAI 
combined with metaphysical internalism.  Since such metaphysical internalism is also 
compatible with S-Wide externalism, Brueckner may label his position as saving “externalist” 
or “anti-individualist” but his position is a metaphysical internalist position for all that. 
 
One final thought on the forgoing discussion is that it is taking place with CPA being 
tacitly assumed.  For example, one can endorse S-wideness about de dicto structured 
cognitive predicates and properties: 
 
S-Wide externalism about properties 
In many cases, if a subject, S, possesses a property P, then S’s thought that p fails to weakly 
supervene upon the subject’s internal physical state. 
 
Then, by tacitly assuming CPA, one can endorse an analogue of S-wideness about mental 
states: 
 
S-Wide externalism 
In many cases, if a subject, S, possesses a thought that p, then S’s thought that p fails to 
weakly supervene upon the subject’s internal physical state. 
 
I myself (and McKinsey) am prepared to endorse most of these theses regarding de dicto 
structured cognitive predicates and properties.  What I object to is then using CPA to infer 
a further claim about the metaphysical nature of mental states.  This is because I think only 
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logically narrow properties individuate the cognitive state they describe and logically wide 
ones do not.  However, since S-wide, metaphysically wide, and counterfactually wide 
properties are inchoate notions which include both logically wide and logically narrow 
properties, I cannot agree that, in general, these properties individuate with respect to the 
mental state they describe.  For example, the property expresses by de se thought ascription 
is logically narrow and perhaps also S-wide, metaphysically wide and counterfactually wide 
but the property individuates only because it is logically narrow (see for example McKinsey 
2002, pp212-7).  On the other hand, the property expressed by the de dicto structured 
cognitive predicate ‘S thinks that man is rich’ is, on some views, logically wide, 
metaphysically wide, counterfactually wide and S-wide but it fails to individuate with 
respect to the cognitive state it describes only because it is logically wide. 
 
§2.2 Formulation of the “Privileged Access” thesis 
 
Brueckner’s brief discussion of the privileged access thesis also shows no signs of 
recognising McKinsey’s formulation of the thesis, nor any signs of recognising the strength 
of aprioricity involved.  He says: 
 
“McKinsey understands a priori knowledge to be 'knowledge obtained 
independently of empirical investigation'” (1992, p112) 
 
According to Brueckner, on Burge’s view, it is just obviously true that a person, Oscar, say, 
can know weakly a priori that he is thinking that water is wet.  Note the weakness of the 
notion of aprioricity involved in Brueckner’s formulation of aprioricity.  Brueckner seems 
to have in mind one the following thesis: 
 
W-PAC 
For any subject , S, and any mental state individuated by the property S is thinking that p:  If S 
is thinking that p, then S can know weakly a priori that she thinks that p. 
 
Where S knows that p weakly a priori iff S acquires his knowledge without using empirical 
investigation as a justicictory basis but may make empirical assumptions. 
 
Brueckner supports his use of weak aprioricity by pouncing on a slip from McKinsey, who 
at one point says does characterise aprioricity in its weak sense (1991, p9). 
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Now at other points, and especially the start of the article, McKinsey (1991a) clearly uses 
the notion of strong aprioricity.  So, I am inclined to take the last McKinsey quote above as 
a slip or an instance of sloppiness and no more.  Why couldn’t Brueckner do the same 
thing?  Why else might Brueckner be inclined to work with a notion of weak, rather than 
strong, aprioricity?  My answers to these questions are only speculation due to the 
compressed nature of Brueckner’s response.  However, I suspect that it is due to 
Brueckner’s tacit acceptance of CPA and adherence to S-wideness about properties.  Let 
me explain. 
 
Here is one explanation.  The theses S-wideness and CPA generate alterative scenarios where 
everything is internally the same for the thinker but the thinker thinks different thoughts 
due to different S-wide properties individuating those thoughts.  For example, on Earth 
perhaps the property Oscar thinks that water is wet individuates his mental state but on  
were Oscar to inhabit Twin-Earth for long enough the property Oscar thinks that twater 
is wet would individuate his mental state.  Now, if Oscar were unwittingly regularly 
switched between Earth and Twin-Earth, there are arguments to suggest that everything 
would be subjectively the same for Oscar when he sincerely utters “I thinks that water is 
wet” but the thought thereby expressed would be different depending on whether Oscar is 
on Earth or Twin-Earth.  So, Oscar must make the empirical assumption that he is not 
undergoing such switching-scenarios.  Thus, the best account we can give of Oscar’s 
knowledge of the contents of his thoughts is one which is based on his empirical 
assumption and this is underwritten by W-PAC. 
 
Another explanation is this.  Suppose CPA is true.  Thus, the de dicto structured cognitive 
predicate ‘Oscar thinks that man is tall’ expresses a wide property which, given CPA, is 
individuating.  Let’s say this property is Oscar thinks the singular proposition that that 
man is tall.  This property individuates a certain mental state of Oscars – call this state .  
On some views there are scenarios where Oscar possesses some mental state which 
subjectively indistinguishable from (call this mental state *).  However, when Oscar is 
in * the term ‘that man’ has no referent and thus Oscar’s mental state * is not 
individuated by the property Oscar thinks the singular proposition that that man is 
tall.  Yet each of these mental states is subjectively indistinguishable for Oscar.  So that the 
possibility of being in mental state * does not undermine Oscar’s knowledge of his 
thoughts, then Oscar will need to make the empirical assumption that he is not in the 
situation in which generates state *.  Thus, such scenarios would prompt one to favour 
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W-PAC to capture the privileged access thesis over something like PAI because only the 
former thesis allows a subject to make empirical assumptions. 
 
 
§2.3 Formulation of the Environmental Access thesis 
 
Brueckner also discusses whether a subject can know “a priori” in some sense that ordinary 
contingent objects external to her exist.  
 
However, by “a priori” Brueckner means “weakly a priori.”  Given Brueckner has weak 
aprioricity in mind, at this point, I am not sure what we should say.  Is it obviously absurd 
that a subject can acquire a belief that e without perceptual observation or empirical 
investigation when that subject also makes empirical assumptions?  It is not obvious to me. 
 
Thus, this last point can be summarised if we introduce a sharp distinction between two 
types of environmental access theses: 
 
Environmental Access 
For any subject , S, and any proposition that e, where e asserts the existence of contingently 
existing ordinary physical objects logically distinct from S, S cannot know strongly a priori that e. 
 
Ambitious Environmental Access 
For any subject , S, and any proposition that e, where e asserts the existence of contingently 
existing ordinary physical objects logically distinct from S, S cannot know weakly a priori that e. 
 
Traditional McKinsey Reasoning relies on Environmental Access as an auxiliary claim.  Since I am 
defending Traditional McKinsey Reasoning, I have to defend Environmental Access and shall 
complete this defence in later chapters.  However, as a defender of Traditional McKinsey 
Reasoning I do not need to take a view on Ambitious Environmental Access and am unsure at 
this stage what to say about it; I discuss the thesis further later in the thesis. 
 
§2.4 Post Brueckner 
 
Given the presentational problems of McKinsey (1991a), as well as some of Brueckner’s 
interpretations of the paper it is tempted to see “McKinsey Reasoning” as being concerned 
with the following theses: 
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W-PAC 
For any subject , S, and any mental state individuated by the property S is thinking that p:  If S 
is thinking that p, then S can know weakly a priori that she thinks that p. 
 
LET 
Many cognitive properties of the form S is thinking that p or S thinks that p are logically 
wide and individuate with respect to the cognitive state they describe. 
 
Ambitious Environmental Access 
For any subject , S, and any proposition that e, where e asserts the existence of contingently 
existing ordinary physical objects logically distinct from S, S cannot know weakly a priori that e. 
 
A priori deduction principle 
{If S can know weakly a priori that p and S can know a priori that (if p, then q) and S can 
simultaneously believe both that p and that (if p, then q) and S can competently deduce q from 
this simultaneous belief}, then S can know weakly a priori that q. 
 
A priori knowability of LET Instances 
For any subject, S, and any mental state individuated by the logically wide property S is 
thinking that p or S thinks that p, and any proposition that e which asserts the existence of 
contingently existing ordinary physical objects: S can know “a priori” that her thinking that p 
logically implies that e. 
 
Furthermore it was tempting to view the main thrust of Brueckner’s responses as being 
that we should deny LET and replace it with an implication between one’s thought and E 
being something weaker than logical.  Presumably, this move would also result in the A 
priori knowability of LET Instances ending up false.  The weaker “externalism” thesis that 
Brueckner had in mind was: 
 
S-Wide externalism 
In many cases, if a subject, S, possesses a thought that p, then S’s thought that p fails to 
weakly supervene upon the subject’s internal physical state. 
 
This way of seeing the debate, provoked a number of commentators to become 
“Brueckner-outsmarters”.  That is to say they wanted to take the notion of “externalism” 
endorsed by Brueckner and show that when conjoined with a privileged access thesis such 
as W-PAC and further plausible auxiliary claims one can still derive an absurd conclusion.  
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If successful the “Brueckner-outsmarters” could show that, even given Brueckner’s claims, 
privileged access (understood as W-PAC) and an “externalism” which is concerned with an 
implication between one’s mental state and the external environment being weaker than 
logical were still threatened. 
 
Before we discuss these “Brueckner-outsmarters” I want to compare the reasoning they are 
aiming to create with Traditional McKinsey Reasoning.  Traditional McKinsey Reasoning had a clear 
target:  to show that it is not possible to assume the conjunction of CPA, SE and PAI.  
Moreover, that target had a clear philosophical basis:  Frege-Russell support for the 
Proposition Theory encourages us to accept CPA, the Cartesian predicament encourages 
us to support PAI, and semantic evidence, including that adduced by Kripke and Kaplan, 
encourages us to accept SE. 
 
Now consider the proposed target of the “Brueckner-outsmarters”:  It seems to be to show 
that the conjunction of W-PAC and S-Wide Externalism are incompatible.  They seem to 
want to reach this target by showing that the conjunction of Weak-PAC, S-Wide Externalism 
and a collection of auxiliary claims such as Ambitious-Environmental Access, A priori deduction 
principle and perhaps others results in a contradiction.  Their idea is that since each of the 
auxiliary claims are true and plausible, it must ultimately be W-PAC and S-Wide Externalism 
that are responsible for the contradiction. 
 
I think the “Brueckner-outsmarters” have much to do in trying to pull this kind of 
reasoning off.  However, even if they do pull such reasoning off, there is a more 
fundamental question to be asked:  What is the philosophical basis for W-PAC and S-Wide 
Externalism?  Why should we be tempted to accept them in the first place?  This is a 
question where the “Brueckner-outsmarters” may run into trouble on when they attempt to 
answer it. 
 
It is worth making my point about the “Brueckner-outsmarters” in a slightly different way.  
Recall, the three paradox building stages I identified in Chapter 1:  The philosophical basis 
stage, the target identification stage and the mechanical stage.  It seems as though the 
“Brueckner-outsmarters” have their target identified: They are trying to show that the 
conjunction of Weak-PAC and S-Wide Externalism are absurd.  And, they may be able to 
produce much detailed work to show how the conjunction of W-PAC and S-Wide 
Externalism (together with a collection of auxiliary claims they will suggest are true and 
plausible) results in a contradiction.  Thus, they may be able to produce much detailed 
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work to support the mechanical stage of the paradox they are creating.  However, what 
about the philosophical basis stage of their paradox?  Why should we be tempted to accept 
the conjunction of W-PAC and S-Wide Externalism?  On this the “Brueckner-outsmarter’s” 
answer is far less obvious. 
 
Now the reasoning created by “Brueckner-outsmarters” seemed to have the upper hand in 
terms of the frequency it was discussed and mentioned in literature between 1991 and at 
least 2010 (see for example Kallestrup’s (2010) survey which focuses much attention on the 
argument created by the “Brueckner-outsmarters”).  Moreover, since the resultant 
reasoning was born out of McKinsey (1991a), it was typically labelled “McKinsey 
Reasoning” even though its true roots may have equally had much to do with Brueckner’s 
responses to McKinsey.  So even if the philosophical basis of its target claims may appear 
to the reader to be dubious, inconclusive or unexplained at this point, I have to try and 
explain its mechanical stage because, otherwise, I won’t have the resources to cleanly 
engage with many of the commentaries on “McKinsey Reasoning” that occurred between 
1991 and 2010. 
 
Moreover, it may be that some of the responses to “McKinsey Reasoning” which was really 
directed at the reasoning constructed by the “Brueckner-outsmarters” also has some 
applicability to the Traditional McKinsey Reasoning that I am trying to defend.  So, without 
further ado, let’s consider the arguments the “Brueckner-outsmarters” are trying to 
construct. 
 
§3 “Brueckner-Outsmarters” 
 
Bruecker’s response to McKinsey provoked a number of responses.  In order to evaluate 
the overall effect these response we have we need to distinguish sharply between two goals.  
The first goal is heavily focussed on the mechanical element of the argument presented by 
McKinsey (1991a) and Brueckner’s responses.  The first goal is an attempt to outsmart or 
sidestep Brueckner’s responses.  The goal is to show that one can take Brueckner’s notions 
of “externalism” construed as S-wideness(or some kind of a notion of externalism that is 
weaker than logical), and some kind of notion of privileged access to content and still 
derive a seemingly absurd conclusion from these theses.  Thus, if this first goal can be met, 
then, perhaps, Brueckner’s response is outsmarted to some degree and, perhaps, 
McKinsey’s (1991a) ad hominem argument against Burge will be vindicated. 
84 
 
The second goal emphasises the philosophical basis level of the paradox.  The second goal 
is to maintain the philosophical basis of each of the theses at the mechanical level of the 
paradox.  The responses to Brueckner seem to heavily focus on achieving the first goal.  
Consequently, the Brueckner responses run the risk of not meeting the second goal.  That 
is to say, the responses may run the risk of producing some sort of a mechanically plausible 
argument with claims that do not have an obvious philosophical basis. 
 
I have some sympathy with these responses to Bruckner:  If they narrowly focussed on 
only McKinsey (1991a) and Brueckner’s responses to that paper, then they may never have 
had a clear grasp of the philosophical basis of each of the claims SE, PAI and CPA 
explained to them.  Therefore, they may never have viewed preserving the philosophical 
basis of the modified arguments they were creating as a priority, when they sought to 
amend the argument.  There are two main lines of argument which have tried to outsmart 
Brueckner’s response.  One argument is given by Brown (1995) and the other by 
Boghossian (1997).   Brown (1995) seems to rely heavily on Burge’s (1979) view that 
general terms are in some sense “wide”.  Given I have suggest that this argument is 
severely limited in scope in Chapter 2, I think that Boghossian’s argument has the best 
chance of being successful, so I shall pretty much simply focus upon his argument. 
 
Boghossian-Brown Reasoning 
 
W-PAC 
For any subject , S, and any mental state individuated by the property S is thinking that p:  If S 
is thinking that p, then S can know weakly a priori that she thinks that p. 
 
S-Wide externalism 
In many cases, if a subject, S, possesses a thought that p, then S’s thought that p fails to 
weakly supervene upon the subject’s internal physical state. 
 
A priori knowability of S-Wideness Instances 
For any subject, S, and any mental state individuated by the property S is thinking that p or S 
thinks that p and such properties fail to weakly supervene upon a subject’s internal physical 
state, and any proposition that e which asserts the existence of contingently existing ordinary 
physical objects: S can know “a priori” that if she thinks that p then e. 
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Ambitious Environmental Access 
For any subject , S, and any proposition that e, where e asserts the existence of contingently 
existing ordinary physical objects logically distinct from S, S cannot know weakly a priori that e. 
 
A priori deduction principle 
{If S can know weakly a priori that p and S can know a priori that (if p, then q) and S can 
simultaneously believe both that p and that (if p, then q) and S can competently deduce q from 
this simultaneous belief}, then S can know weakly a priori that q. 
 
Now consider a case where the thought Oscar is thinking that water is wet is S-wide: 
 
(BB0) Oscar thinks that water is wet [assumption]. 
 
(BB1) Oscar can know weakly a priori that he thinks that water is wet [from BB0 & W-PAC] 
 
(BB3) Oscar can know a priori that {if he thinks that water is wet, then E} [A priori knowability of 
S-Wideness Instances] 
 
(BB4) Oscar can believe both that {he is thinking that water is wet} and {if he thinks that water is 
wet, then E} simultaneously and can competently deduce E from these beliefs [claim] 
 
Therefore, 
 
(BB5) Oscar can know a priori that E [from BB1, BB2, BB3 & BB4 and A priori deduction 
principle]. 
 
But, 
 
(BB6) Oscar cannot know weakly a priori that E [from Ambitious Environmental Access]. 
 
Therefore, 
 
(BB7) Oscar both can and cannot know a priori that E [from BB6 & BB5]. 
 
The idea of the Boghossian-Brown Reasoning is that claims (BB6), (BB2), (BB4) and (BB0) 
are true.  Thus, leaving claims (BB1) and (BB3) as the obvious culprits for the absurd 
conclusion (BB7).  Thus, W-PAC, A priori knowability of S-Wideness Instances sanctioning 
(BB3) and the truth of the externalist thesis in (BB3) seem to be the culprits.  The 
proponent of the B-B Reasoning, may then argue that the externalist thesis in (BB3) is a 
priori knowable, if true.  Consequently, if these further claims are correct, the culprits for 
the absurd conclusion (BB7) look to be the W-PAC thesis and the S-Wide externalism thesis. 
 
There are many differences between B-B Reasoning and Traditional McKinsey Reasoning and I 
shall try to explain some of these in the next section.  However, the main difference to 
emphasise is that where Traditional McKinsey Reasoning explicitly assumes CPA, B-B Reasoning 
seems to tacitly assume the thesis.  To be sure, the assumption (BB1) seems to tacitly 
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assume the property Oscar thinks that water is wet individuates with respect to Oscar’s 
mental state.  However, as it is stated in (BB1), the role of CPA in permitting this 
assumption is not made clear. 
 
While I emphasise a sharp distinction between Traditional McKinsey Reasoning and the 
Boghossian-Brown Reasoning, much of the literature on these topics does not sharply 
distinguish between the two (see, for example, Kallestrup (2011), Davies (2000, 1998), 
Brown (2004), Wright (2000), Farkas (2008)).  Moreover, proponents of the Boghossian-
Brown Reasoning attribute their argument to some of McKinsey’s work and call it an example 
of “McKinsey Reasoning”!  (see, for example, Boghossian p162, n2, Brown (2004)). 
 
So, what explains the tendency of certain commentators to see the Boghossian-Brown 
Reasoning as some kind of an extension or elaborate form of “McKinsey Reasoning”?  I’d 
simply suggest that these commentators have narrowly focussed on only a handful of 
McKinsey’s papers – McKinsey (1991a) and perhaps also McKinsey (2002, 2003).  
However, I hope to have shown in Chapter 1, that considering a broader range of 
McKinsey’s pre-2000 work reveals that a more accurate and clearer presentation of his 
argument is, in fact, what I have called Traditional McKinsey Reasoning. 
 
§4 Traditional McKinsey Reasoning and B-B Reasoning: the 
differences 
 
I wish to emphasise that we must distinguish sharply between, on the one hand, Traditional 
McKinsey Reasoning and, on the other hand, the Brown-Boghossian Reasoning.  Traditional 
McKinsey Reasoning and the Brown-Boghossian Reasoning differ quite radically in a number of 
ways.  In what follows I shall try to list some of those differences.  I do not claim that I 
have provided an exhaustive list. 
 
Difference in emphasis on CPA 
 
Traditional McKinsey Reasoning explicitly states CPA.  The Brown-Boghossian Reasoning does not. 
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Difference in target (where specified) 
 
The target of Traditional McKinsey Reasoning is to establish the joint incompatibility of CPA, 
SE and PAI.  The target of the Brown-Boghossian Reasoning is to establish at least a prima 
facie incompatibility between W-PAC and S-Wide Externalism about Mental Content. 
 
Difference over the kinds of externalism at issue and its basis of support 
 
Traditional McKinsey Reasoning is concerned with externalism as a semantic thesis about the 
logical wideness of de dicto structured cognitive predicates.  This semantic externalism is 
supported by the semantic features of certain proper names, indexical pronouns and kind 
terms.  The Brown-Boghossian Reasoning is concerned with externalism about the metaphysical 
nature of mental states; the basis of support for this externalism is not clear but it may be 
from a priori or armchair reflection. 
 
Difference over the kind of privileged access involved 
 
Traditional McKinsey Reasoning is concerned with privileged access understood as PAI a 
capacity (strong) a priori knowledge of the factors that individuate with respect to the 
mental state one is in.  The Brown-Boghossian Reasoning is concerned with privileged access 
understood as W-PAC:  A capacity for weak a priori knowledge to the contents of one’s 
mental states. 
 
Difference in recommended resolution & post-paradox positive picture (where made) 
 
McKinsey and I would argue that the proper response to Traditional McKinsey Reasoning is to 
reject CPA.  Recommendations of how to respond to the Brown-Boghossian Reasoning are 
varied and sometimes not made at all (see for example Boghossian (1997)) 
 
Difference over whether deduction is a necessary component 
 
Traditional McKinsey Reasoning is does not require that some subject have the capacity to 
perform some deductive inference as a necessary premise; the Brown-Boghossian Reasoning 
does. 
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Difference (in some cases) over the strength of  aprioiricity involved 
 
Traditional McKinsey Reasoning , typically, emphasises a use of strong a priori knowledge; the 
Brown-Boghossian Reasoning does not obviously or typically require this (although it may be 
compatible with such a notion). 
 
Difference in commitment to a neutral free logic 
 
Traditional McKinsey Reasoning , is committed to a neutral free logic; the Brown-Boghossian 
Reasoning is not obviously so committed.  (See Chapter 5 for more about this.) 
 
It may be that certain differences in features between Traditional McKinsey Reasoning and B-B 
Reasoning entail - or strongly suggest – a certain difference in another feature between the 
two types of reasoning.  There may also be more differences between these types of 
reasoning that I have not listed. 
 
My hunch is that a good many of the differences between Traditional McKinsey Reasoning and 
the Brown-Boghossian Reasoning all stem from whether or not CPA is tacitly assumed.  If CPA 
is not tacitly assumed and set out explicitly, it forces one to think of why it is true and how 
precisely to phrase the externalism that is at issue and the notion of privileged access that is 
at issue and why those notions enjoy the support they appear to have:  Perhaps one would 
conclude that (a) the correct form externalism at issue is SE and SE enjoys support from 
certain interpretations of Kripke-Putnam arguments and (b) the correct form of privileged 
access at issue is PAI and it enjoys support from Cartesian intuitions.  If on the other hand, 
CPA is not tacitly assumed and not explicitly set out, one can take the externalism at issue 
to be some claim about the metaphysical nature of mental content being externally 
determined in some sense and the form of privileged access at issue to be PAC; moreover, 
one might not have sound explanations as to why this kind of externalism and privileged 
access enjoy the support that they do. 
 
§5 Conclusion 
 
In this Chapter I have set out B-B Reasoning and have suggested that it is radically different 
from Traditional McKinsey Reasoning.  I have suggested that the explanation as to why these 
arguments are radically different and yet still attributed to McKinsey and labelled 
89 
“McKinsey Reasoning” are due to various misunderstandings of McKinsey’s argument in 
the Analysis journal in the 1990s.  In the next chapters I shall evaluate some of the claims 
that the two pieces of reasoning are concerned with.  In Chapter 4, I consider the 
Environmental Access thesis and Ambitious Environmental Access thesis.  In Chapter 5, I 
consider instances of the meta-closure principle CA and the A priori deduction principle.  In 
Chapter 6 I consider the PAI thesis and the W-PAC thesis.  In Chapter 7 I consider the SE 
thesis and the A priori knowability of S-Wideness Instances thesis.  In chapter 8, I consider the 
CPA thesis. 
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Chapter 4 
 
In this chapter I shall focus on the auxiliary claims of Traditional McKinsey Reasoning and B-B 
Reasoning which concern a subject’s inability to know “a priori”, in some sense, that 
contingently existing ordinary physical objects external to her exist.  I shall conclude that 
the construal of this claim used by Traditional McKinsey Reasoning is untouched by the 
literature that might be thought to constitute objections to it.  Regarding the relevant 
construal of the claim required by B-B Reasoning, I have two points to make about it:  
Firstly, we have not been given enough reason to accept it.  Rather, it seems to have been 
frequently cited due to commentators having the goal of being “Brueckner-outsmarters”.  
And, this frequent and uncritical citing of the claim may have given it some credibility.  
Secondly, some of the literature arguing against the claim, at first glance, seems quite 
threatening.  However, on closer examination, I suggest that this literature does not present 
conclusive considerations against the claim used by the B-B Reasoning.  Moreover, I also 
suggest that the literature has no import to Traditional McKinsey Reasoning.  Specifically, I 
suggest that the considerations in the literature leave the version of the relevant claim used 
by Traditional McKinsey Reasoning untouched.  Thus, I shall conclude that (a) Traditional 
McKinsey Reasoning remains untouched by any apparent criticisms regarding the construal of 
the claim it uses but (b) the considerations both for and against the version of the claim 
used by the B-B Reasoning are inconclusive.  However, since my aim in the thesis is to 
defend Traditional McKinsey Reasoning, I am indifferent to the fact the relevant claim used by 
the B-B Reasoning is not fully defended. 
 
In §1 I remind the reader of the construal of the claim that concerns Traditional McKinsey 
Reasoning and sketch an argument to explain why it is plausible.  In §2 I remind the reader 
of the construal of the claim that concerns B-B Reasoning and examine what support, if any, 
commentators of the B-B Reasoning have given to it.  I suggest that these commentators 
have not provided sufficient considerations in favour of the claim.  In §3 and §4 I look at 
two prominent articles by Sawyer (1998) and Brewer (2000) that might be thought to 
provide considerations against these claims.  I conclude that the considerations offered by 
Sawyer and Brewer are not sufficient to rebut these claims.  §5 concludes. 
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§1 Environmental Access and Traditional McKinsey 
Reasoning 
 
With regard to Traditional McKinsey Reasoning the thesis we are interested in is: 
 
Environmental Access 
For any subject , S, and any proposition that e, where e asserts the existence of contingently 
existing ordinary physical objects logically distinct from S, S cannot know strongly a priori that e. 
 
Some instances of Environmental Access we have seen in instances of Traditional McKinsey 
Reasoning are: 
 
S cannot know strongly a priori that George exists. 
 
S cannot know strongly a priori that water exists. 
 
S cannot know strongly a priori that planet Earth or a speech community exists. 
 
 
Using McKinsey’ (2003) definition, S knows strongly a priori that p iff S knowledge that p is 
not based even in part on the use of perceptual observation or empirical investigation and 
S knowledge that p cannot be undermined or outweighed by the addition of any additional 
empirical evidence. 
 
The idea of strong a priori knowledge is that it is knowledge that one would have even if 
one were radically deceived as to the nature of the external world.  It is knowledge one 
could possess, even if one inhabited a solipsistic world.  The idea behind using this strong 
definition of aprioricity is that it characterises our knowledge of narrow properties which 
individuate our mental states.  Specifically, a thinker does not need to use evidence 
concerning ordinary contingently existing physical objects external to herself in order to 
acquire or retain knowledge of the narrow properties she possesses.  After all, since such a 
thinker could possess such narrow properties in a solipsistic world, it should not be a 
surprising result a thinker does not need to use evidence concerning ordinary contingently 
existing physical objects external to herself in order to acquire or retain such knowledge of 
these properties.  This idea of strong a priori knowledge is rooted in the Cartesian 
Predicament. 
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When we attribute to a thinker strong a priori knowledge of the existence of contingently 
existing physical objects external to her, it just seems obviously absurd.  But why?  On each 
of the three formulations of strong aprioricity to which McKinsey subscribes, there is a 
clear answer to this question. 
 
Consider McKinsey’s first formulation of strong aprioricity as S knows strongly a priori 
that p only if S’s knowledge that p is based on no empirical assumptions.  When p is a 
proposition concerning the existence of ordinary contingently existing objects, then S must 
be making the empirical assumptions that such objects exist and that she is not in a 
solipsistic world.  Since, were she in a solipsistic world or a scenario where no such objects 
exist, than she would not know that p. 
 
Consider McKinsey’s second definition of strong aprioricity as knowledge a subject could 
possess even in a solipsistic world.  Would a subject possess knowledge of such an object 
in a solipsistic world?  Of course not.  The object in question wouldn’t exist in such a 
world partly because the existence of the object in question is contingent. 
 
Consider McKinsey’s third definition of strong aprioricity.  S knows strongly a priori that p 
iff S knowledge that p is not based even in part on the use of perceptual observation or 
empirical investigation and S knowledge that p cannot be undermined or outweighed by the 
addition of any additional empirical evidence.  If it is claimed that S knows strongly a priori 
that ordinary contingently existing physical objects exist, then in order to simply retain such 
knowledge S needs to assume she is not in a scenario where no such objects exist but she is 
presented with evidence of some kind that they do exist.  But such an assumption would be 
an empirical assumption, contrary to the definition of strong aprioricity just given. 
 
So, I think that’s all there is to explaining the truth of the Environmental Access thesis and 
making it prima facie plausible: it is simply the considerations I have given above.  The 
arguments above are brief and only work if we are dealing with the strong sense of a priori 
knowledge.  McKinsey, himself, does not typically argue for the Environmental Access thesis or 
its instances.  Perhaps what I have said in this explanation explains McKinsey’s behaviour: 
the argument in favour of Environmental Access is so short and almost self-contained in the 
definitions of strong a priori knowledge and contingently existing ordinary physical objects 
that we are working with, there isn’t much dialectical need to labour over constructing an 
argument in its favour. 
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§2 The Ambitious Environmental Access thesis and the B-B 
Reasoning 
 
With regard to B-B Reasoning the construal of thesis we are interested in is this: 
 
Ambitious Environmental Access 
For any subject , S, and any proposition that e, where e asserts the existence of contingently 
existing ordinary physical objects logically distinct from S, S cannot know weakly a priori that e. 
 
The typical instance of Ambitious Environmental Access we see in instances of the B-B-
Reasoning is: 
 
Some subject S, S cannot know weakly a priori that water exists. 
 
Note immediately, that Ambitious Environmental Access is not concerned with strong a priori 
knowledge.  Rather, it is concerned with weak a priori knowledge:  S knows that p weakly a 
priori iff S acquired knowledge that p without perceptual observation or empirical 
investigation but may have made empirical assumptions 
 
Proponents of the B-B Reasoning rarely explain why we should accept the Ambitious 
Environmental Access thesis or its instance.  Instead, they just take it to be obvious (see 
especially Boghossian (1997), Davies (2000)). 
 
Thus, commentators on the B-B Reasoning treat the Ambitious Environmental Access thesis as a 
datum.  That is to say, for these commentators there is no felt need to explain why the 
thesis is true or at least plausible.  However, given that there are such arguments against the 
thesis, these arguments need to be engaged with, not ignored.  Either those arguments will 
be sound or they will not be.  Either way, they suggest that treating the Ambitious 
Environmental Access thesis as a datum is not the best approach. 
 
What placed the proponents (or indeed commentators) of the B-B Reasoning in a position 
where they required the Ambitious Environmental Access thesis to be true and yet provided no 
argument for the thesis and treated it as a datum?  I suggest that the culprit is these 
commentators narrow focus on McKinsey (1991a) and Brueckner’s responses to that 
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particular paper.  McKinsey (1991a) used a notion of strong aprioricity and, consequently, 
only required the Environmental Access thesis to be true.  Now that thesis needs little 
argument to support it and, thus, perhaps it can be reasonably  treated as a datum.  So 
commentators on “McKinsey Reasoning” might claim that they don’t need to defend the 
claim S cannot know “a priori” that ordinary contingently existing physical objects exist 
because they are simply following McKinsey’s (1991a) practice of treating this claim as a 
datum.  However, while such an excuse is understandable, it will not do.  Let me explain. 
 
As we saw in Chapter 3, while McKinsey (1991a) may have started using a notion of strong 
aprioricity, Brueckner soon shifted the focus of the debate from that notion of strong 
aprioricity to a notion of weak aprioricity.  This shift from a notion of strong aprioricity to 
weak aprioricity shifts the focus of the argument from requiring merely the Environmental 
Access thesis to be true to requiring the Ambitious Environmental Access thesis to be true.  
However, if some of these commentators are not receptive to that shift in the notion of 
aprioricity, then their belief that a claim like S cannot know “a priori” that ordinary 
contingently existing physical objects exist is just being treated as a datum throughout the 
whole debate is understandable.  This is because their belief that the notion of aprioricity in 
play has not changed is understandable but false.  It is understandable because, as far as I 
can see, no commentator has sharply distinguished between the B-B Reasoning and 
Traditional McKinsey Reasoning as I have done.  But their belief is false because, with that 
distinction between the two types of reasoning in the open, once we focus on the Ambitious 
Environmental Access thesis we find that it is not obviously true and its truth does not follow 
from the definition of weak aprioricity. 
 
So, already then, the case in favour of the Ambitious Environmental Access thesis is 
inconclusive.  Moreover, there also considerations against the thesis.  I shall discuss these 
considerations in the next section.  I shall also consider whether the considerations against 
the Ambitious Environmental Access thesis are also considerations against the Environmental 
Access thesis.  
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§3 Sawyer’s considerations against the Ambitious 
Environmental Access thesis 
 
Sawyer (1998) presents, what appears to be, a case against the Ambitious Environmental Access 
thesis. 
 
She considers a subject who reasons using an argument similar to this one: 
 
Sawyer Argument 
(S1) I am thinking a water-thought 
(S2) If I am thinking a water-thought, then E 
Therefore, 
(S3) E 
 
where the proposition that E stands for the proposition that water exists or the subject is a 
member of a certain speech community. 
 
Sawyer suggests that a subject, Susan, can know each of the premises of the Sawyer 
Argument in a certain “non-empirical” way.  Consequently, Sawyer suggests that Susan can 
thus acquire “non-empirical” knowledge that E.  But, also according to Sawyer Susan 
cannot possess “non-empirical” knowledge that E.  So we have a paradox.  Sawyer 
characterises “non-empirical” knowledge thus: 
 
“I take the claim of privileged access to be the claim that a subject can have non-
empirical knowledge of at least some of her propositional mental events, where 
non-empirical knowledge is simply knowledge gained without recourse to external 
perception” (1998, p523 n3). 
 
Thus, although Sawyer is not inclined to use the term “a priori”, it is clear that she has 
something like what I have called the weak sense of a priori knowledge in mind.  In 
particular, her non-empirical knowledge while acquired without recourse to external 
perception is compatible with a subject making empirical assumptions during its acquisition 
and retention. 
 
So it looks like Sawyer is going to comment on the B-B Reasoning and she does reference 
papers from Brown (1995) and Boghossian (1997) which suggests this.  However, she also 
references McKinsey (1991a).  With my distinction between B-B Reasoning and Traditional 
McKinsey Reasoning in the open, it is not obvious that her considerations will have any 
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import to the latter kind of reasoning; I shall address this issue later on in the section.  For 
now, I shall consider Sawyer’s argument against the B-B Reasoning. 
 
Sawyer’s way out of the paradox just described is to deny the claim that Susan, or any other 
subject, cannot know non-empirically that E.  So it looks like Sawyer is, in effect, going to 
challenge the Ambitious Environmental Access thesis. 
 
Sawyer’s challenge starts be her asking us to focus on the instance of the “externalism” 
thesis in the Sawyer Argument.  It says: 
 
(S2) If I am thinking a water-thought, then E 
 
Clearly (S2) is pitched at the level of the metaphysical nature of thought.  It does not 
mention mere “de dicto structured cognitive predicates”.  According to Sawyer, the 
explanation of this thesis is that one’s water-thought is somehow necessarily causally 
related to the substance water.  Consequently, according to Sawyer, if Susan has a water-
thought, then Susan herself or someone who is a member of Susan’s speech community 
will have had contact with the substance water. 
 
“There is simply no way a subject could ever have the concepts she does have 
without either the referents of those concepts, or other people existing.” (1998, 
p531). 
 
Sawyer uses the term “concept” to mean “thought constituent” or “essential component of 
a thought” rather than meaning (see Sawyer 1998, p530, pp526-7). 
 
So, according to Sawyer, if a subject thinks a water-thought, then she will already have had 
some causal contact with a speech community or the substance water.  Consequently, when 
a subject has a water-thought, that subject will already have the capacity to know that she is 
(or has recently been in) an environment containing the substance water or containing a 
certain speech community.  Such a knowledge capacity will of course be a capacity for 
“empirical” or perhaps even “perceptual” knowledge. 
 
Some “externalists” about the metaphysical nature of a subject’s mental states may object 
to Sawyer’s account of the truth of the externalist thesis (S2).  They might claim that while 
(S2) is in fact true the correct explanation is not a causal explanation.  Thus, the response 
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Sawyer is developing may have no appeal to “externalists” who reject her causal 
explanation. 
 
However, while endorsing this causal explanation, Sawyer is also endorsing the non-
empirical knowability of (S2).  But this is puzzling.  If (S2) is best explained by a causal 
explanation, as Sawyer suggests, then, since such an explanation essentially involves 
ordinary contingently existing physical objects such as the substance water or a certain 
speech community, it is difficult to see how (S2) is knowable “a priori” or “non-
empirically” or “without recourse to sense perception”.  One would have thought that only 
recourse to sense perception would allow us to acquire and retain knowledge that (S2). 
 
Sawyer then suggests that non-empirical knowledge that (S2) can be combined with non-
empirical knowledge of (S1) to thereby allow a subject to acquire non-empirical knowledge 
that E but only on the condition that the subject already had an “empirical” or 
“perceptual” way of knowing that E both prior to performing and after performing the 
inference.  Thus, according to Sawyer, the subject is never in a position where she knows 
(or has the capacity to know) that E non-empirically yet does not possess the capacity to 
know empirically or perceptually that E.  She says: 
 
“Of course it would be unacceptable to suppose that a subject could come to 
know about the external world just by looking inside her mind; that is, despite the 
lack of prior causal contact between that subject and the world, But instance 
arguments do not allow a subject to argue from world-independent facts to facts 
about the world, but rather to argue from the way the world is, via the mark the 
world leaves on her, back out to the way the world must have been to leave such a 
mark. Without prior causal contact, there is no concept available to 
introspection.” (1998, p532). 
 
So, Sawyer is suggesting on her picture that the following situation is not possible: 
 
(Single K-Capacity) For any subject, S: S can know non-empirically that E even without 
also possessing a capacity to know empirically or perceptually that E. 
 
Rather, according to Sawyer, only the following situation is possible: 
 
(Dual K-Capacity) For any subject, S: S can know non-empirically that E only if S also 
possesses a capacity to know empirically or perceptually that E. 
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It is not clear to me how an explanation that one can only be in the (Dual K-Capacity) 
situation removes the seeming absurdity of knowing non-empirically that E. 
 
In conclusion I’d suggest that we are in the following situation.  The considerations in 
favour of the Ambitious Environmental Access are inconclusive.  But Sawyer’s considerations 
against the Ambitious Environmental Access are also inconclusive.  What I now want to 
consider is whether Sawyer’s considerations have any impact upon the Environmental Access 
thesis and Traditional McKinsey Reasoning. 
 
Note that Traditional McKinsey Reasoning does not require a subject perform any kind of 
deduction.  In particular, Traditional McKinsey Reasoning does not require a subject to be 
running through an argument like the Sawyer Argument.  Certain instances of Traditional 
McKinsey Reasoning do require that from certain auxiliary claims and the conjunction of PAI, 
CPA and SE, it follows that a subject, S, can know strongly a priori that E.  But there is 
nothing to stop a proponent of Traditional McKinsey Reasoning also claiming that one can 
know that E in some other way too.  In particular, there is nothing to stop a proponent of 
Traditional McKinsey Reasoning from claiming additionally that S can know that E perceptually 
or “non-empirically” or “in a manner that is not strongly a priori”.  Even if the proponent 
makes such an additional claim, it is still the case that it is absurd for S to have the capacity 
to know strongly a priori that E. 
 
Consider an analogue of Sawyer’s claims held for the strong aprioricity of Traditional 
McKinsey Reasoning: 
 
(Dual K-Capacity-SAP) S can know strongly a priori that E only if S also possesses a 
capacity to know empirically or perceptually that E. 
 
Even if (Dual K-Capacity-SAP) were supported by an adequate argument, it still would not 
explain or mitigate the absurdity of the consequence that S can know that E in a strong a 
priori manner.  Specifically, even if whenever S can know strongly a priori that E, S can 
also know empirically or perceptually that E, it is still absurd that S can know strongly a 
priori that E. 
 
Thus I conclude that Sawyer’s considerations cannot be imported to be used as 
considerations against the Environmental Access thesis used by Traditional McKinsey Reasoning. 
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§4 Brewer’s considerations against the Ambitious 
Environmental Access thesis 
 
Brewer (2000) also provides considerations against the claim that one cannot know that 
ordinary contingently existing physical objects exist in an “a priori” or “non-empirical 
manner”. 
 
Brewer asks us to consider the following inference: 
 
“(e1) I believe that p 
(e2) If x believes that p, then x’s environment contains or did contain C 
Therefore, 
(e3) My environment contains or did contain C” (Brewer 2000, p428). 
 
Brewer focuses on the case where the proposition that p is the proposition that water is wet 
and C is a concept such that C=water. 
 
Brewer suggests that one could know that (e1) “non-empirically” and know that (e2) “non-
empirically” and thereby come to know (e3) “non-empirically”.  The sense of “non-
empirical” knowledge that Brewer has in mind is knowledge which is such that 
 
“neither its acquisition, nor its status as knowledge necessarily involves any 
specific environmental investigation” (2000, p416). 
 
Thus, Brewer’s notion of non-empirical knowledge is compatible with a subject making 
empirical assumptions. 
 
Brewer’s (e1) is directed at the metaphysical nature of mental states rather than “de dicto 
structured cognitive predicates”. 
 
I would suggest that these features clearly show that Brewer is concerned with the B-B 
Reasoning and not Traditional McKinsey Reasoning. 
 
Some of Brewer’s remarks seem to suggest that he is denying that it is absurd that one can 
know that (e3) non-empirically.  He says: 
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“this argument cannot possibly constitute a problematic source of non-empirical 
knowledge: if its premises are true, then the subject already has the wherewithal to 
arrive at knowledge of its conclusion.” (2000, p428). 
 
According to Brewer the subject already has the wherewithal to know that (e3) because the 
truth (not the non-empirical knowability) of (e1) depends on the subject’s grasp of the 
content ‘p’ which in turn depends upon his possession of the concept C.  But, if a subject 
possesses the concept C, then, given Brewer’s views about concept possession, the subject 
will already possess demonstratively based empirical or perceptual knowledge that (e3). 
 
Brewer’s view faces a similar difficult to Sawyer’s.  Specifically, it is not clear how a 
subject’s possessing both empirical and non-empirical capacities for knowledge that (e3) is 
supposed to show how a subject has an unproblematic capacity for non-empirical 
knowledge that (e3).  Brueckner (2004) presses this worry.  He suggests that for some 
propositions one can be “doubly justified, so to speak in believing (e3)” (2004, p43).  
According to Brueckner, one can possess both empirical and non-empirical justification for 
believing that (e3) and, consequently, one can possess the capacity to know that (e3) in 
both an empirical and non-empirical manner.  But, according to Brueckner, this last result 
does not explain why a capacity to know that (e3) non-empirically is not absurd.  I 
conclude that the remarks of Brewer’s that might constitute considerations against the 
Ambitious Environmental Access thesis are inconclusive. 
 
Similarly, Brewer’s remarks do not have a clear import for the Environmental Access thesis 
that is the focus of Traditional McKinsey Reasoning.  Firstly, a subject’s performing an 
inference of the form (e1)-(e3) set out by Brewer is not a requirement or a necessary claim 
of Traditional McKinsey Reasoning.  Secondly, a defender of Traditional McKinsey Reasoning can 
grant that a subject can know that ordinary contingently existing physical objects exist in an 
“empirical” or “perceptual” manner, while still maintaining that the reasoning also commits 
us to the intolerable claim that a subject can also possess the capacity to know strongly a 
priori that such objects exist. 
 
§5 Conclusion 
 
I have suggested that the Environmental Access thesis, which is used by Traditional McKinsey 
Reasoning, has support from simple arguments in its favour which appeal to the notion of 
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strong aprioricity that it is concerned with.  By contrast, I have suggested that the Ambitious 
Environmental Access thesis, which is used by the B-B Reasoning, is typically not provided with 
sufficient considerations in its favour.  However, the arguments of Sawyer and Brewer do 
not provide sufficient considerations against either the Environmental Access thesis or the 
Ambitious Environmental Access thesis.  Consequently, in my view, the Environmental Access has 
been sufficiently defended.  The case both for and against the Ambitious Environmental Access 
thesis is, in my view, inconclusive.  Now, since my aim is to defend Traditional McKinsey 
Reasoning, I am indifferent to the fact that the considerations both for and against the 
Ambitious Environmental Access thesis are inconclusive.  As a defender of Traditional McKinsey 
Reasoning, what I needed to defend only the Environmental Access thesis and I believe that my 
work in this chapter has gone some way to doing that. 
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Chapter 5 
 
In this chapter I shall evaluate the auxiliary claims of Traditional McKinsey Reasoning and 
Boghossian-Brown Reasoning which are concerned with either a meta-closure principle or 
some principle of inference used to get us the earlier claims of the reasoning to the claim 
that a subject can know “a priori” in some sense that e (where the proposition that e 
concerns the existence of ordinary contingently existing physical objects). 
 
There are quite a number of complex issues to be sorted out.  I have argued that Traditional 
McKinsey Reasoning requires only that instances of the meta-closure principle CA be in fact 
true and does not require the claim that some subject have the ability to perform some kind 
of an inference or deduction.  So the immediate issues I face are to (a) give CA – or the 
relevant instances of it which I use - some prima facie motivation and (b) defend CA - or 
at least the relevant instances it I use - from cases which might be thought to constitute 
counter-examples to it.  I try to address these immediate issues in §1. 
 
However, there are other issues that are the focus of this chapter that are far more exciting 
and interesting than a defence of (instances of) the meta-closure principle CA.  Indeed, it is 
on these other issues where I have some of my biggest disagreements with McKinsey. 
 
McKinsey agrees with me that only instances of CA - and thus no instances of a principle 
involving a subject acquiring strong a priori knowledge by way of performing a deduction - 
are required for the formulation of his reasoning.  However, as we have seen earlier, 
McKinsey repeatedly prefaces and summaries his reasoning using precisely the example of 
a subject performing such a deduction.  For example, 
 
“Oscar can simply deduce E, using only premisses that are knowable a priori, 
including the premiss that he is thinking that water is wet. Since Oscar can deduce 
E from premisses that are knowable a priori, Oscar can know E itself a priori.” 
(1991a, p15). 
 
These “deduction stories” of McKinsey’s seem to suggest that although he doesn’t claim 
instances of principles concerning a subject acquiring strong a priori knowledge by way of 
performing a deduction are required for the formulation of his reasoning, the subject who is 
the focus of his reasoning could, nonetheless, perform such an inference and acquire 
strong a priori knowledge that e in this way too.  If this is McKinsey’s position, I am 
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inclined to agree with this claim of his too.  McKinsey is, thus, committed to the following 
claim: 
 
Deduction Story 
If (a) S can know strongly a priori that he possesses the logically wide property W (for example 
the property S thinks that p) and (b) the proposition that W logically implies the proposition that 
e and (c) S can competently deduce the proposition that e from the proposition that W, S can 
know strongly a priori that e in virtue of performing the deduction. 
 
However, when provoked by literature from Wright (2000) and Davies (2000), McKinsey 
makes yet more claims which seem to conflict with his claim Deduction Story (see especially 
McKinsey 2003 & 2002 pp210-12).  Specifically, McKinsey claims, firstly, that there are 
cases in which a subject can deduce one proposition from another which logically implies it 
and have the capacity to know the proposition that logically implies it and yet fail to have 
the capacity know the deduced proposition by way of the deduction.  McKinsey claims, 
secondly, that such cases occur precisely when the subject’s knowledge of the entailing 
proposition requires the subject to have (justificatory prior) knowledge of the entailed 
proposition.  These two claims together with McKinsey’s explanation for the meta-closure 
principle CA commit him to the following claim: 
 
Anti-Deduction story 
Even if (a) S can know strongly a priori that he possesses the logically wide property W (for 
example the property S thinks that p) and (b) the proposition that W logically implies the 
proposition that e and (c) S can competently deduce the proposition that e from the proposition 
that W, S cannot know strongly a priori that e in virtue of performing the deduction. 
 
The claims Anti-Deduction Story and Deduction Story conflict with one another.  What is even 
more striking is that McKinsey sometimes even makes both of these claims in different 
parts of the very same paper (compare, for example, McKinsey 2002, pp210-12 with p200). 
 
Am, I myself, committed to both the claims Deduction Story and Anti-Deduction Story?  No.  I 
claim only the Deduction Story.  I reject the Anti-Deduction Story.  I am able to take up this 
position because, contrary to McKinsey, I reject the view that there are cases where a 
subject can know each of the premises of a valid argument competently deduce the 
argument’s conclusion from those premises and yet thereby fail to know the argument’s 
conclusion.  I reject this view precisely because the cases that provide seeming examples to 
support the view are, in fact, on my view, merely cases where a competent deduction is not 
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performed.  I explain these issues in §2 and discuss their application to Traditional McKinsey 
Reasoning. 
 
So what I am considering is something like the following two principles: 
 
Strong A priori deduction principle 
{If S can know strongly a priori that p and the proposition that p logically implies the proposition 
that q, and S can competently deduce the proposition that q from the proposition that p}, then S 
can know strongly a priori that q. 
 
Deduction Principle 
{If S can know that p and the proposition that p logically implies the proposition that q, and S 
can competently deduce the proposition that q from the proposition that p}, then S can know 
that q. 
 
To repeat, in §2, I am defending these principles from cases that are alleged to be counter-
examples to them.  I suggest that such cases are, in fact cases, where the antecedent of the 
principle is not satisfied and, thus, they do not constitute counter-examples to them. 
 
There is also another element to the issues concerning acquiring knowledge by inference 
which relates more intimately to the work of Wright and Davies, rather than McKinsey.  
Wright and Davies’ contented that their consideration of cases involving perceptual 
knowledge provides a counter-example to Deduction Principle.  Moreover, Wright and Davies 
claim that the diagnosis of why this is so can be extrapolated to show that there are 
counter-examples to Strong A priori deduction principle and something like the following 
principle: 
 
A priori deduction principle 
{If S can know “a priori” that p and the proposition that p logically implies the proposition that q, 
and S can competently deduce the proposition that q from the proposition that p}, then S can 
know “a priori” that q. 
 
Furthermore, when Wright and Davies, test “McKinsey Reasoning” against this 
extrapolated diagnosis, they conclude that “McKinsey Reasoning” is in fact an instance of 
the reasoning which uses a false instance of principle A priori deduction principle.   Of course, 
given my sharp distinction between Traditional McKinsey Reasoning and B-B Reasoning, the 
crucial question for the Wright and Davies position is:  What do they mean by “McKinsey 
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Reasoning”?  There is clear and unambiguous textual evidence that they have the B-B 
Reasoning in mind (see Wright 2000, Davies 2000, 1998).  Consequently, their claim that 
“McKinsey Reasoning” uses a false instance of A priori deduction principle leaves Traditional 
McKinsey Reasoning untouched but may have an effect on the B-B Reasoning.  I discuss the 
Wright and Davies position in §3.  In §4 I discuss one of Wright’s particular applications of 
this strategy to “McKinsey Reasoning”.  §5 concludes. 
 
§1 Defending instances of  the meta-closure principle CA 
 
In this section I shall first distinguish the meta-closure principle CA from more standard 
closure principles that epistemologists are used to dealing with.  And explain why counter-
examples to the latter principles will not also be counter-examples to the former kind of 
principles when the propositions we are concerned with involve a logical implication 
between the proposition S thinks that p and the proposition that e (where e is a proposition 
concerning the existence of ordinary contingently existing physical objects). 
 
We need to distinguish between what I call meta-closure principles concerning a logical 
truth and standard closure principles concerning a logical truth.  Epistemologists are used 
to dealing with the second kind of closure principle but I have rarely seen them considering 
the first kind in great depth. 
 
An example of the first kind of closure principle is what I call a meta-closure principle: 
 
Closure of the capacity for strong a priori knowledge across meta-logical implication (CA) 
For any subject S and any propositions p and q:  If S can know a priori that p and the 
proposition that p logically implies the proposition that q, then S can know a priori that q. 
 
I call it a meta-closure principle because its second conjunct is a proposition which asserts 
a logical implication between two other propositions. 
 
An example of the second kind of closure principle is: 
 
Standard closure of the capacity for a priori knowledge across logical implication (SCA) 
For any subject S and any propositions p and q:  If S can know a priori that p and it is a logical 
truth that (if p, then q), then S can know a priori that q. 
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The last two closure principles above are related.  In order to specify this relation we need 
to introduce a third principle: 
 
LT 
For any propositions p and q:  If the proposition that p logically implies the proposition that q, 
then (if p, then q) is a logical truth. 
 
The relation between the three principles above is this: If CA and LT, then SCA. 
 
Now, counter-examples to the more conventional closure principle SCA, are also counter-
examples to CA, provided that the claim LT is true.  However, on certain systems of free 
logic, which McKinsey favours, or at least favours when stating the reasoning I am 
considering in this thesis, LT is not true.  LT is not true against a background of a neutral 
free logic.  McKinsey says: 
 
“Whatever plausibility (LT) has would seem to derive from a similar principle in 
classical first order logic, where if an argument from a premise ‘p’ to a conclusion 
‘q’ is logically valid, then the argument’s corresponding conditional ‘p⊃q’ is a 
logical truth. However, the very same semantic facts which support the direct 
reference view of singular terms, the facts which support the truth of such 
externalist theses ... also show that classical first order logic is an inadequate tool 
for capturing the notion of logical truth in natural languages. These same semantic 
facts show that (LT) is a false, or at least a highly doubtful, principle 
about logical truth.” (2006, p448). 
 
Against a background of a neutral free logic, it is rather trickier to construct counter-
examples to certain meta-closure principles by citing counter-examples to its analogous 
standard closure principle because now we have the tricky task of picking combinations of 
the closure principles where the corresponding instance of the claim LT is also true.   The 
problem is that whenever the proposition that e concerns the existence of ordinary 
contingently existing physical objects and the proposition that S thinks that p logically 
implies the proposition that e the corresponding instance of LT is not guaranteed to hold.  
McKinsey says: 
 
“A genuine term is a term whose sole semantic contribution to the propositions 
expressed by use of sentences containing the term is simply the term’s semantic 
referent. This means that the proposition expressed by use of a sentence 
containing such a term is a function of the term’s referent in that use. This in turn 
means that use of a sentence containing a genuine term that fails to refer (in that 
use) must also fail to express a proposition. But a sentence (or use) that fails to 
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express a proposition also fails to say anything about the world, and so such a 
sentence (or use) has no truth value, that is, is neither true nor false. 
 
I think it is clear that some of the genuine terms of natural languages at least 
sometimes fail to refer. But then the correct logic for (the first order fragments of) 
such languages must, unlike classical first order logic, be able to tolerate both 
failure of reference and failure of bivalence. The correct logic for such languages 
must in other words be a free logic. But in the forms of free logic that tolerate 
failure of bivalence due to failure of reference, the validity of an argument does 
not guarantee the logical truth of the argument’s corresponding conditional.” 
(2006, p449). 
 
 
§2 My view on deduction and Traditional McKinsey 
Reasoning 
 
In the first part of this section I shall try to explain why a subject’s being able to perform a 
certain deduction as central to one’s grasp of Traditional McKinsey Reasoning even though it is 
not a necessary or required premise in the reasoning.  In the second part I shall deal with 
some rather delicate issues concerning whether I can allow strong a priori knowledge of 
instances of the SE thesis that concern Traditional McKinsey Reasoning.  In the third part, I 
consider some of the cases of the cases which are alleged to constitute counter-examples to 
the deduction principles Strong A priori deduction principle and Deduction Principle and conclude 
that they are not genuine counter-examples but cases where the antecedent is not satisfied.  
In the fourth part of the section I once again consider the case of deduction that is central 
to “McKinsey Reasoning” against the view of acquiring knowledge by deduction that I 
have proposed. 
 
§2.1 The Cartesian Predicament and Bloated Cartesian Predicament 
 
Prior to consideration of CPA and SE, the Cartesian Predicament in the form of PAI alone 
allows that certain cogito style inferences could be performed.  For example, 
 
Cogito 1 
I am thinking that I am a thinking thing 
Therefore 
I exist 
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Cogito 2 
I am thinking that I am a hero 
Therefore, 
I exist 
 
Cogito 3 
I doubt that I am a hero 
Therefore, 
I exist 
 
The general form of these instances might be described thus: 
 
Cogito-General 
I possess narrow cognitive property N 
Therefore, 
I exist 
 
From one’s possession of a certain narrow property, one can deduce one’s own existence.  
Not that deducing one’s own existence does not imply the existence of ordinary 
contingently existing physical objects external to oneself.  Moreover, according to PAI one 
can know the premise of this instance in a strong a priori manner:  One can know that one 
possesses a mental state individuated by narrow property N just by thinking and without 
relying on empirical assumptions.  This makes one inclined to claim that when a subject 
does in fact know strongly a priori that she possesses N and competently deduces her own 
existence from her possession of N, one can also know strongly a priori that she exists.  I 
myself, do not see anything wrong with such a claim.  Given such a claim, we might also 
add that a subject can know strongly a priori that she exists in virtue of deducing her 
existence from a cogito argument when she knows the premise of that argument a priori. 
 
Of course one can query these inferences and claims about ways of knowing in various 
ways.  For example, one might ask: does one always have to perform such an inference to 
know strongly a priori that she exists.  I would suggest not because I would suggest that an 
instance of the meta-closure principle CA holds true. 
 
The relevant instance of CA would say that the subject possesses the capacity to strongly a 
priori know her own existence simply because of her capacity to strongly a priori know that 
she possesses certain narrow and individuating properties and such properties logically 
imply her own existence. 
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Note this last explanation does not require an appeal to Cogito-General.  It might be that 
performing Cogito-General, is one way, and perhaps the first way, in which S explicitly 
recognises or believes (or in fact knows strongly a priori) that she exists but it is not the 
only source of S’s capacity to know strongly a priori that she exists. 
 
Is there a suppressed premise in these inferences?  For example, is something like if “if S 
possesses property N, then S exists” suppressed?  Given that I take the implication 
between S’s possession of N and her own existence to be a logical implication I would suggest 
that something like “if S possesses property N, then S exists” is not a suppressed premise 
of the inference.  However, I would also add that a subject could know strongly a priori 
that if she possesses property N, then S exists.  Thus I would allow that a subject could reason in 
the following way: 
 
Extended Cogito 
I possess narrow cognitive property N 
If I possess narrow cognitive property N, then I exist 
Therefore, 
I exist 
 
Since the subject could know the premises of the Extended Cogito strongly a priori and 
competently deduce its conclusion from its premises, then she could thereby know strongly a 
priori that she exists. 
 
All I wish to paint here is a broad brushstroke picture of how the Cartesian predicament 
looks when we are considering just PAI and ignoring SE and CPA.  In the absence of CPA 
and SE, a de dicto structured cognitive predicate of the form ‘S cs that $’ expresses only a 
narrow cognitive property which may or may not individuate with respect to the cognitive 
state it describes.  Now if we add CPA alone to PAI, then we only have reason to think the 
cognitive predicate ‘S cs that $’ expresses only a narrow cognitive property which always 
does individuate with respect to the cognitive state it describes, so we still have not shifted 
out of the Cartesian Predicament. 
 
On the other hand, if we add both SE and CPA to PAI, then we are shifted from the 
Cartesian Predicament to the Bloated Cartesian Predicament.  Specifically, in the Bloated Cartesian 
Predicament, (i) the cognitive predicate ‘S cs that $’ expresses a wide cognitive property W, 
according to SE; (ii) according to CPA, W is individuating; and (iii) according to PAI, S has 
privileged access to the individuating property W in the sense S can know strongly a priori 
that she possesses a mental state individuated by W. 
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For example, on the bloated Cartesian Predicament, the cognitive predicate ‘Laura thinks 
that George is cute’ express the cognitive property Laura thinks the singular 
proposition that George is cute.  According to certain explanations of SE, the property 
Laura thinks the singular proposition that George is cute is logically wide.  According 
to CPA, the property Laura thinks the singular proposition that George is cute is 
individuating.  According to PAI, Laura can know strongly a priori that she possesses a 
mental state individuated by property Laura thinks the singular proposition that 
George is cute. 
 
Now on the Bloated Cartesian Predicament, logically wide individuating properties get 
treated just like logically narrow individuating properties.  Thus, one can engage in cogito 
style inferences using the logically wide properties as a premise.  If we remember that the 
proposition that e is a proposition asserting the existence of ordinary contingently existing 
physical objects distinct from our thinker S, the general form of these inferences on the 
Bloated Cartesian Predicament looks like this: 
 
Bloated-Cogito Inference 
I possess wide cognitive property W 
Therefore 
e 
 
For a concrete example, consider the following instantiation of the Bloated-Cogito 
Inference (given the particular explanation of SE, I used in the previous example). 
 
Bloated Cogito 1 
Laura possess the property Laura thinks that George is cute 
Therefore, 
George exists 
 
Since, on the Bloated Cartesian Predicament, S can know strongly a priori that she 
possesses W, and S can just deduce the proposition that e from her possession of W, S can 
know strongly a priori that e.  Moreover, S can know strongly a priori that e in virtue of 
deducing the proposition that e from her possession of W and knowing that she possesses 
W strongly a priori.  Is such an inference the only way S could know strongly a priori that e 
on the Bloated Cartesian Predicament?  No.  Recall, I have defend the view that an 
instance of the following meta-closure principle CA holds true: 
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Closure of the capacity for strong a priori knowledge across meta-logical implication (CA) 
For any subject S and any propositions p and q:  If S can know a priori that p and the 
proposition that p logically implies the proposition that q, then S can know a priori that q. 
 
And one can satisfy this closure principle without having to perform anything like a Bloated-
Cogito Inference. 
 
For example, Laura has the capacity to know that George exists simply because it is in fact 
true that the property Laura thinks that George is cute logically implies George’s 
existence (given a certain explanation of SE) and Laura can know strongly a priori she 
possesses the property Laura thinks that George is cute.  Note this last explanation does 
not require an appeal to Laura’s performing an inference of the form Bloated Cogito 1.  It 
might be that performing Bloated Cogito 1, is one way, and perhaps the first way, in which 
Laura explicitly recognises or believes (or in fact knows strongly a priori) that George exists 
but it is not the only source of Laura’s capacity to know strongly a priori that Laura exists. 
 
§2.2 Strong a priori knowledge of instances of SE? 
 
Is there a suppressed premise in the Bloated-Cogito Inference?  I would suggest not 
because the implication is a logical implication.  Were we to have to write out every logical 
implication of every argument in explicit form then we may have a regress of the form: 
 
If N, then e 
If N and (if N, then e) then e... 
 
Moreover, I have argued earlier that I would deny the following claim: 
 
LT 
For any propositions p and q:  If the proposition that p logically implies the proposition that q, 
then (if p, then q) is a logical truth. 
 
For example, I would deny the following instance of LT: 
 
If the proposition that N logically implies the proposition that e then (if N, then e) is a 
logical truth. 
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Moreover, on my view just as the simple sentence ‘George is cute’ expresses a proposition 
that is singular with respect to George and the cognitive predicate ‘Laura thinks that 
George is cute’ expresses a logically wide property, the following meta proposition is also 
singular with respect to George: 
 
(CA*) The proposition that Laura is thinking that George is cute logically implies the 
proposition that George exists. 
 
Thus, I would suggest that the meta-proposition (CA*), cannot, typically, claimed to be 
strongly a priori knowable because it is singular with respect to the ordinary contingently 
existing physical object George (However, see McKinsey (2003), pp206-210 for an 
extremely tortuous route to the strong a priori knowability of the truth {if Laura thinks that 
George is cute, then George exists}, given certain contrary to fact assumptions). 
 
§2.3 My view of counter-examples to inferential principles 
 
Some commentators on “McKinsey Reasoning”, as we have seen, have claimed that the 
reasoning requires an instance of the following principle to obtain (for example Wright 
2000, Davies 2000, 1998): 
 
Deduction Principle* 
{If S can know “a priori” that p and S can know a priori that if p then q, and S can believe that p 
and believe that if p, then q simultaneously and S can competently deduce the proposition that 
q from the propositions she simultaneously believes}, then S can know “a priori” that q. 
 
However, in order for their claim to hold good, they must interpret “McKinsey Reasoning” 
to be the B-B Reasoning or something like it.  Moreover, some commentators have claimed 
that the relevant instance of the principle Deduction Principle* used in “McKinsey 
Reasoning” is in fact false.  That is to say, they deny Deduction Principle*. 
 
The commentators reach this result by claiming that there are counter-examples to the 
more general claim, which sometimes includes cases of perceptual knowledge: 
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Deduction Principle** 
{If S can know that p and S can know that if p then q, and S can believe that p and believe that 
if p, then q simultaneously and S can competently deduce the proposition that q from the 
propositions she simultaneously believes}, then S can know that q. 
 
If you take a step back to consider these proposals, they ought to seem absolutely striking:  
They are claiming that there are cases where a subject knows all of the premises of a valid 
argument competently deduces its conclusion from its premises and yet fails to thereby 
know its conclusion.  If this view is correct, then, were it widespread, then a lot of what we 
claim to know “by deduction” might turn out to be wrong.  Now, in response, the 
proponents of this view might suggest our failures to “know by deduction” aren’t that 
widespread but just apply to an extremely restricted range of cases. 
 
§2.3.1 The issues at stake 
 
Since I am defending Traditional McKinsey Reasoning, which does not utilise the standard 
closure principle like Deduction Principle * and instead, utilises, a meta-closure principle CA, I 
would not accept the diagnosis of these commentators has any impact on the argument I 
am defending.  However, since I allow that inferences like Cogito Inference and Bloated-Cogito 
Inference can be performed and can be used for strong a priori knowledge acquisition on the 
Bloated Cartesian predicament, it is still useful for me to consider any alleged restrictions 
on acquiring “knowledge by deduction”.  This is because while such inferences are not 
essential to my formal statement of Traditional McKinsey Reasoning, I am using them as being 
one way to illustrate the Bloated Cartesian Predicament created by jointly assuming PAI, SE 
and CPA. 
 
§2.3.1 My view of a simple case 
 
Let’s look at some of the cases which constitute alleged counter-examples to the standard 
deductive closure principles Deduction Principle **. 
 
Consider, 
 
Repetition Argument 
P 
If p, then p 
Therefore, 
p 
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Clearly there are cases where I know that p and know that if p, then p and recognise the 
validity of Repetition Argument and I can deduce p from the Repetition Argument premises.  
However, the intuition is that I do not thereby know that p.  Everyone will also grant that I 
know that p because we asked everyone to assume it at the outset.  But, the intuition is that 
I do not know that p in one specific way.  The specific way in question is the way of 
knowing one possesses by deducing the conclusion of a valid argument from its known 
premises.  So it appears we have a counter example to Deduction Principle*. 
 
I disagree with this diagnosis.  My suggestion is that certainly something funny or odd is 
going on in the circumstances described.  I also agree that I do not know that p in one 
particular way.  Specifically, I agree that I do not know that p by inferring the Repetition 
Argument conclusion from its (known) premises.  However, my failure to possess such 
knowledge can be accounted for in two ways.  One way, is by the standard deductive 
closure principle Deduction Principle* being false and admitting counter-examples.  Another 
way, is by the standard closure principle Deduction Principle* holding true but at least one 
conjunct of its antecedent is not satisfied.  What I am going to suggest is that what is funny 
about this case just is that its antecedent is not satisfied.  What I shall suggest is that this 
particular conjunct of its antecedent is not satisfied in this case Deduction Principle*. 
 
When a subject performs a deduction like the one discussed in our example, it is analogous 
to that subject having a conversation with oneself.  For example, you can imagine a subject 
thinking or saying to herself: “p or if p then p therefore....”.  Now, with this picture in 
place, I’d suggest that certain Gricean communication rules are in place even when we are 
making statements to ourselves.  Two such Gricean conversational maxims are: 
 
“Do not make your contribution more informative than is required” (1975, p45 ). 
 
“Be brief.  Avoid unnecessary prolixity” (1975, p46). 
 
 I’d suggest that when one thinks or says the Repetition Argument to oneself, one recognises 
that something seems odd and has stopped mid-way through the deduction or inference.  
Thus the subject has not, and could not, if she is sufficiently rational, deduce p from if p, 
then p and p.  My explanation of why the subject, when attempting to run through the 
inference, recognises that something is odd mid-way through, is that she has violated one 
of these Gricean conversational axioms. 
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On my view does a subject need to be aware of all the Gricean conversational axioms in 
order to perform deductions?  No.  One cannot expect a sufficiently rational subject who 
deduces to know Grice’s point about conversational axioms.  However, when she is 
starting to perform an inference (or state an inference to herself) which is about to violate 
such an axiom, my suggestion is that the subject just does not complete it.  At an intuitive 
conversational level, she realises something is wrong with the inference she is trying to 
perform and just does not perform it. 
 
In giving my view I am helping myself to the claim that the subject is rational to at least 
some extent.  Some non-rational subject of course might go ahead and deduce the Repetition 
Argument conclusion from its premises but I don’t think such cases would be of interest to 
me or commentators on these issues. 
 
§2.3.1 A more complex case 
 
Consider the following inference: 
 
BIV Argument 
That animal is a zebra 
If that animal is a zebra, then I am not a brain-in-a-vat 
Therefore, 
I am not a brain-in-a-vat 
 
One common diagnosis of the BIV Argument is this.  S knows the premises of the BIV 
Argument.  After all, the premise “If that animal is a zebra, then I am not a brain-in-a-vat” is 
an obvious logical or conceptual truth.  Many accounts of perceptual knowledge allow that 
S knows that that animal is a zebra partly in virtue of her visual experiences.  What about 
S’s knowledge that she is not a brain-in-a-vat?  Does she possess such knowledge before 
performing any kind of inference involving the BIV Argument?  One commonly held view 
is that S has to possess such knowledge prior to the inference, because otherwise there is a 
simple sceptical argument that will undermine her perceptual knowledge that that animal is 
a zebra.  So, typically, one will claim that, prior to performing any inference involving the 
BIV Argument, S possesses knowledge that she is not a brain-in-a-vat.  Now consider the 
question:  If S knows each of the premises of the BIV Argument in the ways just described 
and S competently deduces that argument’s conclusion from those premises, then does S 
thereby know that she is not a brain-in-a-vat?  The common diagnosis is that S does not 
possess such knowledge.  That is to say, the common diagnosis denies S knows that she is 
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not-a-brain-in-a-vat in one specific way.  Specifically, the common diagnosis denies S 
knows that she is not-a-brain-in-a-vat by deducing it from the BIV Argument.  However, the 
common diagnosis has to affirm that S knows that she is not-a-brain-in-a-vat in some other 
way in order to set up the scenario from the outset. 
 
Now the common diagnosis just described, is meant to constitute a counter-example to the 
standard deductive closure principle Deduction Principle**. 
 
I disagree that there is a counter-example to the standard deductive closure principle.  I 
agree with the diagnosis that it is right to claim S knows that she is not-a-brain-in-a-vat by 
deducing it from the BIV Argument premises.  However, this claim can be accounted for 
in at least two ways:  Firstly, one can deny the standard deductive closure principle 
Deduction Principle*.  Secondly one can accept the standard deductive closure principle and 
simply deny that one of the components in its antecedent is true.  The view I shall be 
proposing is that the antecedent of Deduction Principle** is false. 
 
I shall argue that Deduction Principle** antecedent is false because a Gricean conversational 
axiom has been violated; consequently, the subject never performs a competent deduction.  
However, the Gricean axiom I have in mind is a different one than in the last example.  It 
is an axiom concerning only making statements that one has adequate evidence for.  In 
order to show how the requirement is relevant to this case, I need to make a quick detour 
into consideration of the sceptical argument and Internalism-externalism debate in 
epistemology which is fuelling our initial set up of the case under consideration. 
 
A rough and ready outline of the sceptical argument that threatens one’s perceptual 
knowledge that that animal is a zebra is this: 
 
Sceptical Argument 
(SA1) S does not know that she is not a brain-in-a-vat [claim] 
(SA2) S knows that if that animal is a zebra, then she is not a brain-in-a-vat [claim] 
(SA3) If {S knows that animal is a zebra and S knows that if that animal is a zebra, then she is 
not a brain-in-a-vat}, then S knows that she is not a brain-in-a-vat. [claim] 
Therefore, 
(SA4) S does not know that animal is a zebra [from SA1, SA2 and SA3] 
 
How does one resist the conclusion of the sceptical argument (SA4) and thus preserve the 
materials needed to set up our problem involving the BIV Argument?  The strategy used by 
those who set up problems like the BIV Argument is to grant the sceptic claims (SA2) and 
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(SA3).  However, they question the claim (SA1).  Specifically they’ll say that another 
argument lies behind (SA1) which uses a false premise. 
 
Evidential Constraint Argument 
(ECA1) S does not possess adequate evidence for the proposition that that animal is a zebra. 
(ECA2) For any proposition that p or at least any proposition about the external environment 
that p: If S knows that p, then S possesses adequate evidence for the proposition that p. 
Therefore, 
(SA1) S does not know that she is not a brain-in-a-vat [from ECA1 and ECA2] 
 
They’ll grant (ECA1).  But they’ll allege that the claim (ECA2) is false.  That is to say they 
reject the claim that all cases of propositional knowledge are constrained by a subject 
possessing adequate evidence.  Their rejection of (EC2A) is compatible with their also 
claiming that possessing adequate evidence is still central to many cases of propositional 
knowledge.  They’ll simply deny that possessing adequate evidence is necessary for 
possession of propositional knowledge. 
 
Thus, those who reject (ECA2) are committed to a certain form of epistemological 
externalism.  If we say that when a subject, S, possesses adequate evidence for the 
proposition that p, S has sufficiently reflective access to the factors that make it the case 
that S knows that p (rather than truly believes that p), we can formulate epistemological 
internalism thus: 
 
(EIK) A necessary condition on S’s knowledge that p is that all epistemic factors relevant 
to S’s knowledge (as opposed to merely true belief) that p are reflectively accessible to S. 
 
(cf. Kallestrup & Pritchard 2004, p346-7). 
 
The denial of (EIK) is epistemological externalism.  Note that an epistemological 
externalist can still claim that in some (or many) cases a subject who knows that p has 
sufficiently reflective access to the factors that make it the case she possesses knowledge 
(rather than true belief) and possesses adequate evidence for the proposition that p.  What 
the epistemological externalist denies is that all such cases of knowledge require such 
reflective access and evidence possession. 
 
Now, my suggestion is that the set-up of the problem concerning the BIV Argument, 
requires epistemological externalism to be true.  Specifically, my suggestion is that if S 
knows that she is not a brain-in-a-vat at the outset (prior to performing any alleged 
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inference), S’s knowledge must be such that S does not possess adequate evidence for the 
proposition that she is not a brain-in-a-vat and S does not have sufficiently reflective access 
to the factors that make it the case that she possesses such knowledge (cf. Zalabardo 
(forthcoming, 2009, 2005)). 
 
My suggestion is also that when she possesses knowledge that that animal is a zebra, S does 
possess adequate evidence for the proposition that that animal is a zebra.  For example, S 
has her visual experience as of a zebra and she knows that certain scenarios involving fake 
zebras and the like are farfetched.  Similarly, S does possess sufficiently reflective access to 
the factors that make it the case that she knows that that animal is a zebra. 
 
Now consider S attempting to perform the inference.  Imagine S saying or thinking to 
herself “that animal is a zebra, if that animal is a zebra, then I am not a brain-in-a-vat....”.  
Does S complete the inference?  I would suggest not.  I would suggest that there is 
condition on S performing the deduction which is analogous to the following Gricean 
conversational axiom: 
 
“Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.” (1975, p46). 
 
In order to secure S’s knowledge that she is not a brain-in-a-vat prior to performing the 
inference, we needed to claim that S knows that she is not a brain-in-a-vat even though S 
does not possess adequate evidence for the proposition that she is not a brain-in-a-vat and 
even though S has no sufficiently reflective access to the factors that make it the case that 
she possesses such knowledge. 
 
Thus, when S is attempting to say or think the argument through herself “that animal is a 
zebra, if that animal is a zebra, then I am not a brain-in-a-vat....” she realises that as soon as 
she states that she is not a brain-in-a-vat, she will be stating something which she lacks 
adequate evidence for.  Thus, S will not complete the deduction.  All of this holds, of 
course, only if S is sufficiently rational.  Consequently, on my view we have no counter-
example to Deduction Principle** but we do have a case where at least one conjunct of its 
antecedent is false. 
 
§2.4 The Cartesian and Bloated Cartesian Predicament Reconsidered 
 
Now let’s return to a simple inference in the original Cartesian Predicament like this: 
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Bloated-Cogito Inference 
I possess narrow cognitive property N 
Therefore 
I exist 
 
If a subject uses such a form of argument to acquire knowledge of its conclusion, is the 
subject’s attempted performance of the deduction going to violate any of the requirements 
on performing a deduction that I have identified in the previous subsection?  Is S repeating 
information like in the Repetition Argument?  It does not appear obvious to me. 
 
Is S attempting to state a claim which she lacks adequate evidence for?  It is not obvious to 
me.  S’s evidence for the Cogito Argument premise is adequate.  Perhaps it would consist 
in the subject merely being in a mental state individuated by property N or having an 
introspective awareness of being in a certain mental state individuated by property N.  
Perhaps S’s evidence that she is in a mental state individuated by property N is also 
adequate evidence for the proposition that she exists.  Perhaps S possesses or could 
possess alternative adequate evidence that she exists. 
 
Moreover, things are similar when we consider the Bloated Cartesian Predicament.  Of, 
course, the Bloated Cartesian Predicament is a contrary to fact predicament, created by our 
making the contrary to fact assumption of the conjunction of PAI, SE and CPA.  But, 
given our assuming this contrary to fact predicament, it does not seem that any of the 
requirements I have identified on performing an inference are violated when one considers 
bloated cogito arguments. 
 
For example, consider: 
 
Bloated-Cogito Inference 
I possess wide cognitive property W 
Therefore 
e 
 
It is not obvious that in performing a deduction using such an argument S is repeating 
information.  Nor is it obvious that S is attempting to state something for which she lacks 
adequate evidence.  Consequently, I’d suggest that S can use such arguments to acquire 
strong a priori knowledge of their conclusions, given we are making the contrary to fact 
assumption of jointly assuming CPA, SE and PAI. 
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§3 Wright and Davies Exposition 
 
Contrary to my view, Wright and Davies contend that there are counter-examples to 
Deduction principle**.  Moreover, they think that the features of these counter-examples can 
be extrapolated to give us counter-examples to Deduction Principle* 
 
Moreover, they argue that in the case of “McKinsey Reasoning” the pertinent instance of 
Deduction Principle* fails, given they take “McKinsey Reasoning” to be B-B Reasoning.  Since I 
interpret “McKinsey Reasoning” not as B-B Reasoning but as Traditional McKinsey Reasoning, 
then Davies and Wright’s position may have no impact on the exact formulation of my 
argument.  It may, however, have an impact on the inferences that I allow can be 
performed when one is in the (contrary to fact) Bloated Cartesian Predicament. 
 
Reconsider our previous case involving the BIV argument.  The set-up of the situation that 
Wright and Davies endorse here is that, contrary to my view, the subject does in fact 
perform the deduction from the argument’s premises to its conclusion.  But intuitively, 
we’d all agree that S does not thereby know the argument’s conclusion.  Thus, Wright and 
Davies conclude that the argument is, in fact, a counter-example to Deduction Principle**. 
 
Moreover, Wright and Davies allege that such cases give us a sufficient condition for 
counter-examples to Deduction Principle**.  Specifically, they suggest that when a subject is in 
a certain epistemic structure, we have a counter-example to Deduction Principle*.  Applied to 
our example, the structure Wright and Davies have in mind is: 
 
BIV Structure 
S knows that the animal is a zebra only if S knows that she is not a brain-in-a-vat. 
 
I agree that BIV Structure is central to the case of the inference that we are considering.  But 
I disagree that it provides a sufficient condition for a counter-example to Deduction 
Principle**.  Rather, I suggest that BIV Structure obtains against the background of a subject 
possessing epistemological externalist knowledge that she is not a brain-in-a-vat.  Now, given 
the knowledge in question is epistemologically externalist, S lacks adequate evidence for the 
proposition that she is not a brain-in-a-vat and S lacks sufficiently reflective access to the 
factors that constitute her knowledge.  Thus, when S attempts the deduction in question 
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she realises that were she to state to herself “I am not a brain-in-a-vat” she would not 
possess adequate evidence for such a statement.  Hence, S does not complete the 
competent deduction.  Thus, we have no counter-example to Deduction Principle**. 
 
(cf. My position with Pryor (2005, 2001 & 1997) & Silins (2005) who may also argue we 
have no counter-example to Deduction Principle** (and similar principles) because both its 
antecedent and consequent are true.) 
 
§4 Illusions of  thought 
 
Wright suggests that one counter-example to Deduction Principle* is given by a case where a 
subject undergoes an illusion-of-thought.  In such a case, the subject’s utterances of say 
“water is wet” would express no proposition because the subject is on a distant planet 
where the substance water does not exist but she and her speech community are 
undergoing the communal hallucination that there is a certain watery substance in her 
environment.  In such a situation, when S utters “I am thinking that water is wet”, she 
expresses no genuine thought thereby.  But nonetheless S is having some kind of an 
experience as of having a thought.  That is to say, on Dry-Earth, S must be in some mental 
state which is subjectively indistinguishable from the mental state she’d be in were the wide 
property S is thinking that water is wet to individuate the mental state.  Such a 
scenario, of course, requires one to assume SE about cognitive predicates of the form ‘S 
thinks that water is wet’ and requires one to assume the Proposition Theory and CPA.  This is 
because, were one not to assume the Proposition Theory, we could say that S has a mental 
state which is individuated by a certain cognitive property, it is just that that cognitive 
property is not characterised by a thinker having a cognitive attitude towards a proposition.  
For more on this issue see Chapter 2.  Let’s call such a scenario the Dry-Earth scenario. 
 
Now, imagine a different subject, S*, considering the following argument on planet Earth: 
 
Water Illusion 
(W1) I am thinking that water is wet 
(W2) If I am thinking that water, then I am not in the Dry-Earth scenario 
Therefore, 
(W3) I am not in the Dry-Earth scenario 
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Wright’s contention is that in order for S* to possess “a priori” knowledge that (W1) one 
needs some kind of externalist or unearned knowledge that (W3).  Thus, according to 
Wright, we have the following epistemic structure: 
 
Structure 2 
S knows “a priori” that she is thinking that water is wet and if S thinks that water is wet then E 
only if S knows “a priori” that she is not in the Dry Earth scenario. 
 
Wright’s contention is that Structure 2 is sufficient to give a counter-example to 
DeductionPrinciple*.  However, crucial to Wright’s claim is that a subject knows only weakly a 
priori that (W1).  If a subject only acquires her belief that (W1) in a manner which does not 
use empirical evidence as grounds for her belief, then S would still need to discount the 
possibility that she is not on Dry Earth possessing a subjectively indistinguishable mental 
state.  Wright’s suggestion is that in such circumstances a subject possess “unearned”, or in 
my terminology, externalist knowledge that (W3).  There are at least there issues about this 
position of Wright’s which I shall briefly mention. 
 
Firstly, it is not clear what kind of a bearing such a diagnosis would have on the B-B 
Reasoning, since that reasoning is concerned with a subject performing the following 
inference: 
 
Water Argument 
(W1) I am thinking that water is wet 
(W2*) If I am thinking that water, then E 
Therefore, 
(W3) E (where the proposition that E concerns the existence of ordinary contingently existing 
physical objects). 
 
Secondly, it is not clear that Structure 2 gives a counter-example to Deduction Principle*.  
Rather, it may only show that a subject does not complete the competent deduction and 
that, instead, the relevant Deduction Principle*is true but its antecedent is false. 
 
Thirdly, Wright’s scenario is completely irrelevant when we are considering Traditional 
McKinsey Reasoning and we make the contrary to fact assumption that the conjunction of 
PAI, CPA and SE are true.  Given our contrary to fact assumption we shift from the 
Cartesian Predicament to the Bloated Cartesian Predicament.  And, the “a priori” knowledge we 
are dealing with in this predicament is strong a priori knowledge - knowledge we possess 
“just by thinking and possessing no empirical assumptions”.  The Bloated Cartesian 
Predicament is contrary to fact.  But while we assume the predicament for a reductio of the 
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conjunction of PAI, SE and CPA, we need to follow through its consequences.  One of 
those consequences is that a subject will already know strongly a priori that she is not on 
Dry Earth.  Let me explain. 
 
Consider a subject S** in the Bloated Cartesian Predicament.  Let’s define the proposition 
that E as the proposition that water exists or a certain speech community exists.  From the relevant 
instance of SE we have both: 
 
(SE**-1)The property expressed by the de dicto structured cognitive predicate ‘S** thinks 
that water is wet’ expresses the (logically wide) property S thinks that water is wet. 
 
(SE**-2) The proposition that S** thinks that water is wet logically implies the proposition 
that E. 
 
Now consider the following inference: 
 
Bloated-Cogito-Water Argument 
S** possesses the property S thinks that water is wet 
Therefore, 
E 
 
According to PAI, S can know that she possesses the (logically wide) property S thinks 
that water is wet.  Let’s suppose S** in fact possesses such strong a priori knowledge.  
Then, S** can just deduce that using the Bloated-Cogito-Water-Argument.  In such 
circumstances, S** will in fact possess strong a priori knowledge that E.  Thus S** knows 
strongly a priori that water exists or a certain speech community exists.  But if S** 
possesses such strong a priori knowledge, then she’ll already know strongly a priori that she 
is not in the Dry-Earth scenario, since on Dry-Earth the substance water does not exist. 
 
You might reply that it is absurd that S** possesses or could possess strong a priori 
knowledge that E.  I agree.  The only point that I am making is that in such an (admittedly) 
absurd, and contrary to fact, scenario, S** will also know strongly a priori that she is not in 
the Dry-Earth scenario. 
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§5 Conclusion 
 
I thus conclude that the points by Wright and Davies concerning one’s failure to acquire 
knowledge by inference at best only have relevance to “McKinsey Reasoning”, if 
“McKinsey Reasoning” is interpreted as B-B Reasoning.  The version of “McKinsey 
Reasoning” which I defend, in the form of Traditional McKinsey Reasoning is left untouched 
by the Wright-Davies point about our failure to acquire knowledge using valid arguments.  
Moreover, my illustration of the contrary to fact situation we are in when we assume the 
conjunction of SE, CPA and PAI – the Bloated Cartesian Predicament – is also unaffected by 
issues that cast doubt upon whether we can acquire knowledge by using certain valid 
arguments or whether we can fully complete certain competent deductions. 
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Chapter 6 
 
In this chapter I shall evaluate the PAI thesis of Traditional McKinsey Reasoning.  I consider 
various objections to the PAI thesis in §1-2 from Quine and Devitt and also objections one 
might be tempted to derive from Descartes scholars like Kenny.  I conclude that the PAI 
thesis is not defeated by these objections but suggest that they do place certain explanatory 
demands on the overall picture I (and McKinsey) am endorsing.  In §3, I consider an 
alternative formulation of the Cartesian predicament from Farkas (2008) and conclude that 
this formulation, just like my PAI formulation, is afflicted by Traditional McKinsey Reasoning.  
In §4 I discuss some motivations for the privileged access that is the concern of the B-B 
Reasoning.  I suggest that the philosophical basis for its formulation is an intense desire to 
account for some distinctive way of knowing our own thoughts, given the CPA and SE 
theses are tacitly assumed.  In §5 concludes. 
 
§1 Objections to PAI 
 
The PAI thesis says: 
 
Privileged Access to Individuating Factors (PAI) 
For any subject, S, if S possesses a given mental state , which is individuated by property F, 
S can know strongly a priori that she possesses F. 
 
It is important to stress the strength of aprioricity involved: it is knowledge that is not 
based on any empirical assumptions and knowledge that a thinker could possess in a 
solipsistic world. 
 
The strongest opponent to PAI I can spot in the literature is Devitt (1990, 1996, 2002, 
2005, 2006).  Devitt has put forward a number of arguments suggesting that there is no 
such category of “a priori” knowledge.  Devitt’s arguments sometimes appeared to be 
inspired by a classical Quinian (1951) argument for the conclusion that there is no a priori 
knowledge.  An outline of the classical Quinian argument looks like this: 
 
(Q1) Any sentence, $, we take to be true might come to be rationally rejected as false in the 
light of experience, and there would be nothing which would make such an event a mere 
change of language and not a change of theory [claim] 
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(Q2) Therefore, the rationality of our currently assigning $ truth does depend on that 
assignment’s compatibility with a total assignment of truth values to sentences which fits well 
with experience [fropm Q2] 
 
(Q3) Therefore, our acceptance of $ depends on experience [from Q2] 
 
The argument appeals to the Quinian sense of belief which is taken to be a sentence we 
take to be true. 
 
Claim (Q1) results from Quine’s web-of-belief model.   The web-of-belief model holds that 
experience confronts the aggregate of our theories as a whole.  Experience confirms or 
undermines a hypothesis only when other hypotheses are held true.  Which hypotheses do 
we hold true?  In the web-of-belief model this depends on many factors but it at least in 
part depends on pragmatic rationality – minimising the overall disruption to our beliefs.  
On the web-of-belief model, some beliefs are more central than others; the central beliefs 
are related to more beliefs than those at the periphery.  There is a gradual rather than an 
absolute difference between beliefs at the centre and at the periphery.  Hence, in light of 
recalcitrant experience, if two beliefs differ only in terms of centrality, then we jettison the 
least central belief on the grounds of pragmatic rationality. 
 
“A recalcitrant experience can…be accommodated by any of the various 
alternative reëvaluations…but our natural tendency [is] to disturb the total system 
as little as possible…” (Quine 1960, p44). 
 
However, no belief is immune to revision, beliefs toward the centre may be more resistant 
to revision; but making the best sense of experience, can sometimes rationally require us to 
jettison a more central belief. 
 
Thus according to the Quinian model, all beliefs are dependent on experience.  So there is 
no a priori knowledge – knowledge independent of experience. 
 
Some literature disputes the validity of the Quinian argument.  It suggests that the 
argument is invalid because it equivocates on the notion of dependence (Giaquinto 1996).   
The thought behind this response is that the Quinian web of belief model shows that all 
our beliefs are negatively dependent on experience in the sense that retaining those beliefs 
depends on empirical evidence.  But our beliefs being negatively dependent on experience, 
does not imply that they are positively dependent on experience in the sense that we need 
empirical evidence to acquire such beliefs. 
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I have not spotted anywhere where Devitt discusses these responses to the Quinian 
argument.  However, even if such responses are correct, they won’t help with my defence 
of PAI.  This is because PAI speaks of strong a priori knowledge, not merely of weak a 
priori knowledge.  Consequently the notion of PAI I have in mind is not positively 
dependent on empirical evidence and not negatively dependent on empirical evidence.  
What the response, if correct, may explain is why the notion of weak a priori knowledge is 
common currency in a wide range of philosophical discussions.  In particular, if correct, the 
response may partly explain why certain commentators would rather not formulate 
“McKinsey Reasoning” using a notion of strong aprioricity and, instead, attempt to 
formulate it using the notion of weak aprioricity. 
 
Moreover, all that matters for my purposes is that strong aprioricity of thoughts and 
meanings (and perhaps also certain simple deductive principles is a priori) is preserved, 
even if many of our claims about propositions which we claim to know strongly a priori are 
wrong. 
 
In order to make some progress, we need to locate the elements of Devitt’s work where he 
explicitly speaks of knowledge of thoughts or knowledge of mental states or even 
knowledge of meaning.  Devitt (see, for example, 1990) endorses a so called “causal theory 
of meaning” (or “causal theory of reference”) and “causal theory of thought content”.  
According to the first of these theories certain term’s meanings are determined by speakers’ 
causal relations to contingently existing external physical objects.  According to the second 
of these theories, certain thoughts composed of these meanings must also be determined 
by the thinker’s causal relations to contingently existing external physical objects.  Thus 
Devitt would seem to endorse SE, the view that cognitive predicates express logically wide 
properties in virtue of such properties being causally related to ordinary contingently 
existing physical objects or a speech community. 
 
Thus, Devitt’s endorsement of SE is a CPA-dependent explanation.  Specifically, Devitt 
needs CPA to transform cases which speak of “de dicto structured cognitive predicates” 
into cases which speak of the metaphysical nature of mental states.  Thus, if Traditional 
McKinsey Reasoning is sound, then Devitt would have to give up PAI in order to avoid the 
result of endorsing the seemingly incompatible combination of SE, CPA and PAI.  So, one 
way of interpreting Devitt’s position is this: he may accept the trilemma posed by 
Traditional McKinsey Reasoning and his response to that trilemma would be to reject PAI 
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alone.  Devitt is forced to chose to reject PAI because he endorses SE and at least tacitly 
assumes CPA. 
 
In order for Devitt’s rejection of PAI to be plausible, he owes us an explanation of why the 
Cartesian predicament which seemingly supports PAI in fact does not.  Devitt needs to 
explain why individuating properties, including the paradigm cases of logically narrow 
properties such as the properties expressed by de se thought predicates cannot be strongly 
a priori. 
 
Such an explanation of Devitt’s is easy to give in the case of logically wide properties.  Let 
us suppose that the de dicto structured cognitive predicate ‘Laura thinks that George is 
cute’ expresses the property Laura thinks the singular proposition that George is cute.  
Given the particular explanation of SE which Devitt endorses, the property Laura thinks 
the singular proposition that George is cute is individuating and is causally related to 
the contingently existing ordinary physical object George.  Since this causal relation is 
always present when Laura possesses the property in question, the property logically 
implies the existence of the contingently existing physical object George. 
 
However, Devitt’s explanation is more tricky to give for a de dicto structured cognitive 
predicate that is claimed to express a logically narrow property.  Consider, for example, the 
de se cognitive predicate ‘Ollie thinks that he himself is a hero’.  Does this express a 
property that is somehow related to ordinary contingently existing physical objects?  Why 
can’t the meanings of each of the words in this cognitive predicate be logically narrow?  At 
this point it is instructive to listen to what Devitt says about certain description theories of 
reference: 
 
“A description theory of reference explains the referential properties of one 
category of term by appeal to those of other categories.  Perhaps description 
theories can be used again.  But this cannot go on forever.  There must be some 
basic terms whose reference is not parasitic upon others.  Otherwise language as a 
whole is cut loose from the world.  The ultimate explanation for reference cannot 
be a description theory.” (1990, Ch. 5)  
 
What moral should we draw from these comments of Devitt’s? And how should we apply 
these comments to the example of de se cognitive predicates?  Has Devitt shown that for 
every general term, t, t is ultimately determined by a causal relation to an ordinary 
contingent object?  He may have shown that a certain interpretation of Putnam and 
Kripke’s work results in certain proper names and kind terms ultimately being causally 
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related to ordinary contingently existing physical objects.  But an inference that this moral 
should be extended from some kind terms and proper names to all general terms seems to 
be going a bit far.  Devitt might reply that there simply is no other candidate apart from 
ordinary contingently existing physical objects to determine the meaning of the terms used 
by a subject.  In fact, Devitt says: 
 
“Description theories are not only incomplete, they are looking in the wrong place 
for the ultimate explanation of reference.  For that explanation we must look also 
to what is outside the head” (1990, Ch.5). 
 
Devitt’s inability to envisage a candidate that is “inside the head” or logically narrow, does 
not imply that there is no such candidate.  In later chapters, I shall be suggesting that the 
meanings of certain terms can be private and internal to the subject because the meanings 
of such terms are private and internal to the speakers.  Moreover, I shall argue that in the 
right circumstances certain private, internal and logically narrow states can still be about 
ordinary contingently existing physical objects.  So Devitt’s case for denying PAI is 
inconclusive.  For it to be conclusive, he would have needed to have ruled out logically 
narrow states as being candidates for determining the meaning of certain terms.  And he 
also would have needed to rule out logically narrow states as being candidates for a subject 
to have thoughts about objects.  What Devitt’s work has done, however, is to focus and 
sharpen the task myself and McKinsey have ahead: We need to explain how private and 
internal logically narrow states can be about public and external objects. 
 
§2 The scope of  Cognitive attitudes 
 
It might be possible to scrounge up objections to PAI by going through some Descartes 
commentaries.  Inspired by the discussion in Kenny (1968) one might ask us to consider 
the predicate ‘S dreams that she herself is a thinking thing’.  It might be suggested that this 
predicate expresses a property that is individuating and logically narrow.  According to the 
privileged access thesis, PAI, S can know strongly a priori that she possesses this property.  
But surely Descartes would not allow that S can know strongly a priori that she possesses 
this property.  So, is there something wrong with using PAI to capture the Cartesian 
predicament?  I shall suggest not.  What this case does suggest is that we need to be careful 
about what verbs we count as cognitive attitude verbs in the de dicto structured cognitive 
predicates of the form ‘Scs that $’ of Traditional McKinsey Reasoning. 
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According to Kenny, the verb “cogitaire” has usage that is much wider than the English 
sense of “thinks”, rather the verb covers everything that exists in us in such a way that we 
are immediately aware of it.  How are we to account for this immediate awareness?  Kenny 
suggests the following test:  If for a verb we answer the following question in the 
affirmative, then it can be used as a cogito premise “Is it true that when I ø, I know that I 
ø?”  For example, if ø is replaced with ‘walk’, or ‘dream’, then we answer the question in 
the negative because one can dream without knowing that one is dreaming and one can be 
dreaming that one is walking.  On the other hand, if ø is replaced with ‘doubt’, ‘think’, 
‘believe’, ‘seeming to see’, ‘experience’, we answer the question in the affirmative. 
 
Thus, for the purposes of characterising the Cartesian predicament, we cannot treat the 
verb ‘dream’ as a cognitive attitude verb that is suitable for Traditional McKinsey Reasoning.  If 
we do this, then it is not the PAI thesis that would be at fault for allowing a priori 
knowledge of the property expressed by the predicate ‘S dreams that she is a thinking 
thing’, rather the fault lies with treating the predicate as a cognitive predicate (i.e. as a 
predicate containing a cognitive attitude verb suitable for Traditional McKinsey Reasoning).  
Thus, not every verb reporting an episode in a subject’s life will do for the construction of 
the cognitive predicates required by Traditional McKinsey Reasoning. 
 
To be sure, Kenny, himself, suggests that though both sleep and waking life may consist of 
thoughts they are not themselves thoughts in the broad sense covered by the verb 
“cogitaire”.  Kenny allows that a dreamer can prove her existence through the cogito with 
the proviso that the dreamer appeal to a premise involving a cognitive attitude verb 
involving something that she is immediately aware of in her dream, such as ‘I believe that I 
am a thinking thing’. 
 
What is interesting about Kenny’s discussion of Descartes is that there is no mention of 
how we would handle cognitive attitude verbs which are claimed to express properties that 
logically imply the existence of ordinary contingent objects, such as ‘S thinks that George is 
cute’ (where ‘George’ is functioning as a proper name with no descriptive element).  This is 
likely to be due to the date of the Kenny publication.  It was published before Kripke 
(1972) and Kaplan’s (1979) work on the modal properties of sentences which might 
support SE.  Consequently, it shows no recognition of the problems that occur with 
conjoining the Cartesian predicament summarised by PAI with SE and CPA.  Traditional 
McKinsey Reasoning is one attempt at trying to articulate the problems of assuming the 
conjunction of PAI, SE and CPA. 
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§3 Farkas’ notion of  privileged access 
 
Some comments in recent literature which might be thought to suggest that the PAI thesis 
should be rejected in favour of an alternative thesis come from Farkas (2008).  Here is a 
flavour of her remarks: 
 
“Knowledge of mathematics is similar to perceptual knowledge in that the kind of 
things I can learn about mathematics with the help of my reasoning faculties are 
available to other potential knowers endowed with a similar reasoning apparatus, 
through the same route. I can prove Pythagoras’s theorem by using my reasoning 
abilities, and so can you.” (2009, p20). 
 
“A priori knowledge of conceptual truths—like a square having four sides—is 
similar to the previously discarded faculties and their subject matters: other 
potential knowers, endowed with similar reasoning capacities, can get to acquire 
them in the same way as I can.” (pp20-1). 
 
“The upshot is that the kind of things I know perceptually, or a priori, or through 
testimony, and, in some cases, through memory, can be known by others through 
the same routes, respectively. But what I learn by reflection or introspection can 
be learnt in that way only by me. What belongs to the mind can be determined 
relative to this capacity: the subject matter of this faculty is the mind.” (p23). 
 
“A priori knowledge (that is, the kind of knowledge we have of logic, maths, and 
conceptual truths) is traditionally regarded as knowledge attained by the use of 
reason alone, and this description does not seem to apply to knowledge of our 
mental states...When I register that I feel a slight pain in my knee, the faculty I am 
using is different from the one used in establishing the correctness of the modus 
ponens. One difference between introspection and a priori knowledge is precisely 
that introspection provides special access to its subject matter, while a priori 
knowledge does not. It is worth noting that even philosophers who are sceptical 
about a priori knowledge of a traditional kind, like Donald Davidson, recognize 
that introspection has a certain essential first-person aspect. I do not share 
Davidson’s scepticism about a priori knowledge, but I think his example supports 
the claim that introspection should not be categorized together with the kind of a 
priori knowledge we have of logic and mathematics.” (pp25-6). 
 
It is clear from these quotes that Farkas endorses an alternative formulation of privileged 
access thesis which does not at all use the term “a priori”. 
 
The way of knowing our own mental states that Farkas envisages seems to have to satisfy 
something like this thesis: 
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The First Person-Third Party Knowledge Thesis 
Necessarily for any distinct subjects S and T:  If S is thinking that p, then S can know that she is 
thinking that p in a special way but T cannot know that S is thinking that p in this special way. 
 
My best attempt at describing the model of knowledge of thoughts that Farkas endorses is 
this: 
 
F-PAC 
Necessarily for any distinct subjects, S and T, and ‘non-a priori’ way of knowing, W, if S is 
thinking that P, then S can know that she is thinking that p in a special way W but T cannot 
know that S is thinking that p in way W.  
 
F-PAC may be in need of further refinement.  In particular, F-PAC would need to state 
whether or not S’s way of knowing, W, can depend on empirical assumptions.  For the sake 
of simplicity I shall simply assume that this is so.  However, I think F-PAC captures 
enough of the details of Farkas’ notion of privileged access to cause problems.  Note the 
idea that way of knowing, W, in F-PAC, can’t be identical with an ‘a priori’ way of knowing 
– that is ‘knowledge without perceptual observation or empirical investigation’. 
 
Farkas’ thesis F-PAC does seems to make the tacit assumption of CPA.  Specifically, it 
seems to assume the property S thinks that p individuates with respect to the cognitive 
state that it describes.  Now if some properties of the form  S thinks that p are logically 
wide, then S could just deduce that ordinary contingently existing objects exist using only 
way of knowing W and the performance of a deduction.  But such a predicament is absurd: 
we cannot know that ordinary contingent objects exist in such a manner. 
 
So Farkas’ position appears to offer little improvement over a thesis like PAI. 
 
§4 The self-questioning model 
 
Consider the weakened versions of the privileged access thesis I have been considering in 
this chapter and earlier chapters: 
 
W-PAC 
For any subject , S, and any mental state individuated by the property S is thinking that p:  If S 
is thinking that p, then S can know weakly a priori that she thinks that p. 
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I have suggested that such formulations are not strong enough to capture the Cartesian 
predicament precisely because they fail to guarantee an unrevisibility requirement on the 
knowledge which they speak about.  However, while such theses are not apt candidates for 
the Traditional McKinsey Reasoning I defend, they are frequently used in formulations of the 
B-B Reasoning.  My query with such theses is that, given they are too weak to capture the 
Cartesian predicament, what philosophical basis do they have? 
 
My suspicion is that these weakened theses are attempts to accommodate a philosopher’s 
acceptance of SE and (perhaps tacit) acceptance of CPA.  Traditional McKinsey Reasoning 
shows us that accepting both CPA and SE, results in our having to reject PAI.  With PAI 
rejected, those who accept CPA and SE still want to account for our intuition that we have 
special first-personal way of knowing our mental states (or at least occurent mental states).  
Their way of accounting for this intuition is to claim that our belief that we possess these 
mental states is acquired without perceptual observation or empirical investigation or in 
some broadly “reflective” manner but such a belief is still based on empirical assumptions 
or is revisable using empirical evidence. 
 
At no point are the philosophers who endorse weakened privileged access theses tempted 
to say 
 
“Look many de dicto structured cognitive predicates express logically wide properties, but 
claiming that we know strongly a priori that we possess such properties poses significant 
problems.  So, we have to reject the claim such properties are individuating while 
continuing to adhere to the claim that we can know strongly a priori that we possess 
properties which individuate our mental states.”  
 
I suggest that these philosophers are not tempted to give this last response because they (at 
least tacitly) accept CPA.  For the CPA-accepters logically wide properties are 
individuating.  Consequently, in order to avoid problems they need to reject a strong 
privileged access thesis like PAI and endorse a weakened privileged access.  In short, these 
CPA-accepters cannot place the blame on the claim that logically wide properties are 
individuating, so they blame the strength of apriority used to formulate the privileged 
access thesis. 
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Those who endorse the weakened privileged access thesis do sometimes attempt to press 
additional considerations in favour of the thesis.  One popular approach is to appeal to a 
model I call the self-questioning model of privileged access (hereafter the SQ model). 
 
The SQ model says something like this.  Ask yourself any mundane question such as “Do 
you think Gödel is arrogant?”  If you sincerely answer the question in the affirmative, then 
they’ll say something like “at the time of answering the question, you think the occurent 
thought that Gödel is arrogant”. 
 
Similarly, were you to truly and sincerely utter “I am thinking that Gödel is arrogant”, then 
the proponent of the SQ-model will say something like “at the time of making the utterance, 
you occurently think that Gödel is arrogant”.  The proponent of the model then continues, 
at the time of having those occurent thoughts, you clearly could know that you were 
thinking them.  Moreover, continues the proponent of the SQ-model, the kind of knowledge 
you have in possessing such thoughts seems to be very different from cases of perceptual 
knowledge and the way of accounting for this difference is to say that your knowledge is 
acquired without the use of perceptual observation or empirical investigation as a 
justificatory basis. 
 
The proponent of the SQ-model is either silent about whether such knowledge rests on 
empirical assumptions or whether the belief in the mental state is revisable given evidence 
involving perceptual observation or empirical investigation.  Perhaps the proponent of the 
SQ-model will label the kind of knowledge in question as “a priori” or “reflective” or 
something like that to distinguish it from perceptual knowledge. 
 
A good example of the SQ-model comes from Brown.  Brown explicitly states that a subject 
“can think about particular objects and kinds” (2004, p5).  She also allows that such 
thoughts are individuated by ordinary contingently existing physical objects and kinds 
(2004, Ch.2).  Then, when it comes to characterising her privileged access thesis she gives 
something like W-PAC.  She says: 
 
“once a subject has formed a propositional attitude on the basis of empirical 
evidence, she does not need to use that evidence to judge that she has the relevant 
attitude.  For example, I might form the belief that lack of exercise is a risk factor 
for heart disease on the basis of data reported in a newspaper article.  But I need 
not use empirical evidence that led me to form the belief to know that I have it” 
(2004, p35). 
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“a subject can typically have a priori knowledge of her propositional attitudes, that 
is, she can have such knowledge without basing it in a justificatory way on 
perceptual experience” (2004, p35). 
 
This second quote allows that a subject may make empirical assumptions in acquiring such 
knowledge. 
 
What I want to do is to unpick this description of the SQ-model and see if any of it can be 
transformed into the terms we are more familiar with such as SE, CPA and PAI.  Consider 
the example of a subject, S, sincerely and truly uttering “Gödel is arrogant.  On the SQ-
Model we can infer we have a case here where a speaker, S, herself, is asserting the true de 
dicto structured cognitive predicate ‘S thinks that Gödel is arrogant’.  Moreover the speaker 
who is asserting the cognitive predicate is also the thinker in question - the subject S.  Now, 
does the de dicto structured cognitive predicate express a logically wide property?  The SQ-
model, does not in itself make this claim.  However, at least some proponents of the SQ-
model are persuaded by the semantic evidence in favour of SE to the point where they’ll say 
that the de dicto structured cognitive predicate in question does possess a logically wide 
property.  Is such a logically wide property individuating?  If we tacitly accept CPA, then 
we’ll be forced to claim that it is. 
 
But there may be a deeper reason as to why the proponent of the SQ-model who endorses 
SE wants the logically wide property to be individuating.  The deeper reason is this:  In the 
example in question, the proponent cannot envisage any other property which would 
individuate S’s mental state apart from a logically wide property.  For example, even if there 
were a logically narrow property that individuates S’s mental state how could that logically 
narrow property be about an ordinary contingently existing physical object which is public 
and external to S.  In short, even if logically narrow states alone are individuated with 
respect to the mental state they describe, how could such properties be about public and 
external physical objects when such states would be private and internal to S?  In the 
absence of being able to envisage a plausible answer to this question, the proponent of the 
SQ-model who endorses SE, is forced to claim that the logically wide property in question 
is the best candidate for individuating S’s mental state at the time of the utterance because 
there simply is no other candidate for individuating that state which she can envisage. 
 
I hope to show, in later chapters, how McKinsey could consistently endorse the SQ-model, 
while endorsing SE and also providing an alternative logically narrow property as the 
candidate for individuating S’s mental state.  McKinsey’s endorsement of this logically 
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narrow property as being individuating, coupled with his rejection of the logically wide 
property as being individuating, allows him to endorse the strong privileged access thesis 
PAI without recourse to any of the weaker formulations of privileged access. 
 
The answer McKinsey endorses allows , in sympathy with the intuitions in favour of SE, 
that the proper name ‘Godel’ is one of our speaker (and thinker’s) way of referring to the 
man Gödel in the public language and has no descriptive content in that language.  
However, this does not prevent the speaker having another way of referring to Gödel by 
way of a reference fixing description that involves descriptions which are private and 
internal to S.    Thus, the individuating properties which are analogous to this private and 
internal reference-fixing description are both logically narrow and still pick out the man 
Gödel as the object which the speaker thinks of. 
 
So, endorsement of the SQ-model together with SE, does not force us to claim that 
logically wide properties are individuating and thus does prompt us to endorse a weakened 
version of privileged access.  Rather, it sets us the challenge of accounting for how, given 
SE and the SQ-model, private and internal logically narrow properties can be about public 
contingently existing physical objects which are external to the thinker. 
 
 
§5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have considered various objections to the PAI thesis.  I have concluded 
that, while these objections do not show that the thesis is false, the do place a certain 
explanatory demand on any account of cognitive states that endorses the thesis.  The 
explanatory demand is to explain how private and internal logically narrow states can be 
about public and external ordinary contingently existing physical objects. 
 
137 
Chapter 7 
 
In this chapter I shall evaluate the SE thesis of traditional McKinsey Reasoning and a claim 
made about the “externalist” thesis of the B-B Reasoning.  I conclude that the SE thesis is 
left untouched by the objections to it.  The claim concerning the “externalist” thesis of the 
B-B Reasoning  is whether the claim in question is “a priori” knowable in some sense.  
Assessing this claim is an extremely delicate matter.  This is partly because one can assess 
the claims while assuming SE, CPA and PAI or one can assess these claims while denying at 
least one of those claims.  As noted earlier, some commentators on the B-B Reasoning, tend 
not to mention whether they would outright reject SE or just reject instances of SE 
involving kind terms such as ‘water’ or whether they wholeheartedly agree with SE (see 
Chapter 3).  Consequently, it is hard to assess the precise explanations they wish to give for 
the truth of the “externalist” thesis in question and hard to understand how they would 
argue for its “a priori” knowability.  My own view is that I have suggested that there is 
sufficient evidence to support the view that the SE thesis applies to proper names, 
indexical pronouns and natural kind terms like ‘water’ (see Chapters 1 and 2).  So, when I 
consider the “a priori” knowability of the “externalist” thesis that is the focus of the B-B 
Reasoning I shall be  assuming that the SE thesis is true for de dicto structured cognitive 
predicates containing the kind term ‘water’. 
 
However, in order to give that explanation I first need to defend the SE thesis from 
objections.  I do that in §1.  In §2 raises some issues over the manner in which the 
proponents of the B-B Reasoning argue for the truth of the externalist thesis that they are 
concerned with.  In §3 I consider I present a case against the a priori knowability of the 
“externalist” thesis of the B-B Reasoning, given that SE is true.  §4 concludes. 
 
§1 Objections to SE 
 
The best example of an argument against the SE thesis is anticipated by McKinsey (1994, 
pp309-310).  Consider the following cognitive predicate: 
 
(BIS) ‘Russell believes that Bismarck is an astute diplomatist’ 
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The argument is that, contrary to what McKinsey and myself have claimed, the predicate is 
not structurally de dicto.  That is to say, the term ‘Bismark’, while being a genuine term 
whose referent is completely exhausted by the contingently existing man, nonetheless has 
large scope relative to the belief operator.  Thus, the argument is claiming that the cognitive 
predicate (BIS) is semantically equivalent to: 
 
(BIS2) ‘Bismark is such that Russell believes that he was an astute diplomatist’ 
 
Now, given the argument that ‘Bismark’ has large scope in (BIS1) we must assume the 
anaphoric pronoun ‘he’ in (BIS2) has small scope relative to the belief operator.  Thus 
McKinsey concludes: 
 
“But of course, the anaphoric pronoun 'he' occurring in (2) is just as much a 
genuine term as 'Bismarck'. Thus the claim that all genuine terms must have large 
scope relative to the belief operator is a claim that cannot even be understood 
unless it is taken in such a way that it implies its own falsehood.” (1994, p310) 
 
So, claiming that the cognitive predicates that are the concern of the SE thesis are not 
really de dicto structured in an attempt to object to SE fails. 
 
Another way of opposing the SE thesis would be to try to go consider piecemeal each of 
the cases involving different individual kinds of terms that are thought to support them.  
This strategy would involve suggesting the various Kripke, Kaplan and McKinsey (1987) 
cases do not support SE.  However, such an attempt may be difficult to completely pull off 
simply because there are so many terms to which the SE thesis may apply.  For example, 
would anyone deny that a cognitive predicate such as ‘Laura thinks that that man is cute’ 
expresses a logically wide property?  If not, then the most this approach promises is to 
show that the SE thesis is more restricted in scope than initially claimed.  It would not 
show that the SE thesis is false. 
 
§2 The case in favour of  the B-B Reasoning’s “externalist” 
thesis 
 
The “externalist” thesis that is the concern of the B-B Reasoning is, typically, established in 
this manner (see for example Kallestrup & Pritchard (2004, p346); Brown (2004 Ch.2), 
Boghossian (1997) pp162-165; Davies (1998, 2000); Wright (2000)). 
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First, make a claim about the S-wideness of about thought contents: 
 
S-Wide externalism 
In many cases, if a subject, S, possesses a thought that p, then S’s thought that p fails to 
weakly supervene upon the subject’s internal physical state. 
 
Secondly, claim that the difference in thought contents between a subject, S, who thinks 
that water is wet and his doppelganger S* on twin-earth who thinks that twater is wet is due 
to a difference solely in those thinkers environments.  Then, we can say, that a subject’s 
thought that water is wet implies, in some sense, that certain conditions in her environment 
obtain. 
 
However, this argument also results in de se thoughts being S-wide.  For example, if the 
property expressed by the predicate ‘Ollie thinks that he himself is a hero’ is individuating, 
then that too will turn out to fail to supervene on Ollie’s internal physical states (see my 
comments in Chapter 2).  So setting up the “externalist” thesis using S-Wide externalism ends 
up characterising internalists about the metaphysical nature of thought as “externalists”.  
What has gone wrong? 
 
I’d suggest that the problem is that this argument, being pitched at the level of the 
“metaphysical nature of mental states”, assumes CPA.  In order to see this, consider an 
expanded version of the thesis: 
 
S-Wide externalism-Expanded 
In many cases, if a subject, S, possesses a property F*, then F* fails to weakly supervene upon 
the subject’s internal physical state and property F* is individuating. 
 
I think we could all agree that many properties fail to weakly supervene on a subject’s 
internal physical state.  The problem is such properties can be logically wide or narrow.  
And, if Traditional McKinsey Reasoning is correct, the logically wide ones do not individuate. 
 
I think that both internalists and externalists alike would endorse a version of the following 
thesis about properties: 
 
 
140 
S-Wide externalism About Properties 
In many cases, if a subject, S, possesses a property F*, then F* fails to weakly supervene upon 
the subject’s internal physical state. 
 
Where they disagree is over whether those properties are individuating.  The metaphysical 
internalist will claim that only properties that are also logically wide are individuating.  I 
would suggest that a true metaphysical externalist (i.e. someone who endorses SE and 
CPA) will claim that some properties also logically wide and, given CPA, are also 
individuating.  So using the notion of S-wide Externalism to characterise the dispute between 
metaphysical internalists and externalists is unhelpful and never explicitly states CPA as a 
candidate for rejection. 
 
§3 The a priori knowability of  the B-B Reasoning’s 
“externalist” thesis 
 
The instance of the claim that we are interested in assessing in the B-B Reasoning is: 
 
A priori knowability of S-Wideness Instances 
For any subject, S, and any mental state individuated by the property S is thinking that p or S 
thinks that p and such properties fail to weakly supervene upon a subject’s internal physical 
state, and any proposition that e which asserts the existence of contingently existing ordinary 
physical objects: S can know “a priori” that if she thinks that p then e. 
 
Again we have a problem of assessing the strength of the aprioricity term in the scare 
quotes.  Does the proponent have “strong a priori knowledge” in mind in the sense of 
knowledge that does not depend upon empirical assumptions?  Or do they mean they have 
a weaker sense of aprioricity in mind?  A weaker sense of a prioricity would coincide with 
the weak sense of aprioricty they use in the W-PAC thesis.  Some of Boghossian’s remarks 
suggest that he has a stronger sense of a priori in mind: 
 
“Now, let us suppose that Oscar-our prototypical 
Twin Earth subject-is a compatibilist. I claim that Oscar is in a position to argue, 
purely a priori, as follows: 
1. If I have the concept water, then water exists. 
2. I have the concept water. 
Therefore, 
3. Water exists. 
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Since the conclusion is clearly not knowable a priori, one of the premises in 
Oscar's evidently valid reasoning had better either be false or not knowable a 
priori.”(1997, p165-6). 
 
If the “a priori” knowability of the proposition that water exists is clearly absurd, then, given 
my argument in Chapter 4, the sense of “a priori” that conclusively guarantees this result is 
strong aprioricity.  Moreover, Boghossian’s suggesting that Oscar can reason “purely a 
priori” strongly suggests that Oscar is not making any empirical assumptions. 
 
On the other hand, in a (rarely discussed) response to his paper Boghossian seems to 
suggest he has a weaker sense of “a priori” in mind.  He says: 
 
“To claim that I can know that I have the concept water a priori is to claim that I 
can know without empirical investigation that I have thoughts that involve the 
concept water. Since for me, as for Frege and lots of others, concepts just are 
what thought contents are composed of, this is just another way of saying that I 
can know without empirical investigation what my thought contents are.” (1998, 
p257). 
 
The sense of “a priori” in the quote above would seem to allow that a subject could make 
empirical assumptions, suggesting Boghossian adheres to a sense of weak aprioricity.  Is the 
sense of aprioricity so weak that one could reason using the Boghossian argument while 
making the empirical assumption that water exists?  If that is so then one could know a 
priori that water exists by pure a priori reasoning that takes place on the empirical 
assumption that water exists.  Surely, Boghossian cannot have an argument as weak as that 
in mind. 
 
So there is a difficulty in interpreting the sense of aprioricity that Boghossian has in mind 
but I think I have done enough to suggest that whatever the sense of aprioricity the 
knowledge in question cannot be based on the empirical assumption that water exists.  I 
now wish to show that Boghossian has to make precisely such an assumption to argue for 
the claim A priori knowability of S-Wideness Instances of the B-B Reasoning. 
 
Boghossian’s case in favour of the claim, roughly, is this (1997, pp171-4):  We are to 
imagine a distant planet from the actual world (call it Dry-Earth) in which water does not 
exist and the whole community of that planet is having a mass communal hallucination of 
the substance water.  In such circumstances, Boghossian suggests, an inhabitant’s tokens of 
the word ‘water’ on this planet would be empty and the subject would possess no genuine 
thoughts about water.  Rather, when a subject sincerely utters “I am thinking that water is a 
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liquid” he expresses no genuine thought thereby.  The subject in question is not in a mental 
state that is characterised by the property of thinking a proposition.  Boghossian then 
suggests that our envisaging such a situation shows that we know that if a subject is 
thinking a genuine water-thought, then water exists. 
 
This argument of Boghossian’s has received much criticism (see for example, Korman 
(2006), Brown (2004), Ch8, Ball (2007) ). 
 
My first comment about Boghossian’s reasoning is it assumes the Proposition Theory and 
CPA.  For if the Proposition Theory and CPA were false, then why not say that in such a 
scenario a subject possesses a genuine thought that is not essentially characterised by the 
property of believing a proposition?  The problem is, that the Proposition Theory and 
CPA may well be false.  This may be what Traditional McKinsey Reasoning is suggesting if PAI 
and SE cannot be denied. 
 
My second worry about Boghossian’s argument is this.  In order to set up the argument he 
needs to assert the sentence “Water does not exist on Dry Earth.”  Now, in order for this 
sentence to make sense it needs to express a proposition.  In cases where a term, t, is 
directly referential, however, the sentence “t does not exist” does not express a proposition 
unless the sentence “t exists” is true.  Thus, the sentence ‘water does not exist on Dry 
Earth’ only expresses a proposition unless the sentence ‘Water exists’ is true.  Thus, in 
order for Boghossian’s argument about Dry-Earth to get started, he must make the 
empirical assumption that water exists.  Now, it might be replied that the term ‘water’ is not 
a directly referring term.  However, given the semantics of natural kind terms I have 
discussed in Chapter 2, I believe that there are persuasive considerations to suggest that in 
simple non-cognitive sentences the term only contributes its referent to what is said.  
Moreover, Boghossian himself suggests that the term ‘water’ (on Earth) is directly referring: 
 
“widespread intuition appears to have it that, whereas Oscar's tokens of 'water' 
apply exclusively to H20, Toscar's tokens of 'water' apply exclusively to XYZ.” 
(1997, p164). 
 
 
Thus even if Boghossian has a sound argument for the conditional claim “If Oscar thinks 
that water is wet, then water exists” he has established it only by using the empirical 
assumption that water exists.  Consequently, Boghossian has not established that the 
conditional claim is “a priori” knowable in the sense that he intends. 
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§ 4 Conclusion 
 
I have defended the SE thesis from the best objections that I could find.  I have also 
discussed the claim A priori knowability of S-Wideness Instances of the B-B Reasoning.  I have 
suggested that the claim is false on the grounds that one needs to make the empirical 
assumption that water exists in order to establish the claim A priori knowability of S-Wideness 
Instances and this undermines the a priori knowability of the conditional claim if S thinks 
that water is wet, then water exists.  Moreover, I have also suggested that the manner in 
which some proponents of the B-B Reasoning argue for the truth of the “externalist thesis” 
they are concerned with is not helpful in characterising the real difference between 
internalists and externalists about the metaphysical nature of thought content. 
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Chapter 8 
 
The predicament Traditional McKinsey Reasoning has put us in is that CPA, PAI and SE are 
incompatible.  But there are strong philosophical cases for holding onto the latter two 
theses, which leaves us having to reject CPA.  Why should we reject CPA?  After all CPA 
is logically implied by the Proposition Theory and assuming the Proposition Theory may derive 
support from the works of Frege (1892) and Russell (1912).  Recall that the Proposition 
Theory is simply the conjunction of the following two theses: 
 
Propositional Theory of Individuation (PTI) 
All cognitive attitudes and states are individuated by their propositional contents. 
 
Relational Theory (RT) 
All cognitive attitude verbs express relations between persons and propositions. 
 
McKinsey argues that there are examples which show that the Proposition Theory is false by 
way of showing that both PTI and RT are false.  However, having good reason to reject the 
Proposition Theory alone is not sufficient to show that one has good reason to reject CPA.  
This is because one can accept CPA without also accepting the Proposition Theory.  The most 
that having good reason to reject the Proposition Theory can do is to undermine one reason for 
accepting CPA; it does not necessarily undermine CPA itself.  McKinsey then constructs 
separate examples to show that CPA is false. 
 
McKinsey’s form of argument might prompt us to ask:  Why couldn’t he just directly state 
his counter-examples to CPA and not bother discussing counter-examples to the Proposition 
Theory?  On McKinsey’s behalf, I can give at least three responses to this question.  Firstly, 
as we shall soon come to see, one’s comprehension of McKinsey’s counter-examples to 
CPA is greatly enhanced by first considering his counter-examples to the Proposition Theory.  
Secondly, had McKinsey just cited counter-examples to CPA alone then we would be left 
in a rather difficult dialectical position.  The difficult dialectical position would be this: 
 
Difficult Dialectical Position 
Counter-examples to CPA give us good reason for rejecting that thesis; but the Proposition 
Theory has support from the history of philosophy and there are no counter-examples against it.  
So, we also have good reason to accept the Proposition Theory and the theses which that 
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theory logically implies one of those theses is CPA.  Hence we have good reason to both accept 
and reject CPA. 
 
Given McKinsey may not want to be in this difficult dialectical position, he must provide 
counter-examples to both CPA and the Proposition Theory.  Thirdly, McKinsey’s case for 
rejecting the Proposition Theory also carves out part of his positive proposal of how we have 
thoughts involving certain terms.  Thus, his case for rejecting the Proposition Theory is not 
only essential for his rejection of CPA but also for his positive picture of the cognitive 
attitudes. 
 
In §1 I go through a number of scene setting preliminaries to give a broad-brushstroke 
structure of McKinsey’s argument against CPA.  In §2-4 I describe McKinsey’s argument 
against CPA in detail.  In §5 I describe McKinsey’s explanation of one problem his view 
faces.  §6 briefly discusses further problems that McKinsey’s view faces.  §7 concludes. 
 
§1 Preliminaries 
 
McKinsey’s argument against the Proposition Theory involves examining what he calls referring 
genuine terms – terms whose referents are exhausted by ordinary contingently existing 
physical objects.  For example, when the term ‘George’ functions as a proper name and a 
referring genuine term, it directly refers to the contingently existing man George.  That is to 
say, the referent of the term ‘George’ when it functions in this way is completely exhausted 
by the contingently existing man George. 
 
Similarly, the terms ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’ when functioning as referring genuine terms 
directly refer to the contingently existing planet Venus.  That is to say the term’s referents, 
when the terms function in the way described, are completely exhausted by the 
contingently existing planet Venus. 
 
When referring genuine terms feature in de dicto structured cognitive predicates, the predicate 
expresses the property of a subject believing a singular proposition.  A singular proposition 
is a proposition which is a function of the referent of the referring genuine term. 
 
McKinsey suggests that when a subject thinks of an object, that subject must base her 
reference to an object upon something.  Thus, according to McKinsey, a subject must have 
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a means or way of thinking of the object in question in order to think singular propositions 
involving the object.  McKinsey then infers that there must be something in addition to 
believing the singular proposition in question which is required to individuate or fully 
characterise a subject’s mental state.  This suggestion of McKinsey’s, if he can make it 
good, would be a counter-example to one direction of PTI.  Specifically, would be a 
counter-example to the right to left direction of PTI:  a subject’s thinking a singular 
proposition is not sufficient to individuate that subject’s mental state. 
 
Moreover, McKinsey, after reflecting upon the property which does individuate with 
respect to mental state, further suggests that singular proposition believed is not necessary 
to individuate a subject’s mental state.  This suggestion, if good gives us yet another 
example to PTI in the left to right direction. 
 
Putting the last two suggestions together, McKinsey further suggests that the property 
which does individuate a subject’s mental state is not identical to a subject’s believing a 
(singular) proposition; consequently, thoughts are not relations between persons and 
propositions, contrary to RT.  Instead, McKinsey advocates that the properties which 
individuate a subject’s mental state are so-called mental anaphoric properties which contain a 
complex amalgamation of certain descriptive assumptions (which may be first-personal and 
private and internal to the thinker) and cognitive attitude towards the referent (if any) 
picked out by those descriptive assumptions. 
 
McKinsey’s suggestions require rejection of the following assumption which might be 
made by some in the philosophy of language: 
 
Unity Assumption 
For all referring genuine terms,t; non –cognitive simple sentences containing t, $(t), and singular 
propositions that p expressed by $(t): A de dicto structured cognitive predicate of the form ‘S cs 
that $(t)’, expresses the property S cs that p. 
 
The Unity Assumption can be split into two parts: 
 
Unity Part 1 
For all referring genuine terms,t which have no descriptive linguistic meaning in the public 
language; non –cognitive simple sentences containing t, $(t), and singular propositions that p 
expressed by $(t): A de dicto structured cognitive predicate of the form ‘S cs that $(t)’ expresses 
the property S cs that p. 
147 
 
Unity Part 2 
For all referring genuine terms, t which do have linguistic meaning in the public language; non –
cognitive simple sentences containing t, $(t), and singular propositions that p expressed by $(t): 
A de dicto structured cognitive predicate of the form ‘S cs that $(t)’ expresses the property S cs 
that p. 
 
Unity Part 1 is exclusively concerned with referring genuine terms which have no 
descriptive linguistic meaning.  Unity Part 2 is exclusively concerned with referring genuine 
terms that do in fact have descriptive linguistic meaning.  McKinsey explicitly agrees with 
Unity Part 1.  What McKinsey disputes is Unity Part 2.  At this stage you might ask “what 
right has McKinsey got to suggest that there are terms which have descriptive linguistic 
meaning?”  Later on in this chapter I shall outline McKinsey’s case for there being referring 
genuine terms which have descriptive meaning in the public language.  For expository 
purposes at the moment, I’d simply ask the reader to assume that there are such terms in 
the public language. 
 
McKinsey suggests that there is a radical semantic difference within the class of referring 
genuine terms.  On the one hand, according to McKinsey, there are referring genuine terms 
that have no descriptive meaning in the public language.  For example, the proper name 
‘George’ has no descriptive meaning in the public language.  On the other hand, according 
to McKinsey, it is at least a theoretical possibility that a genuine term such as ‘Hesperus’ or 
‘Phosphorus’, while having referents completely exhausted by the contingently existing 
planet Venus, also have descriptive meanings in the public language. 
 
§2 Genuine terms with descriptive linguistic meaning and 
counter-examples to the Proposition Theory 
 
Here is a simplified example (from McKinsey (1994), Loar (1985) and Salmon (1986)) 
showing how the theoretical possibility of genuine terms with descriptive linguistic 
meanings results in those terms not expressing logically wide properties when they occur 
small scope in some cognitive contexts. 
 
Let us suppose that S, a citizen of ancient Rome, regularly recognizes and refers to the 
brightest heavenly body on the western horizon in the evening and the name he uses to 
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refer to the heavenly body so recognized and described is 'Hesperus'. S also recognizes and 
refers to the brightest heavenly body on the eastern horizon in the morning, using the 
name 'Phosphorus'.  S does not, himself, recognise that when he uses these two names he 
is referring to one and the same planet – the contingently existing physical planet Venus.  
Thus, S would dissent or withhold assent from the sentence ‘Hesperus is phosphorus’.  S 
would also assent to the sentence ‘Hesperus appears in the evening’ and for most of his life 
would not have assented to ‘Phosphorus appears in the evening’. 
 
At some point in S's life, an exciting new theory is constructed from which it follows that 
Hesperus = Phosphorus S does not learn about this new theory at all, but one fact that 
follows from the theory is passed on to S: the fact that Phosphorus also appears on the 
evening horizon.  So, given this new information, S also assents to 'Phosphorus appears in 
the evening', though it still does not occur to him that perhaps Hesperus is Phosphorus. 
 
After the information is passed on to him, S now assents to both the sentence 'Hesperus 
appears in the evening' and the sentence 'Phosphorus appears in the evening'. Moreover, 
these two sentences express the same proposition, since, the names 'Hesperus' and 
'Phosphorus' are both genuine terms that refer to the same planet Venus. 
 
What beliefs does S express when, after receiving the new information, he assents to both 
of these sentences?  It is not plausible to say S has the same belief because, in light of the 
new information, when he began assenting to 'Phosphorus appears in the evening' he 
acquired a new belief.  We might say that in light of the new information "S changed his 
mind".  However, since during this "change of mind", S always possessed the belief he 
would express with the sentence 'Hesperus appears in the evening', the new belief he has 
acquired cannot be identical must be a different belief. 
 
S uses two sentences that express the same proposition to express two different beliefs.  S's 
beliefs are different, even though they have the same singular proposition as their content 
(the singular proposition that Venus appears in the evening).  So we have a counter-example to 
one direction of the PTI thesis. 
 
The example suggests that there is something more to S’s beliefs than just (singular) 
proposition believed but what more?  McKinsey’s (1994, p314) suggestion is that S must 
base her reference to an object in order to believe singular propositions involving the 
object in question (in this case Venus).  S must have some way or means of thinking of the 
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object in question in order to believe singular propositions involving that object.  Thus this 
way or means of thinking of the object in question is something in addition to the singular 
proposition believed. 
 
McKinsey’s suggestion is that the following two belief properties will do the trick in 
individuating S’s beliefs in each case: 
 
(MA1) S assumes that just one heavenly body is brightest on the western horizon in 
the evening, and he believes that it (that very heavenly body) appears in the 
evening. 
 
(MA2) S assumes that just one heavenly body is brightest on the eastern horizon in 
the morning, and he believes that it (that very heavenly body) appears in the 
evening. 
 
How should we analyse such constructions?  This question is not easy to quickly answer.  I 
shall, thus, take a brief detour into how McKinsey suggests we analyse similar properties in 
order to give a definitive answer to this question. 
 
§3 Mental Anaphora 
 
Consider (non-factive) de dicto structured cognitive of the form ‘S wishes that $’ where $ is 
a simple non-cognitive sentence.  Specifically, let’s consider the de dicto structured 
cognitive predicate 
 
(O) ‘Oscar wishes that he had caught the fish that got away’. 
 
On one of its readings, (O) can be true even though no fish actually got away from 
Oscar (he had a branch or old boot on the end of his line). On this same reading, the wish 
ascribed to Oscar by (O) would be consistent. To capture this reading, McKinsey proposes 
that we follow a suggestion made by Geach (1967) for understanding similar cases, 
and analyse the relevant reading of (O) as follows: 
 
(MAO)  Oscar assumes that just one fish got away, and Oscar wishes it had been 
the case that he caught it (that very fish). 
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McKinsey (1986, 1994) argues that the second occurrence of the pronoun ‘it’ in (MAO) is 
neither a bound variable nor going proxy for a description. Rather, the best hypothesis is 
that ‘it’ is functioning here as what Evans (1977) called an ‘E-type’ pronoun, a rigid genuine 
term whose referent is fixed by the description recoverable from its quantifier antecedent 
(cf. Geach (1967)).  McKinsey calls such readings of (MAO) mental anaphora.  Similarly, I 
call constructions such as (MAO) mental anaphoric properties. 
 
Suppose that just one fish did get away from Oscar at a time, t, and call it ‘Bubbles’. Since 
the truth of the singular proposition that Oscar catches Bubbles at t would make Oscar’s wish 
come true (at some other possible world), and since the words ‘he caught it’ in (MAO) 
express this proposition, this singular proposition would be the content of the wish 
ascribed by (MAO). But then, Oscar’s wish would really be about Bubbles. But this wish 
would be about Bubbles merely because Bubbles in fact uniquely satisfies the descriptive 
assumption on which the mental act involved in Oscar’s wish is based. 
 
McKinsey’s suggestion is that we analyse the constructions (MA1) and (MA2) in the same 
way as (MAO).  In the constructions (MA1) and (MA2) the pronoun ‘it’ is neither a 
bound variable nor going proxy for a description. Rather, in (MA1) and (MA2) ‘it’ is 
functioning as a rigid genuine term whose referent is fixed by the description recoverable 
from its quantifier antecedent.  
 
Note that properties (MA1) and (MA2) are different since their first conjuncts – the 
components involving S making a descriptive assumption – are different.  Thus, (MA1) 
and (MA2) are different cognitive properties.  However, although the properties (MA1) 
and (MA2) are different, in the circumstances described in the last section, the 
propositions believed, as opposed to those assumed, are the same: in each case S believes 
the singular proposition that Venus rotates. 
 
McKinsey also argues that further manipulation of the Hesperus-Phosphorus example in 
the last section shows that sameness of proposition believed is not necessary for sameness 
of belief.  McKinsey asks us to imagine a possible world in which Mars, rather than Venus, 
is the brightest heavenly body on the eastern horizon in the morning and in which (MA2) 
is true.  In this manipulated example, (MA2) is still true just as it was in our initial example 
but the singular proposition believed is different: In this manipulated example, S believes 
the singular proposition that Mars rotates whereas in the initial example S believes the 
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singular proposition that Venus rotates.  So in the initial example and manipulated example, 
S’s beliefs are the same but the singular proposition believed by S is different.  Hence, 
sameness of proposition believed is not necessary for sameness of belief. 
 
The initial Hesperus-Phosphorus example in the last section can be manipulated in yet 
another way:  Imagine a world in which (MA2) is true but the whole population has a mass 
optical illusion and there is no planet which rotates.  In this example, S’s belief has no 
propositional content but S still has a genuine belief characterised by the cognitive property 
(MA2).  Again, comparing this example with the initial example, shows that sameness of 
proposition believed is not necessary for sameness of belief. 
 
Moreover, the mental anaphoric properties (MA1) and (MA2) show that RT is also false.  
RT says that cognitive attitudes express relations between persons and propositions.  But if 
the mental anaphoric properties like (MA1) and (MA2) individuate beliefs then cognitive 
attitudes do not express relations between persons and propositions, contrary to RT.  
Rather, according to McKinsey, 
 
“cognitive operators like 'thinks that' and 'believes that' do not express relations of 
any sort. Rather, they form one-place predicates out of sentences (open or 
closed).” (1999, p527). 
 
Now since the properties (MA1) and (MA2) are logically narrow these are permissible as 
individuating the cognitive state of S (the citizen of ancient Rome in the example of the last 
section).  Note that not all such mental anaphoric properties will be logically narrow:  Some 
may be logically wide and those that are will still not individuate the cognitive state that 
they describe.  It just so happens that both (MA1) and (MA2) are logically narrow because 
the descriptive linguistic meanings of the terms ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ contain no 
objectual element. 
 
Thus, according to McKinsey, terms with descriptive linguistic meaning, in fact, have two 
kinds of meaning: descriptive linguistic meaning and propositional meaning.  Their 
linguistic meanings are: 
 
(LM1) For any token α of 'Hesperus', α is to refer to an object x if and only if x = the 
brightest heavenly body on the western horizon in the evening, 
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(LM2) For any token α of 'Phosphorus', α is to refer to an object x if and only if x = the 
brightest heavenly body on the eastern horizon in the morning. 
 
Their positional meaning in the original circumstances just is their referent – the 
contingently existing planet Venus. 
 
In the next section, I shall outline McKinsey’s comments on genuine terms that have no 
descriptive linguistic meaning and only have propositional meaning. 
 
§4 Genuine terms with no descriptive linguistic meaning 
 
Were all terms to have descriptive meanings like the theoretical examples of ‘Hesperus’ and 
‘Phosphorus’ in the last subsection, then de dicto structured cognitive predicates 
constructed using simple sentences containing these terms would all express narrow 
properties which individuate with respect to the cognitive state they describe.  Thus, on the 
assumption that all terms have descriptive meanings, all de dicto structured cognitive 
predicates constructed out of simple sentences would individuate with respect to cognitive 
state described or, in other words, CPA would be true. 
 
Of course, on McKinsey’s view it is not the case that all terms have descriptive meanings.  
On McKinsey’s view many referring genuine terms have no descriptive meaning and 
merely have referents which are completely exhausted by ordinary contingently existing 
physical objects.  Proper names like ‘Gorge’ or ‘Godel’ are examples of such terms. 
 
So, for McKinsey, de dicto structured cognitive predicates applied to simple sentences 
containing genuine terms with no descriptive meaning express precisely the property of 
believing a singular proposition.  For example the cognitive predicate ‘Laura thinks that 
George is cute’ expresses the property Laura thinks the singular proposition that 
George is cute.  We have seen by Traditional McKinsey Reasoning that if such properties are 
individuating, then given PAI and SE, we reach an absurd conclusion.  Thus, on 
McKinsey’s view, the properties expressed de dicto structured cognitive predicates applied 
to simple sentences containing genuine terms with no descriptive meaning do not 
individuate with respect to cognitive state they describe. 
 
153 
Consequently, due to the existence of genuine terms with no descriptive meaning and the 
way such terms behave when they have small-scope in de dicto structured cognitive 
predicates, such cognitive predicates do not express properties which individuate with 
respect to cognitive state described.  Thus, CPA is false:  Not every de dicto structured 
cognitive predicate expresses a property which individuates with respect to the cognitive 
state it describes. 
 
However, the existence of two radically different types of referring genuine terms (those 
with descriptive linguistic meaning and those without such meaning) creates a further 
problem for McKinsey that I shall consider in the next section. 
 
§5 The contribution problem 
 
McKinsey’s view that many cognitive predicates containing genuine terms express logically 
wide (and non-individuating) cognitive properties but some express logically narrow (and 
individuating) properties faces a problem.  How is it that one kind of genuine term can 
behave in one way when in the scope of a certain cognitive operator whereas a different 
kind of genuine term behaves in a radically different way when it is in the scope of the very 
same operator?  McKinsey call this problem the Contribution Problem. 
 
Stated in a different way the Contribution Problem says:  Why is it that a referring genuine 
term with no descriptive meaning contributes only its referent when it occurs in a sentence 
within the scope of a certain cognitive operator, whereas a referring genuine term with 
descriptive meaning contributes its descriptive meaning, rather than its referent, when it 
occurs in a simple sentence which is in the scope of a cognitive operator? 
 
One might be provoked to ask these questions due to the behaviour of the two different 
kinds of referring genuine terms in simple sentences where no cognitive operators are 
involved.  In simple sentences the referring genuine term contributes only its referent to 
the proposition expressed by the sentence regardless of whether or not it has descriptive 
meaning.  For example, the simple non-cognitive sentence ‘George is five feet tall’ when 
‘George’ is a referring genuine term with no descriptive meaning expresses the singular 
proposition that George is five feet tall.  And the simple non-cognitive sentence ‘Hesperus 
rotates’ expresses the singular proposition that Venus rotates.  However, in cognitive 
contexts the de dicto structured cognitive predicate ‘Laura thinks that George is five feet 
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tall’ expresses the (logically wide) property Laura thinks that George is five feet tall.  
Whereas, the cognitive property ‘Laura thinks that Hesperus rotates’ expresses the 
following mental anaphoric property: 
 
(MA3) S assumes that just one heavenly body is brightest on the western horizon in 
the evening, and he believes that it (that very heavenly body) rotates. 
 
McKinsey’s dissolution of the consequence problem involves an emendation of Sellar’s 
(1963) Jonsean myth about how the cognitive predicates were introduced into ordinary 
language.  McKinsey’s interpretation of that story, as he understands it, is cognitive 
predicates were introduced in order to provide semantic classifications of theoretical inner 
states.  So, a predicate of the form ‘believes that $’ is supposed to classify a person’s belief 
as one that is semantically analogous to the sentence $.  Thus, syntactically, the operator 
‘believes that’ was introduced on the assumption that, for any well formed sentence $, 
‘believes that $’ will be a well formed predicate. 
 
But the original Sellars picture is faced with a problem when we consider the fact that the 
sentences which can occur in the belief predicate ‘believes that $’ can differ radically in 
their semantics.  And, it may have taken some time since the initial publication of Sellars’ 
picture, for these radical difference in sentence semantics to be revealed.  For example, 
Kripke’s (1972) Gödel-Schmidt case shows that there are sentences containing referring 
genuine terms that have no descriptive meaning in the public language and express only 
singular propositions that are a function of the genuine term’s referent.  There is at least 
the theoretical possibility that $ contains a referring genuine term which does have 
descriptive meaning and thus allows there to be a way of thinking about the genuine term’s 
referent.  There may be other cases where a genuine term has descriptive meaning and no 
referent, so the sentence it is contained in expresses no proposition.  There are other cases 
involving indexical pronouns which have linguistic meanings that depend on context and 
rely on context to determine what proposition is expressed by the sentence. 
 
Given these radical differences in the semantics of sentences that might occur in the 
operator ‘believes that $’ McKinsey says: 
 
"it is hard to see how belief predicates could all have a uniform type of 
Interpretation.  And yet we introduced the belief operator on the assumption t 
hat, for every well-formed sentence S, 'believes that S' is going to be a well-formed 
predicate that provides a way of semantically classifying a belief. 
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So what are these predicates supposed to mean? The fact is that when we 
introduced belief predicates into our language we didn't know what we were 
doing. For the predicates are in effect metalinguistic and semantic in nature, and 
yet we did not then, nor do we now, know much of anything about the semantics 
of the sentences on the basis of which the "analogous" belief properties are 
supposed to be constructed. Yet we went ahead and introduced the predicates 
anyway, and let the semantic properties of the sentences of our language 
(whatever they may be) dictate what the resulting belief predicates might say about 
our beliefs. We introduced the predicates, and let the semantic chips fall where 
they may." (1994, p320). 
 
McKinsey claims that when we introduced the cognitive predicates, such as ‘believes that $’ 
in our language our intention was to use them to say as much as possible about our 
cognitive states.  We hoped that the cognitive predicates would express belief individuating 
properties and thus gave this interpretation of the predicates priority over all others. 
 
If the sentence $ in the predicate ‘believes that $’ has sufficient semantic characteristics to 
individuate the corresponding belief, then this predicate is interpreted as expressing an 
individuating property.  Let’s call such an interpretation of the cognitive predicate ‘believes 
that $’ the default interpretation.  In particular when $ contains a descriptive genuine term, the 
referent of the term (if any) drops out as irrelevant to the classification of the belief because 
the referent is not relevant to the property that individuates the belief, rather it is the 
descriptive meaning of the term that is relevant.  Whenever possible we always seek to give 
the default interpretation of belief predicates. 
 
However, the default interpretation of cognitive predicates does not always work.  For 
example, when a sentence $ contains a referring genuine term with no descriptive meaning 
(t*, say), $ is too poverty stricken to allow an application of the default interpretation.  
Instead, t*’s referent becomes relevant to the interpretation because without it there would 
be no interpretation.  Were we not to use t*’s referent to semantically classify the belief, we 
could not use $ to classify the belief at all.  Thus, when the default interpretation fails, we 
use t*’s referent to classify the belief and the cognitive predicate ‘believes that $’ becomes 
semantically de re. 
 
We are in a similar position when we have a cognitive predicate ‘believes that $2’ where $2 
contains a (non-anaphoric) indexical with a context-dependent meaning (say t**):  $2 is too 
poverty stricken to allow an application of the default interpretation.  So t** becomes 
relevant to the interpretation or there would be no interpretation.  Thus, when the default 
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interpretation fails, we use t**’s referent to classify the belief and the cognitive predicate 
‘believes that $2’ becomes semantically de re. 
 
Summarising this situation McKinsey says: 
 
“In short, the quite different kinds of semantic properties possessed by the 
sentences of our language force us to construct quite different kinds of belief 
predicates out of these sentences. As a result, there lies within the class of 
structurally de dicto predicates a sharp distinction between those that are 
semantically de re and those that are semantically de dicto, that is, those predicates 
that express narrow, individuating belief properties that are not de re. If this is 
right, then the traditional semantic distinction between de re and de dicto exists 
within the class of structurally de dicto belief predicates.” (1994, p321). 
 
 
Of course, McKinsey’s conclusion only holds if his assumption that there are descriptive 
names in real language holds good.  I shall briefly suggest how he defends this assumption 
in the next section. 
  
§6 Are there descriptive names in real language? 
 
McKinsey’s view is opposed in two directions.  One way of opposing McKinsey is to keep 
the Unity Assumption, by claiming that there are no genuine terms with descriptive 
meaning in the public language; this is the view of Rusellian Relationalists.  Another way of 
opposing McKinsey’s position is to claim that the Unity Assumption is false because there are 
no genuine terms at all.  On this latter view, all terms have some descriptive meaning or 
another.  However, McKinsey takes the semantic evidence of Kripke and Kaplan to show 
that this latter view is false.  Thus, McKinsey sees the Rusellian Relationalists as his toughest 
opponent.  McKinsey has a number of arguments against the Rusellian Relationalists which I 
do not have the space to give here (see McKinsey 1999 especially p519-36).  Even if such 
arguments are successful this would only secure McKinsey the result that genuine terms 
with descriptive linguistic meanings are theoretical possibilities.  McKinsey is still left with 
the question of whether there are cases of terms with descriptive linguistic meaning in real 
language.  In the absence of evidence for the existence of genuine terms with descriptive 
meanings in real public language, it might be thought that McKinsey’s view has no 
application to our use of cognitive predicates in real language.  In the absence of such 
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evidence, perhaps we ought to conclude that our public language contains only genuine 
terms with no descriptive meaning. 
 
McKinsey, however, suggests that there is sufficient evidence that genuine terms with 
descriptive meaning exist in the public language.  He says: 
 
"descriptive names do exist, and though they are statistically rare, they are, I think, 
theoretically important. The common feature of such names is that their referents 
(if any) are epistemically remote from all speakers in the same way, so that all 
speakers have to base their reference with the name upon the same narrow set of 
descriptive assumptions. One excellent example suggested by Kripke (1972, p. 
291) is the name 'Jack the Ripper', used to refer to whoever was the murderer of 
several prostitutes in 1890's London, but about whom nothing else is known. 
'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' also seem to be good examples, at least as used by 
the ancient Greeks, since everyone's access to these names' referent was then 
based solely on visual impressions of the planet in different locations at different 
times of day. (The English terms 'the Evening Star' and 'the 
Morning Star' may well be descriptive names that accurately translate the Greek 
names 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus', respectively.31) Other good candidates for 
descriptive names include names of deities like 'Zeus' and 'God'; names of 
historically remote figures about whom little if anything is known, such as 
'Homer' and 'King Arthur'; and pseudonyms, including pen names, at least prior 
to revelation of the referents' "real" identities. 
 
It is of course always an empirical question as to whether or not a given name has 
a descriptive meaning in a language" (1999, p537). 
 
I think that McKinsey has put enough of a case here to suggest that while, many names in 
our language, have no descriptive meaning (which is partly due to Kripke’s (1972) Gödel-
Schmidt case), there are at least a small class of such names in real language which do also 
have descriptive linguistic meaning. 
 
§7 Conclusion 
 
I have briefly outlined McKinsey’s picture of the properties expressed by cognitive 
predicates.  A cognitive predicate of the form ‘S cs that $’ where $ is a simple sentence that 
may express a singular proposition p, can differ quite radically in the properties they 
express.  The question depends on what terms are contained in the simple sentence $.  If $ 
contains a referring genuine term with no descriptive meaning, then the predicate will 
express the property of S having a certain cognitive attitude toward a singular proposition.  
If $ contains a genuine term with linguistic descriptive meaning, then the referent (if any) 
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of the genuine term will drop out as irrelevant and the term will contribute its linguistic 
meaning to what is said by the cognitive predicate and the predicate will express a mental 
anaphoric property.  Are all such mental anaphoric properties logically narrow and 
individuating?  No.  It is possible that such properties are objectual in that they themselves 
contain referring genuine terms with no linguistic meaning.  However, some mental 
anaphoric properties are logically narrow and do individuate the cognitive states they 
describe.  I discuss these cases in more detail in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 9 
 
With the cognitive predicate assumption rejected, how can we have thoughts (or other 
cognitive attitudes) about objects?  How can we have thoughts about natural kinds?  In 
particular, if the only mental states we have privileged access to consist of logically narrow, 
private and internal states, then how can such states be about public and external 
contingently existing ordinary physical objects?  There are also other separate questions: 
How can we have thoughts which might be expressed using terms which have descriptive 
meaning in the public language, thoughts involving the term ‘Jack the Ripper’ or ‘Santa 
Claus’ for instance?  What happens when we are in error in some sense?  In this chapter I 
shall briefly sketch some of McKinsey’s answers to these questions, which, I, myself, shall 
also be endorsing. 
 
In §1, I briefly review some of the various kinds of mental anaphoric properties which can 
be expressed by certain de dicto structured cognitive predicates.  Some of these properties 
are logically narrow and some of them are logically wide.  I show how it is only the logically 
narrow properties which individuate our mental states.  I also show how the logically wide 
mental anaphoric properties are themselves susceptible to an amended version of 
Traditional McKinsey Reasoning.  In §2 I show how one can have (logically narrow) mental 
states individuated by mental anaphoric properties which are about natural kinds.  In §3 I 
show how one can have (logically narrow) mental states individuated by mental anaphoric 
properties which are about ordinary contingently existing physical objects.  In §4 I try to 
briefly outline cases of a subject possessing (logically narrow) mental states individuated by 
mental anaphoric properties that do not succeed in picking out a single object or single 
kind.  In §5 I briefly defend the view of thoughts about objects and kinds sketched in the 
earlier sections against two prominent objections.  §6 concludes. 
 
§1 Mental anaphoric properties 
 
In the last section, I sketched McKinsey’s suggestion that de dicto structured cognitive 
predicates containing genuine terms with descriptive meaning express certain mental 
anaphoric properties.  For example the de dicto structured cognitive predicate ‘S believes 
that Hesperus appears in the evening’ expresses the following mental anaphoric property: 
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(MA1) S assumes that just one heavenly body is brightest on the western horizon in 
the evening, and he believes that it (that very heavenly body) appears in the 
evening. 
 
This particular mental anaphoric property is logically narrow in the sense that it does not 
logically imply the existence of ordinary contingently existing physical objects.  However, 
the descriptive assumption succeeds in picking out the ordinary contingently existing 
physical object Venus.  So, the particular mental anaphoric property (MA1) being logically 
narrow individuates S’s cognitive state and still succeeds in being about the ordinary 
contingently existing physical object Venus. 
 
However, matters become tricky when we deal with de dicto structured cognitive 
predicates containing a kind term such as ‘water’.  McKinsey, and myself, would claim that 
such terms do have descriptive linguistic meaning in the public language.  However, these 
descriptive linguistic meanings are objectual, in the sense they logically imply the existence of 
a contingently existing physical object.  For example, the de dicto structured cognitive 
predicate ‘S thinks that water is wet’ might have one of the following two objectual 
linguistic meanings: 
 
(DF3) x is water iff x is the colourless, odourless thirst-quenching liquid of the kind that is 
found on Earth. 
 
(DF4) For any ø, if ø is a token of 'is water', then for any property P, ø is to predicate P if 
and only if: there is a natural kind K such that in the actual world, the colourless, odourless, 
thirst-quenching liquid that we have experienced belongs to K, and P = the property of 
belonging to K. 
 
Corresponding to these objectual descriptive linguistic meanings, we might say that the de 
dicto structured cognitive predicate ‘S thinks that water is wet’ expresses one of the 
following two mental anaphoric properties: 
 
(MA3) S assumes that there is just one kind that the colourless, odourless thirst-
quenching liquid of the kind that is found on Earth belongs and S thinks that all 
stuff belonging to that kind is wet. 
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(MA4) S assumes that there is just one natural kind to which liquid that is 
colourless, odourless, thirst-quenching liquid and that we have experienced 
belongs, and S thinks that all stuff belonging to that kind is wet. 
 
Do these properties individuate S’s mental state?  No.  They are logically wide properties.  
Property (MA3) is semantically de re with respect to the planet Earth.  Property (MA4) is 
semantically de re with respect to the group referred to by the pronoun ‘we’.  That is to say 
in the respective properties the terms ‘Earth’ and ‘we’ are functioning as genuine terms 
(which do not, themselves, have context-independent linguistic meanings) whose sole 
function is to introduce their referent into the property in question. 
 
We could set up an amended versioning of Traditional McKinsey Reasoning to show this.  We 
just need to cite that the de dicto structured cognitive predicate ‘S thinks that water is wet’ 
expresses the (logically wide) property (MA3). 
 
The relevant instance of SE which we need to use is one which says:  The de dicto 
structured cognitive predicate ‘S thinks that water is wet’ expresses the property (MA3) 
and this property is logically wide because it is semantically de re with respect to the planet 
Earth. 
 
§2 Logically Narrow thoughts about kind terms 
 
So the question remains: how can a subject have thoughts about natural kind terms 
especially when de dicto structured cognitive predicates containing such natural kind terms 
are logically wide?    In order to recover an individuating property from the properties 
(MA3) and (MA4) we need to characterise the way in which the subject thinks of the 
object which features in the kind term’s (objectual) linguistic meaning; doing that yields yet 
another mental anaphoric property which is logically narrow (and individuating).  The 
following examples, corresponding to (MA3) and (MA4) would seem to do the trick: 
 
(MA3*)  S assumes that there is just one planet that he inhabits and S assumes that 
there is just one kind that the colourless, odourless thirst-quenching liquid of the 
kind that is found on that planet belongs and S thinks that all stuff belonging to 
that kind is wet. 
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(MA4*)  S assumes that there is just one group consisting of himself and all who 
bear R to him and S assumes that there is just one natural kind to which liquid that 
is colourless, odourless, thirst-quenching liquid and experienced by that group 
belongs, and S thinks that all stuff belonging to that kind is wet. 
 
The properties (MA3*) and (MA4*) are logically narrow in the sense that they do not 
logically imply the existence of ordinary contingently existing physical objects.  Moreover, 
(MA3*) and (MA4*) would succeed in picking out the natural kind term ‘water’. 
 
§3 Logically Narrow thoughts about objects 
 
How can a subject have private and internal logically narrow cognitive attitudes about 
public and external contingently existing physical objects?  In short, McKinsey’s answer to 
this question, which I endorse, is one has such thoughts in virtue of possessing certain 
individuating mental anaphoric properties which use descriptive assumptions to pick out 
the object in question.  McKinsey is restricting his model to our having thoughts about 
unsighted objects.  McKinsey is more coy about what goes on when we have thoughts 
about sighted objects.  About the latter case he merely says: 
 
“Now there could be another, weaker, sort of causal view of thought about 
objects on which some particular sort of causal relation, while not a necessary 
condition of mental reference, at least provides one way, among others, of 
thinking about physical objects. One obvious candidate for such a causal relation 
is the particular sort that is involved in perception, and I would not deny that in 
such cases, causation plays a role in determining mental reference. But most causal 
theorists have also believed that even thoughts about objects of which the thinker 
is not perceptually aware are often determined to be about those objects by virtue 
of some special causal relation. So again, perhaps such a causal relation could 
provide one way (among others) of thinking about objects of which the thinker is 
neither directly nor perceptually aware.” (ms1, p8). 
 
In what follows, I shall follow McKinsey’s assumption and assume that we are dealing with 
thoughts about unsighted objects. 
 
However, if this is McKinsey’s view, we have a prima facie problem. Doesn’t Kripke’s 
Gödel-Schmidt case tell us that that a subject’s use of many proper names can succeed in 
referring to an object even when the object being referred to satisfies none of the 
descriptions in the public language commonly associated with it?  The answer to this 
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problem is that the subject must use a non-common private and internal first-personal description to 
refer to the object and not a common description in the public language. 
 
In order to illustrate this point it is important to distinguish between two interpretations of 
Kripke’s Gödel-Schmidt case.  There is the minimal interpretation (which I outlined in 
Chapter 1 and shall call the minimal interpretation) but there is also a more ambitious and far 
reaching interpretation of the case too (what I shall the extended interpretation). 
 
The minimal interpretation claims this:  Practically the only thing many people have heard 
about the logician Kurt Gödel is that he discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic. But 
people's uses of the name 'Gödel' would still refer to Gödel even if it had not been Gödel 
but an unknown Viennese high school teacher named 'Schmidt' who actually discovered 
incompleteness. Since a similar point can be made regarding all the other achievements for 
which Gödel is famous, it is clear that the referent of the name 'Gödel' is not determined 
by any description, like 'the discoverer of incompleteness', that might be commonly associated 
with the name. But then surely, the name 'Gödel' has no descriptive meaning in any public 
language since if it did, there would be a commonly associated description that determines 
its referent.  Thus, the referent of the name 'Gödel' is completely exhausted by the 
contingently existing man - Gödel.  Thus, the property expressed by the de dicto structured 
cognitive predicate ‘Laura thinks that Gödel is cute’ is logically wide in the sense that it 
logically implies the existence of a contingently existing physical object distinct from the 
thinker - Laura – the object in question is the contingently existing man Gödel. 
 
The extended interpretation, on the other hand, claims what the minimal interpretation does and 
also claims that there is no description whatsoever that succeeds in uniquely picking out the 
contingently existing man Gödel.  What might motivate the extended interpretation is the 
assumption of CPA.  Given the assumption of CPA, then the logically wide property 
expressed by the de dicto structured cognitive predicate such as ‘S thinks that Gödel is 
cute’ will also be an individuating property. 
 
There are arguments against the extended interpretation.  These arguments suggest that in 
the Godel-Schmidt case a speaker or thinker could have some non-common private and 
internal description which succeds in uniquely picking out Gödel.  For example, a speaker 
might use the following private and internal description to pick out Gödel: 
 
The man to whom I’ve heard others refer to as ‘Gödel’. 
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Note that the use of the term ‘I’ in the property man to whom I’ve heard others refer to 
as ‘Gödel’makes the description private and internal to the speaker or thinker who uses 
that description.  Note that the description in question is not using a description that is 
solely constructed out of terms in the public language. 
 
Corresponding to this private and internal description one can construct a logically narrow 
mental anaphoric property like this: 
 
(MA5) S assumes that there is exactly one man to whom he, himself, has heard 
others refer to as ‘Godel’ and S thinks that he (that very man) is cute. 
 
(MA5) is logically narrow in that it does not logically imply the existence of ordinary 
contingently existing physical objects.  However, provided that the first personal 
descriptive assumption uniquely picks out Gödel, S will succeed in having a thought that is 
of or about Gödel. 
 
More generally, McKinsey defends the following model of a speaker having thoughts that 
are of or about objects: 
 
“Necessarily, for any person x, object y, and property G, if there is a property F such that 
(i) y = the F, and (ii) x assumes that there is just one F, and x cs that it (that very F) is 
G, then x cs of or about y that y is G.” (ms1, p13). 
 
 
§4 Descriptive names and error 
 
McKinsey allows that there are examples of descriptive names in real language which do 
not contain an objectual element.  Cognitive predicates involving such terms, typically, 
express logically narrow mental anaphoric properties which individuate with respect to the 
cognitive state they describe. 
 
For example, consider the cognitive predicate ‘Laura thinks that Jack the Ripper is cute’ 
where the name ‘Jack the Ripper’ is functioning as a descriptive name and may not have a 
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referent.  Here ‘Jack the Ripper’ may have the following descriptive meaning in the public 
language: 
 
(DfJTR)  x is Jack the Ripper iff x is the murderer of several prostitutes in 1890's London 
 
Corresponding to the above descriptive linguistic meaning we can say the following mental 
anaphoric property is expressed by the cognitive predicate ‘Laura thinks that Jack the 
ripper is cute’: 
 
(MAJTR)  Laura assumes that exactly one man is the murderer of several 
prostitutes in 1890's London and Laura thinks that he (that very man) is cute. 
 
This property is logically narrow and individuates Laura’s thought.  Note, however, that 
since ‘Jack the Ripper’ may have no referent, then its occurrence in simple non-cognitive 
sentences such as ‘Jack the Ripper is a murderer’ may result in those sentences expressing 
no proposition.  However, in cognitive predicates the referent, if any, of ‘Jack the ripper’ 
drops out as irrelevant and the term contributes only its descriptive linguistic meaning to 
what is said by the predicate; and the predicate, thus, expresses a mental anaphoric property 
corresponding to this descriptive meaning. 
 
Consider a situation like “Dry-Earth” which is identical to Earth except that a subject, S, 
and his speech community all have a mass perceptual illusion of a substance which has the 
macroscopic properties of water when there is in fact no such substance.  In such a 
situation a simple non-cognitve sentence such as ‘water is wet’ expresses no proposition 
because water is a genuine term with no referent.  However, in the cognitive predicate ‘S 
thinks that water is wet’ the referent, if any, of ‘water’ drops out as irrelevant to what is said 
and ‘water’ contributes its objectual linguistic meaning.  Corresponding to that objectual 
linguistic meaning, the predicate expresses a (logically wide) and non-individuating cognitive 
property such as: 
 
(MA3`) S assumes that there is just one kind that the colourless, odourless thirst-
quenching liquid of the kind that is found on Dry-Earth belongs and S thinks that 
all stuff belonging to that kind is wet. 
 
Property (MA3`) is semantically de re with respect to the contingently existing physical 
planet Dry-Earth.  However, S’s mental state can still be individuated by another logically 
166 
narrow property which characterises the subject’s way of thinking of the planet that 
features in (MA3`), for example: 
 
(MA3*`)  S assumes that there is just one planet that he inhabits and S assumes that 
there is just one kind that the colourless, odourless thirst-quenching liquid of the 
kind that is found on that planet belongs and S thinks that all stuff belonging to 
that kind is wet. 
 
Note that in (MA3*`),  S will not have a cognitive attitude towards a proposition, since the 
sentence ‘water is wet’ expresses no proposition on Dry Earth due to the term ‘water’ 
having no propositional meaning on Dry-Earth.  However, S still has a logically narrow 
cognitive attitude (which does not essentially involve a proposition) in these circumstances. 
 
There are also cases where a subject might make a certain descriptive assumption which 
fails to pick out a single object or kind.  For example, it may be that in the Gödel example 
in the last section, perhaps there are in fact two different men to whom others refer using 
the name ‘Gödel’.  Consequently, the first personal description in question does not pick 
out exactly one man but instead picks out two different men.  Recall, the first personal 
description in question was: 
 
The man to whom I’ve heard others refer to as ‘Gödel’. 
 
The mental anaphoric property corresponding to this was: 
 
(MA5) S assumes that there is exactly one man to whom he, himself, has heard 
others refer to as ‘Godel’ and S thinks that he (that very man) is cute. 
 
Now, in such circumstances the mental anaphoric property (MA5) will still be true of the 
thinker and will still individuate the thinker’s mental state but the mental state in question 
will not a cognitive state that is of or about an object. 
 
In these cases, the subject’s first personal descriptive assumption is false.  However, it is 
not false that the subject makes such an assumption and possesses a mental state consisting 
of a complex cognitive attitude partly composed of that first person descriptive assumption 
and cognitive attitude.  In such cases the subject does not have a cognitive attitude about an 
object nor does the subject have a cognitive attitude towards a proposition but the subject, 
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nonetheless, has a cognitive attitude characterised by a logically narrow mental anaphoric 
property which individuates her mental state. 
 
The last few cases of error also have analogues in the cases of kind terms.  Suppose for 
example, a subject uses a first personal descriptive assumption to pick out the substance 
water but in fact fails to do so.  For example suppose that S takes the definition of water to 
be: 
 
(DFError) x is water iff x is the thirst-quenching liquid of the kind that is found on Earth. 
 
Now, (DFError) may end up picking out several natural and non-natural kinds such as 
water, alcohol, ethanol and so on.  But (DFError) can still result in logically narrow 
properties which individuate with respect to a thinkers cognitive states.  For example, given 
a thinker is using (DFError), she may end up possessing the following (logically narrow) 
mental anaphoric property: 
 
(MAError)  S assumes that there is just one planet that he inhabits and S assumes 
that there is just one kind that the thirst-quenching liquid of the kind that is found 
on that planet belongs and S thinks that all stuff belonging to that kind is wet. 
 
The mental anaphoric property fails to pick out the substance water or the kind water but, 
nonetheless it is still a logically narrow property that individuates S’s cognitive state.  
However, we wouldn’t call S’s cognitive state, in this case, a thought that is about the substance 
water or a thought that is about the kind water; nor would we say S has a cognitive attitude 
towards a proposition in such a case.  But, for all that, the S is still in a mental state 
individuated by (MAError). 
 
§5 Objections to the McKinsey Account 
 
I can spot at least two prominent objections to McKinsey’s account of individuating our 
thoughts using logically narrow mental anaphoric properties.  The first objection to utilises 
a crude reading of Burge’s ‘arthritis’ thought experiment.  The second objection utilises a 
strong interpretation of the semantic evidence adduced by Kripke and Putnam regarding 
terms and their meanings. 
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A crude moral to draw from Burge’s ‘arthritis’ thought experiment is that cognitive 
properties expressed by de dicto structured cognitive predicates containing general terms 
such as ‘arthritis’, ‘sofa’, ‘brisket’ and so on logically imply the existence of a speech and 
linguistic community that is external to the subject of whom the thought is attributed.  For 
example, on this interpretation the cognitive property expressed by the predicate ‘Oscar 
believes that arthritis is painful’ logically implies the existence of a speech community of 
other human beings external to Oscar. Similarly, on this crude reading of the experiment, 
the property expressed by a de dicto structured cognitive predicate such as ‘S believes that 
Hesperus appears in the evening’ will logically imply the existence of a speech community; 
and this result will occur whether or not the property expresses is a mental anaphoric 
property.  The thought continues, that since many general terms are susceptible to this 
interpretation of Burge’s thought experiment, then there just won’t be enough terms in the 
public language which can be used to construct mental anaphoric properties that are 
logically narrow. 
 
This objection trades on a crude reading of Burge’s thought experiment.  Firstly, it is not 
clear cut that a cognitive predicate such as ‘Oscar believes that arthritis is painful’ is 
structurally de dicto (see Chapter 2 and McKinsey 1993).  Secondly, even if the cognitive 
predicate is de dicto, the strongest moral that can be drawn from Burge’s thought 
experiment is that it shows that the qualified cognitive predicate ‘Oscar believes that 
arthritis is painful and Oscar has an incomplete grasp of the meaning of the word ‘arthritis’’ 
expresses a cognitive property that logically implies the existence of a speech community.  
Similarly, this moral applied to cases of Hesperus-thoughts shows only that a qualified 
cognitive predicate involving the term ‘Hesperus’ expresses a property that logically implies 
the existence of a speech community.  Such a qualified cognitive predicate might be, for 
example, ‘S thinks that Hesperus appears in the evening and S has an incomplete grasp of 
the meanings of the words ‘water’ and ‘appears in the evening’’. 
 
Moreover, all we need to do to avoid these qualified cognitive predicates which express 
logically wide properties would be to simply qualify the de dicto structured cognitive 
predicates that we are considering.  For example, we simply have to specify that we are 
working with the qualified de dicto structured cognitive predicate ‘S thinks that Hesperus 
appears in the evening and S has a complete grasp of the meanings of the words ‘water’ 
and ‘appears in the evening’’. 
 
The second objection to McKinsey’s account is outlined by this argument: 
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Objection II 
(OII- 1) A correct account of every general term’s meaning must be given by a causal theory, 
according to which the term’s meaning is determined by a speaker or thinkers causal relations 
to ordinary contingently existing physical objects. [claim] 
 
(OII-2) All mental anaphoric properties contain at least one general term. [claim] 
 
Therefore, 
 
(OII-3) All mental anaphoric properties are ultimately determined by the thinker’s causal 
relations to ordinary contingently existing physical objects [ from OII-1 and OII-2]. 
 
The thought behind the claim (OII-1) of the objection is that Putnam (1975) and Kripke’s 
(1972) account of proper names and natural kind terms shows that the meaning of these 
kinds of words must be given by a causal theory of some sort.  And, one can infer, from 
the Putnam-Kripke result that the meanings of all words are determined by a causal theory.  
Consequently, the meanings of all words are determined by a causal relation to ordinary 
contingently existing physical objects (see Devitt (1981) and Stalnaker (1984)). 
 
However, the thought behind the claim (OII-1) is dubious.  There is work that disputes the 
result of the Kripke-Putnam account shows that the account of proper names and natural 
kind terms shows that the meaning of these kinds of words must be given by a causal 
theory of some sort (see McKinsey 1978a, 1978b, 1981, 1983, 1984, 1987, 1991b).  
Moreover, even if the Putnam-Kripke showed that the correct account of proper names 
and natural kind terms shows that the meaning of these kinds of words must be given by a 
causal theory of some sort, it does not show that the meanings of all words must be 
accounted for in this way.  Perhaps the objection could be patched up by making an appeal 
to Burge’s account of general terms but I have suggested in my comments earlier in this 
section that such an appeal would be ineffective. 
 
§6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have sketched McKinsey’s picture of how a subject has cognitive attitudes 
that are about kinds or objects.  A subject has such cognitive attitudes in virtue of certain 
logically narrow mental anaphoric properties individuating the subject’s mental states.  The 
logically narrow states succeed in being about public and external objects and kinds, even 
though they themselves are private and internal to the thinker, because they use private and 
internal first person descriptive assumptions to pick out these objects and kinds.  I have 
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also sketched a picture of the kind of cognitive states a subject might possesses when her 
private first personal descriptive assumptions fail to pick out a single object or kind. 
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Chapter 10 
 
In this chapter I want to suggest how a proper understanding of “McKinsey Reasoning” 
and McKinsey’s positive picture of thoughts about kind terms and objects might have an 
important impact on two other recent paradoxes concerning issues in epistemology and 
philosophy of mind.  
 
The first problem is the so-called Achievement Problem for privileged access.  Roughly, the 
problem is to account for how we can know our thoughts in a special first-personal and, 
broadly, non-empirical manner when those very thoughts are partly determined by ordinary 
contingently existing physical objects in the thinker’s external environment.  I have briefly, 
outlined this problem in Chapter 2 and will return to it here.  In brief, my response is that 
in order to set up the Achievement Problem, we must assume CPA.  However, since Traditional 
McKinsey Reasoning and McKinsey’s positive picture of the cognitive attitudes suggest that 
we ought to give up CPA, we can deny one of the assumptions required to set up the 
problem.  Moreover, using McKinsey’s positive picture of the cognitive attitudes, I show 
how we can have thoughts about natural kinds without those thoughts being determined by 
ordinary contingently existing physical objects or kinds.  On McKinsey’s picture of the 
cognitive attitudes we can enjoy a very strong form of privileged access to our cognitive 
attitude states in the form of PAI. 
 
The second paradox is one given by Kallestrup & Pritchard.  They argue that one cannot 
endorse the conjunction of the following three claims: 
 
(EIK) A necessary condition on S’s knowledge that p is that all epistemic factors relevant to S’s 
knowledge (as opposed to merely true belief) that p are reflectively accessible to S. 
 
Content Externalism (CE) 
The contents of an subjects’, S’s, mental states fail to supervene upon S’s intrinsic physical 
properties. 
 
(K-thoughts) S can know that she thinks that p in some way or another. 
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My response to Kallestrup & Pritchard’s argument is that it tacitly assumes but does not 
explicitly state CPA; and, since I think we have good reason to reject CPA, I think we can 
see the problem posed by Kallestrup & Pritchard which allows that (a) we can have strong 
a priori knowledge of our mental states that are about ordinary contingent objects and 
kinds, (b) retain externalism in the form of SE about de dicto structured cognitive 
predicates and still hold onto (K-thoughts) and perhaps (EIK) at least for some of our 
knowledge. 
 
§1 The Achievement Problem 
 
A number of commentators on “McKinsey Reasoning” also sometimes comment on a 
separate argument which they call the Achievement Problem.  A rough outline of the 
problem looks like this: 
 
Achievement Reasoning Template 
 
(ART1) If S can know a priori that she is thinking that p, then S can distinguish a priori between 
the actual situation in which she thinks that p and a relevant alternative situation in which she 
lacks the thought that p [claim] 
 
(ART2) There are situations in which S lacks the thought that p which S cannot a priori 
distinguish from the actual situation in which she possesses the thought [claim]. 
 
(ART3) At least some of the situations in which in which S lacks the thought that p which S 
cannot a priori distinguish from the actual situation in which she possesses the thought are 
relevant alternative situations to the actual situation [claim] 
 
Therefore, 
 
(ART4) S cannot know a priori that she thinks that p [from ART1, ART2 and ART3]. 
 
The term “a priori” in scare quotes is to be clarified in a moment. 
 
§1.1 Common views on the relationship between the Achievement 
Problem and McKinsey Reasoning 
 
Some commentators, typically, see the Achievement Problem as being fundamentally more 
important than what they take to be “McKinsey Reasoning”.  Specifically, they think that a 
requirement on being able to correctly cite “McKinsey Reasoning” requires the 
Achievement Problem to be solved in a certain way (see for example Sawyer 1998, 1999; 
Brown 2004; Davies 2000, 1998).  Specifically, they think that if the Achievement Reasoning 
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Template is sound, then no subject can know the contents of her thoughts in an “a priori” 
manner.  But, then, continues the thought, we do not have one of the required premises to 
set up “McKinsey Reasoning”.  They think that the Achievement Reasoning Template, if sound, 
will have shown that the following claim is false whatever the interpretation of “a priori”: 
 
S can know “a priori” that she thinks that p 
 
And, they also think that a claim like S can know “a priori” that she thinks that p 
will be required to set up “McKinsey Reasoning”. 
 
In order to make sense of these commentators views they must take “McKinsey 
Reasoning” to be something like the B-B Reasoning.  
 
Clearly, the thesis W-PAC of that reasoning requires that a subject can know “a priori” 
(weakly a priori, in fact) that she thinks a certain thought.  However, if the Achievement 
Problem Argument is sound, then the claim that a subject can know “a priori” that she thinks 
a certain thought will always be false and the B-B Reasoning can never get started. 
 
Now, if these commentators are correct, then in order for the B-B Reasoning to present us 
with a genuine problem where the claim that a subject can know “a priori” that she thinks a 
certain thought has at least has some plausibility and is not obviously false, we need to 
show how the Achievement Reasoning Template is unsound in such a way that does not render 
the claims of the B-B Argument false or implausible.  The road these commentators tend to 
go down to achieve this result is to endorse what I shall call epistemic solutions to the 
Achievement Problem (see Flavey & Owens (1994); Farkas (2008)).  An epistemic solution to 
the problem, in effect, disputes the requirements on “a priori” knowledge of thought used 
to set up the problem.  In effect it denies the claim AR1. 
 
So, to summarise, we have two commonly held views about the Achievement Problem: 
 
View 1 
The Achievement Problem is “prior to” or “more basic” than “McKinsey Reasoning” in the sense 
that a certain solution for the Achievement Problem is required in order for “McKinsey 
Reasoning” to be plausible. 
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View 2 
The Achievement Problem requires an epistemic solution in order for “McKinsey Reasoning” to 
have some plausibility. 
 
I shall challenge View 1.  In fact, I shall argue that “McKinsey Reasoning” is in fact more 
fundamental than the Achievement Problem or prior to the Achievement Problem.  I shall 
argue for this claim by showing how the rejection of CPA and the positive picture of the 
cognitive attitudes developed by McKinsey resolves the Achievement Problem Argument 
by denying its (ART2). 
 
I deny the (ART2) because while I agree that many de dicto structured cognitive predicates 
express properties that are logically wide, my rejection of CPA does not force me to claim 
that these properties individuate mental states.  Thus, I am not forced to claim such mental 
states are logically wide.  Instead, using McKinsey’s positive picture of the cognitive 
attitudes, I shall show how one can have (logically narrow) thoughts about natural kinds 
like water without those thoughts being determined by ordinary contingently existing 
physical objects or kinds. 
 
§1.1 My response to the Achievement Problem Argument 
 
Firstly, we need to look at the various scenarios that are sometimes used to generate the 
Achievement Problem.  These scenarios usually involve us imagining distant planets in the 
actual world which are identical to planet Earth except for the fact that water does not exist 
on these planets.  Rather, on one of these planets, Twin-Earth, a substance called XYZ 
exists which has macroscopic properties that are indistinguishable from water and is found 
in all the lakes and rivers of Twin Earth.  However, substance XYZ has an entirely 
different chemical structure to water, while water has the chemical structure H2O, 
substance XYZ is composed of the chemicals XYZ.  The Achievement problem asks us to 
imagine a subject who, is unwittingly transported between the two worlds. 
 
Now we have a dilemma about how to interpret the term “a priori” in the Achievement 
Problem Argument Premises.  Some commentators have weak a priori knowledge in mind, 
which allows that a subject can make empirical assumptions in coming to know that she 
thinks that p even though her acquisition of that knowledge did not use perceptual 
observation or empirical investigation. 
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But if weak a priori knowledge allows a subject to make empirical assumptions, then why 
can’t that subject just make the (empirical) assumption that she is not being switched 
between Earth and Twin-Earth?  It might be replied that, even given this use of “weak a 
priori” a subject still requires adequate a priori discriminative abilities so that she could tell 
whether or not she was on Earth or Dry-Earth, and this is what claim (ART1) of the 
Achievement Reasoning Template is demanding.  On the other hand, the sense of “a priori” 
used by the Achievement Reasoning Template might be a strong sense of a priori resulting in its 
not being possible to make any empirical assumptions in her acquisition of her knowledge 
that she is thinking that p. 
 
However, I think that other details of the travelling case story need to be unpicked; and 
once they are unpicked they will clearly show that CPA has been used. 
 
If one is claiming that one thinks that water is wet on Earth but, after spending a sufficient 
time on Dry Earth, thinks that twater is wet, then one is claiming that certain logically wide 
properties are individuating.  For example, one is claiming that the logically wide property S 
thinks that water is wet is individuating. 
 
Now since the Achievement Problem tacitly uses CPA, then it cannot be a more 
fundamental argument than “McKinsey Reasoning” if we interpret “McKinsey Reasoning” 
as Traditional McKinsey Reasoning.  This is because Traditional McKinsey Reasoning challenges the 
view that one can assume the conjunction of PAI, SE and CPA.  Moreover, given that I 
have argued that CPA and SE are plausible, given Traditional McKinsey Reasoning, we are 
forced to give up CPA.  So I would suggest that in order to get the Achievement Problem 
started by moving from the claim that properties expressed by de dicto structured cognitive 
predicates containing kind terms are logically wide to the claim that such properties 
individuate with respect to the cognitive state described, one must assume CPA.  But if one 
is going to assume CPA, then it must be explained, why in the face of Traditional McKinsey 
Reasoning and the support for PAI and SE, such an assumption is legitimate.  As far as I can 
see, no commentators or proponents of the Achievement Problem have ever done this. 
 
Cast your mind back to View 1.  It said: 
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View 1 
The Achievement Problem is “prior to” or “more basic” than “McKinsey Reasoning” in the sense 
that a certain solution for the Achievement Problem is required in order for “McKinsey 
Reasoning” to be plausible. 
 
I have challenged View 1 by interpreting “McKinsey Reasoning” as Traditional McKinsey 
Reasoning.  However, were we to interpret “McKinsey Reasoning” as B-B Reasoning, then 
the claim may have some plausibility.  This is because B-B Reasoning itself tacitly assumes 
CPA.  With CPA tacitly assumed and never questioned, it may well be that one needs to 
resolve the Achievement Problem in a certain way before one can even get the B-B 
Reasoning started. 
 
Also recall View 2.  It said: 
 
View 2 
The Achievement Problem requires an epistemic solution in order for “McKinsey Reasoning” to 
have some plausibility. 
 
As I reject the claim CPA in the Achievement Problem Argument, I do not also need to 
challenge the other premise ART1.  One does not need to challenge the epistemic claim 
ART1 in order to avoid the Achievement Problem.  However, given I also endorse a strong thesis 
about the a priori knowability of the properties that individuate mental states in the form of 
PAI, it may well indirectly commit me claiming ART1 anyway.  
 
§2 Kallestrup & Pritchard Paradox 
 
Kallestrup and Pritchard (hereafter K&P) claim to have devised an argument to show that 
the following three claims are incompatible: 
 
(EIK) A necessary condition on S’s knowledge that p is that all epistemic factors relevant to S’s 
knowledge (as opposed to merely true belief) that p are reflectively accessible to S. 
 
Content Externalism (CE) 
The contents of an subjects’, S’s, mental states fail to supervene upon S’s intrinsic physical 
properties. 
 
(K-thoughts) S can know that she thinks that p in some way or another. 
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They say: 
“Pick your favourite example of a wide content concept. We shall use ‘water’ but 
any will do. Now consider an agent’s putative knowledge that she has a mental 
state with the content water is wet. Given [Content Externalism], if an agent has a 
mental state with this content, then it must be true that she is not a brain-in-a-vat 
who has never had any experience – either directly or indirectly – of water (a 
BIV*). After all, were she a BIV*, then she would have a thought with a different 
content altogether.” (2004, p350). 
 
It is clear the “Content Externalism” that K&P have in mind is not what I have called 
Semantic Externalism (SE) – that is an externalism about the properties expressed by de dicto 
structured cognitive predicates.  Rather, their “Content Externalism” is directed at the level of 
the metaphysical nature of a subject’s mental state.  Additionally, their externalism does not seem 
to be too concerned about there being a logical implication between the property expressed by 
the de dicto structured cognitive predicate (or mental state) in question and ordinary 
contingently existing physical objects.  In order to see what they do have in mind by 
“externalism” it is worth quoting their discussion of the topic at length: 
 
“Content Externalism (CE) 
The contents of an agent’s, a’s, mental states fail to supervene upon a’s intrinsic 
physical properties. 
 
We take CE to be supported by the standard ‘Twin Earth’ arguments.  If an 
agent’s mental contents did always supervene upon her intrinsic properties, then 
she would share mental contents with her doppelganger on twin-earth.  But the 
Twin-Earth arguments purport to show that such internal physical duplicates 
might have different mental properties – i.e. that different de dicto belief 
ascriptions might be true of these agents.  Accordingly, the issue of what mental 
content an agent entertains need not be solely decided by that agent’s intrinsic 
physical constitution..  Instead it may also depend upon which physical or social 
environment the agent is embedded in” (2004, p346). 
 
I agree that some so-called “Twin-Earth arguments” may result in different de dicto 
ascriptions of agents that are “internally the same” in some sense and, in my view, such 
ascriptions will express different cognitive properties.  However, I disagree that such 
cognitive properties individuate the cognitive state they describe.  Consequently, I disagree 
that the metaphysical nature of the cognitive states of two agents who are “internally the 
same” will be different.  So, what makes K&P so certain that such properties do 
individuate with respect to the metaphysical nature of mental states?  They do not say in 
the paper but one explanation is that they take every de dicto cognitive predicate to express 
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a property which individuates the cognitive state it describes.  That is to say, one 
explanation is that K&P assume CPA. 
 
I suspect the explanation as to why the certain properties expressed by s-wide de dicto 
structured cognitive predicates is that the inchoate notion of S-wideness sometimes picks 
out de dicto structured cognitive predicates that express logically wide properties. 
 
A quick summary of K&P’s argument which does not explicitly state its commitment to 
CPA is this: 
 
K&P Quick Argument 
(KP1) If S knows the content of her thought is that water is wet, then S must not be a 
BIV* [claim] 
 
Therefore, 
 
(KP1*) A relevant factor to S’s knowledge that she is thinking that water is wet is that S is not a 
BIV* [from KP1]. 
 
(KP2) If S knows the content of her thought that water is wet, then S must be able to reflectively 
determine that she is not a BIV* [claim]. 
 
But, 
(KP3) It is impossible to reflectively determine that one is not a BIV* [claim]. 
 
Therefore, 
 
(KP4) It is impossible for S to know the content of her thought that water is wet [from KP1*, 
KP2 and KP3]. 
 
As I understand it, he Kallestrup-Pritchard Argument works like this. Claim (KP2) is an 
instance of accepting the thesis (EIK) about knowledge of one’s thought that water is wet. 
Claim (KP1) results the “Content externalism” they endorse, they say: 
 
“Given CE, if an agent has a mental state with this content, then it must be true 
that she is not a brain-in-a-vat who has never had any experience – either directly 
or indirectly – of water (a BIV*). After all, were she a BIV*, then she would have 
a thought with a different content altogether.” (2004, p350). 
 
Claim (KP3) results from the nature of the BIV* hypothesis:  S could not subjectively 
distinguish the experiences he has from the experience he would have of occurently 
thinking the thought that water is wet. 
 
Expressed with the assumption of CPA explicitly stated K&P’s argument looks like this: 
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K&P Longer Argument 
(KP0) The property expressed by the de dicto structured cognitive predicate ‘S thinks that water 
is wet’ expresses the property S is thinking the proposition that water is wet and (a) this 
property individuates with respect to the cognitive state it describes and (b) this property is both 
logically wide and s-wide [claim] 
 
(KP1) If S knows that she possesses a mental state individuated by the property S is 
thinking the proposition that water is wet, then S must not be a BIV* [from KP0] 
 
Therefore, 
 
(KP1*) A relevant factor to S’s S knows that she possesses a mental state individuated by the 
property S is thinking the proposition that water is wet is that S is not a BIV* [from KP1]. 
 
(KP2) If S knows that she possesses a mental state individuated by the property S is 
thinking the proposition that water is wet, then S must be able to reflectively determine that 
she is not a BIV* [claim]. 
 
But, 
(KP3) It is impossible to reflectively determine that one is not a BIV* [claim]. 
 
Therefore, 
 
(KP4) It is impossible for S to know that she possesses a mental state individuated by the 
property S is thinking the proposition that water is wet [from KP1*, KP2 and KP3]. 
 
K&P Longer Argument emphasises the role that CPA and logical wideness plays in the 
derivation of claim (KP1).  Specifically, being a BIV* is a relevant factor to S’s knowledge 
that she possesses a mental state individuated by the property S is thinking the 
proposition that water is wet precisely because this property is logically wide and 
individuating.  Were the property not individuating, then perhaps S would share the same 
(logically) narrow mental states when she is on planet Earth and her thought happens to 
pick out water and when she is a BIV* and her thought picks out no object or substance.  
Similarly, were the property not logically wide but individuating, then perhaps it would be 
logically narrow ant the mental states it individuates would be the same whether S inhabits 
Earth or whether S is a BIV*. 
 
What this result shows is that the K&P argument really shows is that the claims (i) 
Epistemological Internalism (EIK), (ii) CPA, (iii) the logical wideness of the properties 
expressed by certain de dicto structured cognitive predicates (such as those containing the 
kind term ‘water’) and (iv) knowledge of the properties that individuate our mental states 
are jointly incompatible. 
 
Here, CPA is on our list of suspects and, with the weight of evidence I have presented 
against CPA in this thesis, I’d suggest that it is the sole culprit responsible for the problem 
that K&P raise. 
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Conclusion 
 
In Chapter 1 I have considered the following three claims: 
 
 Privileged Access to Individuating Factors (PAI) 
For any subject, S, if S possesses a given mental state , which is individuated by property F, 
S can know strongly a priori that she possesses F. 
 
Semantic Externalism (SE) 
Many de dicto structured cognitive predicates express properties that are logically wide (in the 
sense of logically implying the existence of contingently existing physical objects external to the 
thinker). 
 
Cognitive Predicate Assumption (CPA) 
Every de dicto structured cognitive predicate expresses a property that individuates with respect 
to the mental state it describes. 
 
Each claim has enjoyed some support in the history of philosophy.  The Cartesian 
predicament supports PAI.  Semantic evidence adduced by Kripke, Kaplan and perhaps 
others supports SE.  Frege (1892) and Russell’s (1912) work may have made CPA an 
entrenched assumption. 
 
In Chapter 1, I presented a form of argument, which I have called Traditional McKinsey 
Reasoning, which aims to show that the conjunction of these three claims results in a 
contradiction.  Traditional McKinsey Reasoning also uses instances of the following two 
auxiliary claims: 
 
Closure of the capacity for strong a priori knowledge across meta-logical implication (CA) 
For any subject S and any propositions p and q:  If S can know a priori that p and the 
proposition that p logically implies the proposition that q, then S can know a priori that q. 
 
Environmental Access 
For any subject , S, and any proposition that e, where e asserts the existence of contingently 
existing ordinary physical objects logically distinct from S, S cannot know strongly a priori that e. 
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I have defended those auxiliary claims in Chapters 4 and 5.  I, thus, conclude that 
Traditional McKinsey Reasoning has shown that the conjunction of CPA, SE and PAI results 
in an absurd conclusion. 
 
Moreover, I have suggested that both PAI and SE are plausible and have defended them 
from objections in Chapters 6 and 7.  In Chapter 8, I have suggested that CPA is false.  
Given the falsity of CPA, some cognitive predicates express properties that do individuate 
with respect to the cognitive state they describe, whereas other express properties that do 
not individuate.  The view I suggest in Chapter 8 is the properties that do individuate with 
respect to the cognitive state they describe are logically narrow properties.  However, this 
leaves me with a problem: How can private and internal mental states individuated by 
logically narrow properties be about ordinary contingently existing physical objects and 
kinds?  In Chapter 9, I addressed this issue by endorsing McKinsey’s view of the cognitive 
attitudes which uses an analogue of the semantic phenomenon of reference fixing by 
description.  In Chapter 10, I then showed how a rejection of CPA together with 
McKinsey’s view of the cognitive attitudes resists the so-called Achievement Problem and 
could shed interesting new light on a recent paradox by Kallestrup & Pritchard. 
 
A second theme running throughout the thesis has been that there has been another form 
of reasoning that is not Traditional McKinsey Reasoning but has often been labelled 
“McKinsey Reasoning”.  I have called this form of reasoning Boghossian-Brown Reasoning and 
have outlined this form of reasoning in Chapter 3.  I have suggested that Boghossian-Brown 
Reasoning seems to be concerned with showing that the conjunction of the following claims, 
or something similar to them, are incompatible: 
 
W-PAC 
For any subject , S, and any mental state individuated by the property S is thinking that p:  If S 
is thinking that p, then S can know weakly a priori that she thinks that p. 
 
S-Wide externalism 
In many cases, if a subject, S, possesses a thought that p, then S’s thought that p fails to 
weakly supervene upon the subject’s internal physical state. 
 
A priori knowability of S-Wideness Instances 
For any subject, S, and any mental state individuated by the property S is thinking that p or S 
thinks that p and such properties fail to weakly supervene upon a subject’s internal physical 
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state, and any proposition that e which asserts the existence of contingently existing ordinary 
physical objects: S can know “a priori” that if she thinks that p then e. 
 
Ambitious Environmental Access 
For any subject , S, and any proposition that e, where e asserts the existence of contingently 
existing ordinary physical objects logically distinct from S, S cannot know weakly a priori that e. 
 
A priori deduction principle 
{If S can know weakly a priori that p and S can know a priori that (if p, then q) and S can 
simultaneously believe both that p and that (if p, then q) and S can competently deduce q from 
this simultaneous belief}, then S can know weakly a priori that q. 
 
The basic idea of the Boghossian-Brown Reasoning seemed to be to argue that the claims  
A priori deduction principle, Ambitious Environmental Access, A priori knowability of S-Wideness 
Instances are all plausible, thus, leaving the culprits for the incompatibility S-wideness and 
W-PAC.  
 
In Chapter 4, I suggested that the considerations both for and against the Ambitious 
Environmental Access thesis are inconclusive.  In Chapter 5, I suggested that the case against 
claim A priori deduction principle is not completely conclusive. 
 
In Chapter 6, I suggested that the common explanations for W-PAC, tend to assume the 
CPA thesis; but since there are considerations against CPA, in my view, such explanations 
are inadequate.  Moreover, in Chapter 6, I also queried the philosophical basis for W-PAC:  
I suggested that such support cannot be from the Cartesian predicament because the 
notion of aprioricity that W-PAC is concerned with is simply too weak to capture that 
predicament. 
 
In Chapters 3 and 7, I suggested that interpreting the implication in the A priori knowability 
of S-Wideness Instances thesis as something weaker than logical fails to capture the position of 
a semantic externalist SE and is, in fact, consistent with the denial of SE.  However, if one 
is denying SE, one has to explain away the array of semantic evidence in SE’s favour and, 
so far as I can see, no commentator on the B-B Reasoning has attempted to do that.  
Moreover, in Chapter 7, I suggested that the case for the “a priori” knowability of A priori 
knowability of S-Wideness Instances thesis was flawed, given the semantics of many terms. 
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I would, thus, suggest that the various shortcomings of the claims that are the concern of 
the B-B Reasoning stem from an inability to have grasped the philosophical basis of the 
claims that are the concern of Traditional McKinsey Reasoning.  Once again, the philosophical 
basis of the problem is the Cartesian predicament supports PAI, semantic evidence from 
Kripke (1972) and Kaplan (1979) supports SE and the work of Frege (1892) and Russell 
(1912) supports CPA.  In particular, I’d suggest that the B-B Reasoning’s commentators tacit 
assumption, rather than explicit recognition, of CPA has provoked these shortcomings. 
 
What I have done is to put the ball back in the court of the commentators and proponents 
of the Boghossian-Brown Reasoning.  I have said to them: 
 
“Look the problem you are considering seems to tacitly, rather than explicitly assume CPA.  
A proper and thorough investigation of McKinsey’s work, together with some small 
emendations and presentational changes made by me, provides persuasive considerations 
against CPA.  So in light of this what are you going to do?” 
 
The commentators on the Boghossian-Brown Reasoning still have many options in responding.  
For example, perhaps, they’ll attack McKinsey’s positive picture of cognitive attitude states 
only being individuated by logically narrow properties which I have endorsed.  Or, for 
example, perhaps they’ll suggest that the McKinsey case for the claim that some words in 
our language have descriptive linguistic meanings isn’t strong enough.  But even if these 
attacks on the positive McKinsey picture are successful, these commentators still have 
McKinsey’s negative case against CPA to contend with.  That negative case against CPA is 
given by Traditional McKinsey Reasoning, it says that the conjunction of CPA, SE and PAI is 
untenable but there are persuasive considerations in favour of the latter two theses, so we 
must reject the former thesis.  I believe I have done enough in this thesis to defend 
Traditional McKinsey Reasoning.  However, whichever route the commentators on the 
Boghossian-Brown Reasoning choose, it is going to take them into the realms of some very 
different literature and very different arguments compared to the reasoning that they are 
currently commentating upon. 
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